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Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

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Military Affairs

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CONTENTS

15 June 1994

CIS/RUSSIAN MILITARY ISSUES

ARMED FORCES

| | |
|---|---|
| Yeltsin Calls for New Border Security Regime / <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 28 May</i> / | 1 |
| Lt-Gen Sokolov Arrives Gudauta / <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 28 May</i> / | 1 |
| New SSBN 'Kursk' Undergoing Trials / <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 28 May</i> / | 1 |
| Col-Gen Yakovlev Discusses Servicemen's Socio-Economic Complaints / <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 2 Jun</i> / | 1 |
| Servicemen's Welfare Group Says 25-30 Soldiers Die Daily / <i>INTERFAX 12 Jun</i> / | 4 |
| Lopatin Analyzes History, Results of Military Reductions / <i>NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA 26 May</i> / | 4 |

POLICY

| | |
|--|----|
| Political Postponement of Peacekeeping Exercise Possible / <i>SEGODNYA 2 Jun</i> / | 8 |
| Calls To Cut Military Funding Assailed / <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 8 Jun</i> / | 9 |
| Government Underfunding of Army Scored / <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 9 Jun</i> / | 10 |

STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

| | |
|--|----|
| START II Impact on Strategic Forces Viewed / <i>SEGODNYA 1 Jun</i> / | 12 |
| Army's Nuclear Monitoring Service Described / <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 9 Jun</i> / | 15 |

GROUND TROOPS

| | |
|---|----|
| Tunguska Air Defense System / <i>TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE 1994</i> / | 17 |
|---|----|

AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

| | |
|--|----|
| Free-Flight Aviation Rockets / <i>TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE 1994</i> / | 19 |
|--|----|

REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

| | |
|---|----|
| Disposal of Unused Garrison Facilities / <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 28 May</i> / | 20 |
| Servicemen's Social Protection Measures Not Working / <i>TRUD 9 Jun</i> / | 21 |

STATE AND LOCAL MILITARY FORCES

UKRAINE

| | |
|--|----|
| Leaders Convene Conference on Measures To Improve Discipline | 22 |
| Radetsky Stresses Impact on Force Readiness / <i>NARODNA ARMIYA 5 May</i> / | 22 |
| Kobzar Stresses Moral-Psychological Factors / <i>NARODNA ARMIYA 5 May</i> / | 25 |
| Leaders Attend Conference To Discuss Strengthening Discipline | 27 |
| Speakers, Problems, Goals Noted / <i>NARODNA ARMIYA 5 May</i> / | 27 |
| Rear Services Head Mikhaylichenko on Supply, Support Problems / <i>NARODNA ARMIYA 6 May</i> / | 29 |
| Officers Called Upon To Improve Staff Skills / <i>NARODNA ARMIYA 4 Jun</i> / | 32 |

CAUCASIAN STATES

| | | |
|--|------------------------------|----|
| RF Troops Serve as Armenia's Border Guards | [GOLOS ARMENII 7 Jun] | 33 |
| Forced Roundup of Conscripts Seen Harmful | [AZG 7 Apr] | 35 |
| Pilot Sentenced to Death in Nagorno-Karabakh | [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 28 May] | 35 |

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

| | | |
|--|-------------------------|----|
| Insurgent Supply Dumps Found in Tajikistan | [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 2 Jun] | 36 |
|--|-------------------------|----|

GENERAL ISSUES

ARMS TRADE

| | | |
|---|-------------------------------|----|
| U.S., Novosibirsk Share Conversion Tasks | [VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK 7 Jun] | 37 |
| 'Voyentekh' Director Funtikov Interviewed | [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 28 May] | 37 |
| Sweden's Selection of Leopard-2 Tank Over T-80 Examined | [NARODNA ARMIYA 18 May] | 39 |

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

| | | |
|--|---------------------------|----|
| Duma's Sulakshin on Impact of Defense Cuts on Industry | [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 28 May] | 40 |
| Kirov Plant Shut Down | [KOMMERSANT-DAILY 12 Mar] | 42 |
| Products From Kurgan Machine-Building Plant | [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 28 May] | 43 |
| 'Dvigateli-94' Engine Design Show | [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 28 May] | 45 |
| Nuclear Ship Designer Khlopin Interviewed | [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 28 May] | 46 |

SECURITY SERVICES

| | | |
|--|--------------------------------|----|
| Nikolayev Reviews Performance of Border Troops in 1994 | [ROSSIYA 25-31 May] | 48 |
| General Explains New Border Protection Concept | [ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 11 Jun] | 48 |
| Russian Counterintelligence Officer Interviewed | [VOLGOGRADSKAYA PRAVDA 12 May] | 52 |

ARMED FORCES

Yeltsin Calls for New Border Security Regime

94UM0433A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 May 94 p 1

[Report by ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Gondusov under the rubric "Correspondents of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and Telegraph Agencies Report": "Russia's President Has Presented a Border Policy Concept"]

[Text] The concept of Russia's border policy was presented today by Boris Yeltsin at a conference of higher command staff of the Russian Federation's Border Troops.

Upon arriving at the Main Military Commissariat Boris Yeltsin announced that he intends to discuss the difficult missions facing the defenders of Russia's border. The president indicated the need to set up a new system of border protection with the Baltic, Transcaucasus and other CIS states.

Lt-Gen Sokolov Arrives Gudauta

94UM0433B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 May 94 p 1

[Report by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Vitaliy Denisov under the rubric "Correspondents of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and Telegraph Agencies Report": "Peacekeepers Are Prepared To Enter Abkhazia"]

[Text] Lt-Gen Aleksey Sokolov, deputy commander in chief of Russia's Ground Troops, has arrived at Gudauta in the area of the Georgian-Abkhasian conflict in connection with the imminent deployment of CIS peacekeeping forces there.

It is expected that he will meet with Georgia's leaders in Tbilisi on 28 May. The purpose of the meeting is to discuss issues pertaining to the input and deployment of Russian "Blue Helmets" in the area of the conflict.

New SSBN 'Kursk' Undergoing Trials

94UM0433C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 May 94 p 1

[Report by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Vladimir Giundarov under the rubric "Correspondents of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and Telegraph Agencies Report": "The 'Kursk' in Champagne Bubbles"]

[Text] On 23 May dock trials began at Severodvinsk on the new nuclear missile submarine 'Kursk' commanded by Capt 1st Rank V. Rozhkov.

As pointed out by Ivan Vasilyev, in charge of releasing the order, the nuclear submarine has a number of improvements, including the navigational system, and

improved living conditions for the crew. The new nuclear submarine will become a part of Russia's Navy in December of this year.

Col-Gen Yakovlev Discusses Servicemen's Socio-Economic Complaints

94UM0437B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
2 Jun 94 pp 1-2

[Interview with Colonel General Valentin Alekseyevich Yakovlev, first deputy chief of Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Main Cadres Training and Assignment Directorate, by Oleg Falichev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, date, place and occasion unknown, under rubric "Today's Guest": "Service, Unfortunately, Is Not the Most Prestigious Job"; photograph of Yakovlev included]

[Text]

[Box insert]

Calling Card: Colonel General Valentin Alekseyevich Yakovlev

Born 7 May 1942 in the village of Toryal, Novotoryalskiy Rayon, Mari ASSR. Finished Leningrad Higher Combined Arms Command School imeni S. M. Kirov, the Frunze Military Academy and the General Staff Military Academy.

Served in positions from platoon commander to commander of a naval infantry division in the Black Sea and Pacific fleets. Commanded an army corps. Since September 1991 has been first deputy chief of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Main Cadres Training and Assignment Directorate.

[End box insert]

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Valentin Alekseyevich, we live in a difficult time, a time of trial and error, a time of "polishing" laws and establishing young Russian statehood. Not everything is turning out for us for now as we would have liked, as was planned and as was promised the people, and above all, perhaps, in the social sphere, which fully affected people in shoulderboards... Letters and complaints come to state authorities, to the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA from servicemen and military retirees concerning a violation of their rights to privileges established by laws in force. Therefore permit me to converse with you on behalf of our readers, a portion of whose letters you familiarized yourself with the day before.

Here is the most typical one. It came from Lieutenant A. Yemelyanenko, who serves in the Baltic. The officer justly complains that he is not being paid an interest-free loan and the so-called appointment allowance. Officials refer to the fact that his personal file has not arrived in the unit from his previous duty station and it is impossible to give out the money. The lieutenant concludes the

letter with a question: "Why do I have to fulfill contract terms and the Ministry of Defense does not?"

[Yakovlev] Naturally we could not ignore this letter. First of all we contacted the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Main Military Budget and Finance Directorate and received appropriate explanations. In particular they clarified that an interest-free loan for initial acquisition of household goods has been paid since March 1993 in accordance with the Russian Federation Law "On the Status of Servicemen." It is paid for three years in an amount up to 13 times the base pay and allowances. As a result it is over 1.5 million, which, you will agree, is no small amount for young officers for the present difficult times, although, of course, sad blunders also occur.

In addition to this, we phoned the unit where Lieutenant Yemelyanenko presently serves and learned that by this time the personal file already had arrived, about which the officer has been informed. Funds will be paid him according to the prescribed procedure.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Letters from Lieutenant V. Tsvetkov, Senior Lieutenant S. Levkov and Major A. Dadykin contain uneasiness over the uncertainty of social guarantees to servicemen performing contract military duty. You will agree that there are questions here too, as they say... And the main one is Did we introduce contract service a little early?

[Yakovlev] The organization of performance of contract military service matured long ago in the midst of our society. As of today it is a very important element in elevating Russian Federation Armed Forces combat readiness, democratizing the Army (Navy) environment, and strengthening discipline and law and order in military collectives. It is also without question that this system can operate effectively only on condition that the interested parties (a specific serviceman on the one hand and the state in the person of the Ministry of Defense on the other) comply with their commitments fixed in the corresponding contract.

Unfortunately, the reality is such that the mechanism of mutual responsibility does not always operate, through the fault of both parties. Take just time periods for concluding contracts. Social guarantees are given officers for the entire transition period, which is established until 31 December 1994, but this should not at all mean that those servicemen who wish to continue military service invariably will sign an application about their desire to serve the homeland further on the last day set aside for this procedure.

Circumstances force us to take many factors into account which influence this situation. First is the accounting of officers on whom one can plan for replacement, for appointment to a higher position, and for schooling. Naturally we cannot consider those who vacillate and have not determined their choice as being potential candidates. Therefore explanatory and organizational

work continues vigorously—not forcible actions by commanders (supervisors) to conclude contracts with those who have not yet concluded them. Some military district commanders issued orders on this account. This also was done in particular in the Ural Military District, from which Major Dadykin's letter arrived. The deputy chief of the Ural Military District Cadres Directorate reported that a contract for performing duty under paragraph "a" for a period of 5 years already had been concluded with the officer based on his application.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Valentin Alekseyevich, there are many letters in which officers are perplexed as to why the Ministry of Defense permits them to conclude contracts only under paragraph "a," although other forms of contracts had been proclaimed at one time. Air Force Captain A. Andryushkin from Pskov Oblast, Captain A. Kochetkov from Maritime Krai and many others ask about this.

[Yakovlev] The decision on having officers conclude contracts only under paragraph "a," part 1, Article 33 of the Russian Federation Law was made by the Russian Federation Minister of Defense based on the right granted him to establish forms of contracts and the procedure for concluding them (paragraph 6 of Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Decree No 4983-1 of 19 May 1993 "On Certain Measures Connected With Use of the Russian Federation Law On Military Obligation and Military Service"). This was substantiated by the need to maintain a proper level of troop strength with the Russian Federation Armed Forces reform and a large number of officer reassignments. Officers who enter military service from the reserve can conclude contracts under paragraphs "b" and "c."

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] We also linked great hopes for solving acute social and everyday problems with the Russian Federation Law "On the Status of Servicemen," which entered into force on 1 January 1993. I recall that entire lines of people wishing to purchase pamphlets with this and other legislative acts formed in our editorial offices. And what happened? Many provisions of this very necessary law are not in effect. Moreover, there is talk of revising the others...

[Yakovlev] Let us dot the "i's." The main portion of provisions of this document, which is really very important for strengthening the Armed Forces, succeeded in being implemented immediately after it was adopted. Above all this concerns norms of pay and allowances and certain other supplementary payments.

At the same time, it is impossible to disagree with servicemen's concern over further delay in putting certain rules of this law into effect (transportation privileges, payment of monetary compensation at the moment the serviceman and his family go on leave, property insurance and so on). It is the responsibility of the Russian Federation Government to develop a mechanism for implementing these privileges, but necessary

government decisionmaking has dragged out unjustifiably despite the fact that the Ministry of Defense has made proposals on this score.

The main reason is the extremely difficult economic situation in the country and absence of finances for implementing the Law "On the Status of Servicemen." But the law exists, and any arguments contradicting it naturally are not recognized (either in military collectives or by military courts at various levels) as sufficient for "freezing" established privileges. People ask for what is due them, but there is no possibility of satisfying their requests. Voluntarily or not, the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense ends up in the role of hostage.

The situation which has formed in this area cannot last indefinitely. Unhealthy sentiments on this score are ripening in the troops (fleets). There also is open speculation in the example of some not too respectable servicemen (especially among young officer graduates of military schools), who figure on leaving the Armed Forces in this way with maximum advantage to themselves.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] But is any kind of solution at all seen here?

[Yakovlev] Several options for solving the problem are possible theoretically.

The first and most radical one is to legislatively repeal privileges which did not come about as unsupported by necessary appropriations. It is not hard to predict the consequences of such a step: exacerbation of the socio-political situation in military collectives. Servicemen will consider this as nothing other than fraud on the part of the state. The Armed Forces will suffer not only moral, but also military-political harm.

The second way is for fastest implementation of all rules of the law without consideration of the Armed Forces' real economic capabilities. That approach outwardly is attractive, but at the existing and planned level of financing of defense expenditures it will only drive the "disease" inside the body. The Army and Navy economy simply will not bear up under this additional load.

In my view, the talk today can and must be about phased implementation of the law's rules that have not yet been put into effect, with specific financing of these measures from the federal budget, and this has to be resolved at the legislative level.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Military service is a special kind of state activity. A person in shoulderboards is bound by many restrictions and is largely unprotected. Higher pay and privileges are called upon to stimulate military service of officers and warrant officers and compensate for all possible material and moral costs. This is covered by

laws, but it is different in real life. Officers V. Kozin and V. Raskatov of the Tambov garrison and others write that this hits the prestige of military service hard and prompts young officers to "flee" to "civilian life." How great is this outflow?

[Yakovlev] Yes, servicemen's insufficient social protection and comparatively low standard of living contribute to a drop in prestige of service and to disillusionment of a considerable portion of the youth in selecting a military profession. As a result there is a drop in Armed Forces manning and a continued outflow of young officers from the Army. More have begun to be discharged both among those who are rather experienced but who have lost prospects in service and among those from 31 to 40 years of age needed in the Army and Navy.

As a result, military service as a special kind of activity is not the most prestigious profession today. Let us take a civil aviation pilot and military pilot for comparison. Both experience similar mental stresses and have identically high responsibility, but the aircraft commander at Sheremetyevo-2 receives up to 3 million rubles a month, while an aircraft commander who is a major and a first class pilot with 15 years or more service receives approximately 400,000 rubles, i.e., 5-6 times less.

This is just one example, but many can be found, and the comparisons will not favor servicemen. It is not surprising that competition for military educational institutions continues to fall. In 1992 it was 1.6 persons per slot and in 1993 it is already 1.4, and that is for schools providing free education in specialties that are in short supply under civilian conditions. This trend is most noticeable in Air Force and Navy military educational institutions, where competition essentially was absent in 1993. As a result the schools are forced to accept civilians who are on the borderline of professional suitability.

A trend also has become apparent toward an increased number of cadets expelled immediately before signing a contract. The basic reason is lack of desire to learn and disillusionment in choice of a military profession. Over 50 percent of all cadets who have left school have been expelled from military educational institutions for these reasons.

In this situation, further delay in placing into effect even a portion of privileges proclaimed by law can lead unavoidably to a final fall in prestige of military service, which will not enable manning the Army and Navy to the extent which permits keeping combat readiness at the proper level.

In conclusion I will emphasize that there has to be a precisely adjusted, long-range social policy with respect to the Army. Only this will permit removing many acute questions which KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers ask.

Servicemen's Welfare Group Says 25-30 Soldiers Die Daily

1 DE 206151094 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1443 GMT 12 Jun 94

[Text] A serviceman dies in the Russian Army every hour, Anatoliy Alexeyev, chairman of the International Committee of Defending the Rights of Servicemen and Their Families told Interfax. He said that 25 to 30 soldiers and officers died daily.

According to the Defense Ministry, over 2500 people died in the Russian Army but the committee believed that the real figure was at least twice that.

A 19,000 rubles, about 9.5 dollars, pension is paid for a soldier who died in the line of duty but only to parents who are older than 50. No pension is paid to the family of an officer.

Alexeyev said that the military prosecution office had not opened a single case against commanding officers of the units where soldiers were killed. No investigation of a death of servicemen in the times of peace has been brought to a conclusion.

He also said that the human rights of servicemen and draftees were continuously infringed on. In particular, numerous youths whose weight was below the norm and who could not therefore be legally drafted were forcibly held in recruiting offices and fed until their weight was brought up to the norm and then sent to the Army.

Lopatin Analyzes History, Results of Military Reductions

941 M04281 Moscow NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA
GAZETA in Russian 26 May 94 pp 1, 3

[Article by Vladimir Lopatin under rubric "Nongovernmental Report": "A Professional Army Instead of an Armed People"]

[Text] *In May 1994 it was two years from the day the Russian Armed Forces were formed. All this time the Russian military headed by P. Grachev have been saying over and over again that a combat-effective Army is being created from the Soviet Armed Forces rear which Russia inherited, and that is why there are so many shortcomings and problems. They say that the Army is being reduced, but to defend the enormous expanse the numerical strength of the Armed Forces should be not one percent of the population as provided by law, but 2.1 million servicemen. They say that a reduction in officers costs enormously more than their pay and that the problem of Armed Forces manpower acquisition is "one of the weakest points of military organizational development" and consequently it is necessary to keep the draft until the year 2000, placing all persons of draft age "under arms." Finally, they say that what "previously was worked out and implemented over many years" has been done in the Army in two years. Is this so?*

Transferring Instead of Scrapping

According to USSR Ministry of Defense data, after disintegration of the USSR there were over two million servicemen on the territory of Russia as of 1 January 1992 out of a Union Army of three million, including 575,000 officers and 280,000 warrant officers, 80 percent of nuclear weapons, over 60,000 pieces of armored equipment, around 60,000 artillery tubes, 6,000 combat aircraft and helicopters, over 500 combatant ships and 70 percent of supplies. On the territory of Russia there also remained 813 of the main enterprises of the military-industrial complex, supplying 80 percent of arms and military equipment to the USSR (the annual output was over 400 aircraft and helicopters, around 500 tanks, over 500 artillery systems, over 20 combatant ships, around 400 missiles and 25 space vehicles).

In the following two years Russia gradually increased its military potential by subordinating to itself groups of forces abroad and troops on the territory of a number of former Union republics (Georgia, Armenia, Belorussia, Moldavia, Tajikistan, Kirgizia...). During 1992-1993 270,000 servicemen, 3,100 tanks, 6,000 BMP's and 1,500 aircraft were removed to Russian Federation territory from the far and near abroad.

In essence there was a gradual transfer of the Union Army together with the military department from certain hands to others (initially unified USSR Armed Forces, then combined CIS Armed Forces, and finally Russian Federation Armed Forces). That is how it always has been in world practice: with a change in state leadership, the army has been resubordinated by the traditional method—the military leadership was bought (or bribed), concessions were made in the form of partial reforms or the promise of them for the lower Army strata, and the oath was administered to military units, with actions by enemies of the new authority suppressed. That was how it was this time as well. The exceptional experience of the Bolsheviks, who created the Red Army through a scrapping of the old one, was not repeated. Thus, the Russian Armed Forces were formed by changing uniform and name, with resubordination and maximum preservation of the Union Army.

Preservation Instead of Reduction

In 1850 it was believed that one million soldiers were sufficient to defend all European countries. A half-century later, in 1900, the numerical strength of standing armies had been brought to three million. Toward the end of the 20th century there are 25 million persons under arms in the world (including around 8 million in Europe, 3 million in the Near East, around 10 million in Asia, 3.5 million in America and 1 million in Africa).

In Russia the numerical strength of the standing army also rose: in 1725 there were 210,000 in the regular Army, 28,000 in the Navy, and 100,000 Cossacks, in 1913 there were 1.35 million, including over 1,700 generals and 150,000 officers.

After disbanding the Russian Army of 10 million in a few months in 1917, the Bolsheviks subsequently introduced the practice of sharp reductions in the Army, which repeatedly led to social shocks both in the Army as well as in society:

- 1922-1923—Army reduced from 5.5 million to 562,000;
- 1945-1947—8.5 million demobilized (2.8 million remained);
- 1953-1955—1.1 million, including 119,000 officers, discharged because of reduction;
- 1956-1958—a reduction of 600,000, including over 100,000 officers.

With the beginning of perestroika in the USSR, the reduction in the Army proceeded basically through a decrease in the authorized strength of servicemen, which greatly exceeded their actual number:

- 1989-1990—from 4.2 to 3.7 million, including 100,000 officers and 50,000 warrant officers;
- 1991—by 700,000, including 150,000 officers and 90,000 warrant officers, with a shortage of 660,000 persons in the USSR Armed Forces.

Thus, in the Soviet period a reduction in the Armed Forces as a rule took place in 1-2 years, and at the proposal of the military department itself, but without a program being developed to settle servicemen being discharged to the reserve. This was explained either as a transition from war to peace, or as a reduction in those who even so already had served the prescribed terms, or simply as a reduction in "dead souls" from the shortage of personnel, or as a "reduction" through removal of troops from the Armed Forces makeup (1989—Railroad Troops, MVD Internal Security Forces, KGB Border Guard Troops; 1991—Civil Defense troops and road construction units; 1994—according to the plan, "peace-making forces" and the Airborne Troops.

In January 1992 B. Yeltsin announced a reduction in the Armed Forces of 700,000 persons from their actual number. In September of that same year the Russian Federation Law "On Defense" established that by 1 January 1995 "the actual number of Russian Federation servicemen in the peacetime Russian Federation Armed Forces cannot exceed one percent of the Russian Federation population," i.e., in 2.5 years there was to be a reduction of another half-million in the size of the Army. The military department committed itself to preparing a program for the Armed Forces reduction.

But in February 1993 the Russian Federation Minister of Defense announced, and the Russian Federation President confirmed then as well, an authorized strength of Russian Federation Armed Forces of 3.5 million, including 2,218 generals, 692,000 officers, and 2.8 million privates and NCO's, with an actual numerical strength of 1.8 million servicemen. A half-year later Grachev announced the authorized strength of the Armed Forces already as 2.34 million with an actual strength of around 1.5 million, although, as we know,

nowhere did anyone announce a reduction of 1.2 million in the Army during this period. The state program for Armed Forces reduction just had not been prepared, but on the other hand the task of "reducing the Armed Forces to the prescribed level" according to basic provisions of military doctrine had been postponed for a year (until 1996), and the Armed Forces numerical level itself, established by law, was arbitrarily raised by Grachev from 1.5 to 2.1 million. While he had declared repeatedly in 1993 that the Army had to be "small and completely professional" and the numerical strength of the Armed Forces, as specified by the Law "On Defense", would be brought to 1.5 million, in 1994, admitting that the Armed Forces were only at 54 percent strength in privates and NCO's, he nevertheless asserts that we need an Army of two million, but a reduction in the Armed Forces is possible in 1994 by 200,000 and in 1995 by another 200,000. For the umpteenth time he explains his position by the need to defend the homeland and by the threat of social shocks, although the task of reducing an Army of 1.5 million by increasing it by 400,000-600,000 persons does not lend itself to understanding.

One might ask why such sly statistics are necessary. They permit the following:

- preserve over 150 formations and the entire gigantic superstructure above them (hence the 7 to 50 percent personnel strength of units, by which an attempt is made to patch "Trishka's caftan" of combat readiness [from a Krylov fable, meaning that fixing one thing results in damaging another]; and substantiate the need for 2,500 generals and greater expenditures for Army upkeep;
- preserve the existing military system, including universal military obligation, and not hasten with military reform;
- announce, if necessary, another "peaceful" initiative in reducing the Armed Forces.

That is how it was under M. Gorbachev, and that is how it is under Yeltsin. As a result, with an Armed Forces reduction of 2.7 million announced over the last five years, the overall number of those under arms in Russia's 16 departments remained practically the same—3.5 million. But even if everyone who reaches the age of 18 (in Russia this is around one million persons annually) were to be placed under arms, as Grachev wishes to do, even then one could not reach the level announced by our generals in the interests, of course, of "ensuring Russia's security."

What Does History Teach?

As follows from the unclassified report which the USSR submitted to the League of Nations in April 1931, the numerical strength of servicemen in the USSR as of 1 January 1931 was 562,000 in the Armed Forces, including 38,000 command personnel; 28,000 in the Border Guard Troops; and 17,000 in OGPU [United State Political Directorate] Internal Security Forces.

At that time 1.2 million persons reached draft age annually, of whom 300,000-350,000 were not physically fit. The principle of an "armed people" professed by Napoleon and von Moltke, who even intended to provide the Army as the teacher of their nations by passing all people through the barracks, required teaching military affairs to 900,000 persons annually. But with a two-year term of service it was possible to pass only 270,000 temporary duty personnel through the RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army] and other troops. It was necessary either to increase the Army to 1.7 million or combine a regular army with a militia system (a regular division passed 1,900 persons through a year and a territorial division 3,500, with expenditures for training one fighting man being R535 in 2 years and R291 in 5 years respectively). With the economic and political isolation of the USSR, which did not possess nuclear weapons, the second path was chosen as being most economical and effective. The situation has changed fundamentally under present conditions, as follows from Russian Federation military doctrine. First of all, "the immediate threat of direct aggression being unleashed against the Russian Federation has dropped considerably" and Russia "does not regard a single state as its enemy," considering "as partners all states whose policy does not harm its interests and does not contradict the UN Charter." Secondly, traditional Armed Forces have a tertiary significance as a deterrence factor in ensuring military security after nonmilitary means and nuclear weapons, first use of which we rightly rejected. Thirdly, the Russian Federation ensures its security through entry into or cooperation with collective security structures. And finally, an overall reduction of armed forces and military expenditures is occurring in the world.

The country's economic capacities changed substantially simultaneously with this:

- Russia's territory and its population and draft resources are less than in the USSR by one-third and one-half respectively;
- gross domestic product [GDP] for 1992-1993 dropped 30 percent along with a growth in domestic debt and the budget deficit;
- over 40 million Russians were below the subsistence minimum in 1994.

The situation has changed, but we continue to try to fit the practice of military organizational development to the theory of "massive war" and an "armed people." Speaking recently in the State Duma to substantiate increased military expenditures, Chief of Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff Colonel General M. Kolesnikov asserted that "armed conflict will require a mass army four times larger than the present one" and that today we cannot fight for four years in a row as during World War II. Having 30 million persons on military registration, of whom 6 million are the top-priority reserve, we continue to try to place all youth under arms, sending one-third of draftees to "other troops" to perform duty—Border Guard Troops

(150,000), Internal Security Forces (around 400,000), and Railroad, Road Construction and other troops (in 15 departments in all), including troops under joint-stock companies (such as Rostelekom, Dal'spetsstroy and so on), which altogether contradicts the Russian Federation Constitution.

The demand is not to increase the number of privates, but to reduce the number of supervisory personnel with a change in the table of organization structure by reducing the number of highly paid general and officer positions and increasing the proportion of NCO's and civilian personnel. But only 10 of the 115 military educational institutions on the territory of Russia with an annual graduation of 37,000 officers have been reduced in two years. As before, up to 30,000 young officers are graduated each year with a simultaneous increase in monetary allowance for cadets to R130,000 per month.

It would appear that neither world experience nor our own history teaches us anything. In Czarist Russia before World War I only 26 cadet schools and 38 warrant officer schools were training commanders for an army of 1.5 million, with an annual graduation of 3,000 officers and 19,000 warrant officers. In the summer of 1941 there were 1.3 million officers in a Red Army of 10 million, while by the end of 1941 Germany had only 148,000 officers at all fronts, of whom only 23,000 were regular. In 1941 both Russia and Germany were relying on NCO's—professional junior commanders. In the world practice of military organizational development today, the norm for states with a highly developed economy is a ratio in which 0.05 percent are generals, 10-15 percent officers, and 35 percent junior commanders, with an overall numerical strength of servicemen not exceeding 0.7-0.8 percent of the country's population and with the proportion of military expenditures at 3-4 percent of GDP. For Russia this would mean having the numerical strength of the Armed Forces at one million, including up to 700 generals, up to 200,000 officers and up to 350,000 junior commanders.

'Be, Rather Than Appear To Be'

These parting words left for the German General Staff by A. von Schlieffen seemingly acquire special pertinence in our Russian reality.

On the one hand, Russian generals record and the Russian Federation President approves among basic provisions of military doctrine such principles of ensuring military security in the Russian Federation as "conformity of Armed Forces organizational development to the country's political goals and economic capacities and to the course of reforms," and "use of domestic and world experience in military organizational development."

On the other hand, with growing military expenditures, the practice of military organizational development does not conform to the country's political goals and economic capacities. Dissipation of allocated forces and

assets to a large number of formations and units, an absence of interest in service among officers, massive draft dodging among civilian youth, and "commercialization" of service all lead to decay of the Army. As a result there is neither money nor an Army.

This is occurring because, using military reform as a cover and speculating on problems of servicemen and workers of the military-industrial complex, state and military bureaucrats demand increased expenditures not for transformations, but for preserving the previous system, partially canceling the dissatisfaction of its representatives through increased pay. This enables keeping the military-bureaucratic apparatus at the previous size and permits its uncontrolled use of sources of incomes in the military department for their personal goals.

Only through military reform is it possible to obtain a combat-effective army with a real and inevitable reduction of military expenditures. The goals proclaimed in Russia of building a democratic, rule-of-law state and civilian society demand a decisive rejection of the practice of mass education of society through the Army, general militarization of citizens, and militarization of their labor. A professional army of one million on a volunteer basis must come to replace the "armed people," with introduction of alternative (civilian) service and with retention of service by conscription only in wartime. Today every third state in the world has a fully professional army on a volunteer basis, including the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Japan, India, Pakistan and Australia.

How can we shift to a professional army with fewest losses and costs, in the shortest time and with greatest effectiveness?

An optimum solution to this problem requires fulfilling the following basic conditions:

1. If we immediately recognize the actual numerical strength of the Armed Forces to be authorized and plan military expenditures, withdrawal of troops, real reduction and military reform on this basis.
2. If we cut the number of units and formations in half and man the rest with the freed-up personnel (1994-1995).
3. If we change the ratio of branches of Armed Forces through a significant reduction in the proportion of ground troops and air defense and shift to Armed Forces organizational development based on missions (1994-1995).
4. If we reduce military schools (by 40-70 percent for branches of the Armed Forces) and military academies (leave one per branch) and bring the annual graduation of officers to 10,000 (1994-1995).
5. If we reduce the size of command and control entities (above all at the expense of the intermediate level) with a threefold reduction in the number of generals' positions and with the granting of pensions and of the benefits prescribed by law (1994).

6. If we reduce the number of officer positions, with the discharge (at their wish) of those who have served the prescribed terms, with presentation of an opportunity to fill previous positions in administrative management entities and logistic, medical and financial support entities, positions of technical specialists and positions in military science with civilian personnel, and with the discharge and settling of the remaining portion of officers under a reduction (1994-1998).

7. If we reduce the number of positions filled by warrant officers (by 80-90 percent), with the right granted to fill a number of previous positions by civilian personnel (storekeepers, chiefs of depots, storehouses and messhalls, and so on) and positions of junior commanders, with nonextension of contract with persons who have not been certified (1994-1996).

8. If we revise the time periods, conditions and curriculum for training junior commanders based on a number of military schools being reduced, bringing in servicemen from among cadets and warrant officers, and increasing the prestige of their service (1994-1995).

9. If we carry out the reduction and certification of cadets, warrant officers, officers and generals for further service through competitive professional selection, with mandatory reorganization and professionalization of military cadre entities and with greater rights granted to servicemen's assemblies (1994-1996).

10. If we revise the conditions, time periods for going over to contract service, and content of the contract (not only obligations of the serviceman, but also responsibility of the state is necessary), with priority conclusion of contracts (for 2-5 years) with officers and persons certified for positions of junior commanders and of technical specialists in combat teams and crews (1994-1995).

Fulfillment of these ten "ifs," which define the concept of transition to a professional Army through a structural reduction in the Armed Forces, will permit having a professional army in Russia already in this century.

A professional army is not an end in itself.

Transition to a volunteer method of manpower acquisition and to contract service permits resolving problems and tasks which are difficult to resolve under the present system of military organization:

- preserve combat effectiveness and increase combat readiness of the Armed Forces with a reduction in their numerical strength;
- perform selection and manpower acquisition based on strict competition with increased demands on candidates instead of registration without competition and mass call-up.

- relieve officers of performing duties of junior commanders and privates, and relieve the Army of the function of a "cheap labor force";
- ensure high professionalism through an interest in service and responsibility of both parties to the contract (both the civilian and the command element);
- lower the number of accidents, breakdowns and crashes and increase the operating life of equipment, reducing the volume of military orders for its production;
- substantially reduce the number of instances of loss and injury among personnel, eliminate causes of "dedovshchina" and elevate the level of military discipline;
- free up additional working hands for the country's national economy (by reduction and non-call-up) and also free up real estate, equipment and property in the Armed Forces, which in other countries led to an increase in GDP and full compensation for additional expenditures for transition to a professional army;
- ensure stability of the Army in an unstable society, and prestige of military service amidst strong anti-Army sentiments among draft-age youth and their parents.

In agreeing with the Russian Federation President's statement that "the military department does not reform itself," it is evidently necessary to examine this matter in the Security Council, in the Federal Assembly, and in society, creating a Committee for Assistance to Military Reform in the Russian Federation based on results of the discussion.

POLICY

Political Postponement of Peacekeeping Exercise Possible

94U M04564 Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian
No 102, 2 Jun 94 p 3

[Article by Pavel Felgengauer, under rubric "Partnership": "Conflict in the Atlantic: Politicians Cannot Resolve the Fate of Russo-American Exercises"]

[Text] In the summer of 1994 the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division and the 27th Russian Motorized Rifle Division were supposed to have acted jointly to stop a "conflict on the island of Atlantida [the Atlantic]," where the inhabitants of two states (the "agrarian" one and the "industrial" one) had come to grips because of disputed territory. It had been proposed to find "Atlantida" on the territory of the vast Totalskiy Firing Range in the Southern Urals.

But in April the Duma enacted a special decree, "proposing" to President Yeltsin that he cancel or transfer abroad the joint peacekeeping Russo-American exercises. On the threshold of signing the Treaty of Public Consent, the president shared the fears of the Duma members and ordered the interested departments to reconsider the need for the exercises and the time for holding them.

However, among the country's highest military leadership the politicians' actions caused irritation. If the peacekeeping exercises at the Totalskiy Firing Range actually threaten Russia's national interests, then as a result the Russian generals who agreed to conducting the exercise automatically fall into the category of traitors. And, naturally, the generals did not like that.

In the discussion concerning the Totalskiy exercises, Russia's higher and higher military leadership acted as a single front. Defense Minister General Pavel Grachev: "The attempt is being made to disrupt the peacekeeping exercises, but if we want to remove the image of the enemy and to proceed toward partnership, the exercises must be conducted." Chief of General Staff General Kolesnikov: "Public opinion is being specially heated up by people who do not know, or who pretend not to know, what a command post exercise is."

However, the influence of the Ministry of Defense in the Duma, the Kremlin, and the White House is limited. Therefore no one has yet made any intelligible decision concerning whether to conduct the exercises, and if so, where and when. The American partners are also perplexed. Last week 3rd Division commander General Holder was supposed to arrive in Moscow (with a delegation), in order to carry out the final coordination of the exercise details, but our military men were forced to "recommend the cancellation of the trip," inasmuch as, properly speaking, there was not yet anything to coordinate.

On 27 May General Schroeder, deputy commander of U.S. troops in Europe and the chief coordinator of the exercises on the American side, met on his own initiative with Colonel-General Eduard Vorobyev, who is responsible for the exercises on the Russian side, in the hopes of ascertaining at least something definite. But General Vorobyev was able only to express the hope that the exercises would indeed be held, perhaps even in August-September of this year. In the autumn or winter it will be difficult for American infantry to survive in Totalskiy. In the opinion of the military, 15 September is the extreme date for holding exercises in 1994. At the same time the proposal to conduct Russo-American exercises in the United States or on neutral territory will, obviously, be "brought down" in one form or another. Our generals will scarcely agree to expend the limited funds in the defense budget to transfer troops to conduct a symbolic operation.

During the next few weeks Russian politicians will have to make the final decision about whether or not to hold the exercises this summer. Incidentally, an official representative of the U. S. Defense Department expressed to a *SEGODNYA* correspondent his satisfaction with the work that has already been done: in the course of preparation for the exercises, the military of the two countries have been able to prepare a joint manual for the holding of peacekeeping operations, which may prove to be useful in the future.

Calls To Cut Military Funding Assailed

*Editorial in Moscow KRISNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 June 1994*

Editor: Vladimir Marvukha "Social Protection for the Military Is Primarily Necessary To Protect Russia's Interests."

Editor: While the military budget is being "shaken up" in an attempt to save 18 trillion [rubles] at the Army's expense, the mass media are raking up fusty arguments and saying that "we are all hostages of the military-industrial complex." Even the government's ROSSISKAYA GAZETA, lobbying for a reduction in defense spending, writes about the "occupation regime" of the Russian military-industrial complex. And says that "there is a need to intimidate people with the horrendous consequences of underfunding of the defense complex" that is just a case of shenanigans on the part of "military-industrial complex bigwigs" and "corrupts" opposed to army reform.

Those who are actively involved "case of the 18 trillion on defense" where everyone seems to be "in favor" and "military reform" money for the military, by no means constitute an attack by military-industrial complex bigwigs on the limited state budget. The minimum figure suggested by the Defense Ministry has been decided in accordance with the following principle: "Think about the Motherland first and then about yourselves." There is no lack of defense spending that has been submitted for certification is a balanced combination of spending on re-equipping the troops' combat capability ("undiluted" "noble exertion," so to speak) and on social protection for military families. And—albeit indirectly—also affects the military's defense capability. Thus the argument over whether or not to provide the money has long since changed from being a financial "wrangle" to being the subject of political speculation that may explode the situation around and within the Army.

However, these "explosions" are already regrettably becoming a reality instead of just projections. In particular, a quite conflict situation has arisen among the Northern Fleet's military construction workers. A kind of protest action akin to a strike has even been held here. Not to say that is quite intolerable in army conditions. Although the demands do not go beyond what they were promised by the state—the military are asking for their debts to be repaid. Yet the state owes money not only to the men of the Northern Fleet and not only for pay, which is commonly paid two or three months late in the Army and the Navy.

When this edition has been signed to press, the State Duma will start discussing the question of social guarantees for servicemen. It is not worth speculating how the discussion will go, whether the State Duma's Defense Committee will succeed in persuading the government and deputies that playing financial games with the Army is intolerable, just as it is intolerable to reduce its standard of living below the lower limit beyond which

chaos sets in. It is better to turn one's gaze to Moscow and figures which, incidentally, were discussed by the parliamentarians themselves at the Northern Fleet. That took place in mid-May, but since then there has been change for the better and the Duma representatives will examine the submitted documents. However, the money sent to State Duma Chairman Iosadovskiy, addressed to all deputies duly with an outline of the military aspect of the Northern Fleet's problems, in which servicemen themselves usually feel, on a personal aspect. And this is even more important, namely, in relation as regards combat training of the present, of the arms and manning of units.

Thus, as of 1 March just 40.5 percent of the money that had been allocated for the upkeep of the Northern Fleet as a whole. At the same time there are now 148,000 people without apartments in the Northern Fleet and the number of such families will rise while the number of apartments in the fleet's housing stock will drop as the fleet's need for the ability of existing people discharged into the family. The closed garrisons. Around 2,800 families are connected with the Navy this year and they are not doing well. Even with current legislation, money to build housing for the garrisons. Nor is there enough money to pay for the families who are serving. The money allocated for the year was not enough to build just 242 apartments for the Northern Fleet servicemen have only received 145.

Or take medical support. Navy garrisons have fewer as many medics as the Murmansk Oblast average. There are even worse with regard to hospitals and the prevention of disease among children. Some 40 percent of children under 16 have been deprived of the regular course of multivitamin treatment prescribed for sailors, sailors and naval families are beset by illnesses that are unthinkable for children of this age—anaemia, distemper, etc. A third of schoolchildren study on a second shift, and barely 50 percent of the required number of children, and sometimes classes are held in unlit basements. Thus we are not even talking about the military families who are accustomed to "burdens and privations" of trillions, if they appear on a platter, will be used to ruin Russia's gene pool. And for the social reintegration of the quite able-bodied citizens who have been discharged from the service. And to implement articles of law that have been announced but are not in force, thus undermining faith in the foundations of the state.

Regrettably, judging by the way in which the budget blanket of the state budget is being "piled" (as was said that, you have to see all this for yourself) war is being and serve the Fatherland not out of fear but out of conscience in order to realize that the Army is not asking for anything unnecessary. It needs firm social guarantees with financial backup rather than laments that the country is having a hard time of it today. The suggested minimum sum will not ensure that servicemen have a good life, it only guarantees Russia's security for 20 years. In uniform are accountable.

Government Underfunding of Army Scored

*PM1006101194 Moscow KR ISNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Jun 94 pp 1, 3*

[Vladimir Yermolin report: "Army Needs Worthy Budget"]

[Text] The State Duma Defense Committee conducted hearings Tuesday on "The Social Protection of Servicemen, Persons Discharged From Military Service, and Members of Their Families. Housing for the Army. Status, Problems, and Ways of Finding Solutions."

It seems unnecessary to spell out to our readers, servicemen, and military pensioners the reasons for which parliamentarians are turning their attention to this theme. I will just mention two aspects. First, the Russian Federation Government sent to the State Duma for examination a draft law stipulating the removal from existing legislation of a whole series of benefits for servicemen and their families. Second, the hearings were a last-ditch attempt somehow to exert influence primarily on the Russian Federation Government on the eve of the repeat discussion in the Duma of the draft law on the 1994 Federal Budget, in which, as we know, defense spending was cut by at least 18 trillion rubles [R]. And without the required sum of R55 trillion, how can we talk about the social protection of servicemen?

First to outline their stances during the hearings were the Defense Ministry (Deputy Minister Colonel General Valeriy Mironov), and the Ministry of Finance (Sergey Kondrashov, deputy leader of Finance Ministry Department for the Defense Complex).

Defense Ministry: Over 75 Percent of Officers' Families Have Incomes Below the Minimum Living Wage

It has to be recognized that in recent years the country's leadership has demonstrated on several occasions its good intentions in respect of servicemen. Over 40 edicts, decrees, laws, and other legal acts have been issued which in one way or another protect the military and their nearest and dearest. There have also been state programs for housing construction, and for resettling and catering for troops withdrawn from abroad. And, finally, there are the basic guidelines for the Russian Federation Government activity on social policy for 1994, where, again in black and white, there is mention of the need to implement all (legislation-backed!) servicemen's rights. So what has the Army got as a result? I will cite Col. Gen. Valeriy Mironov (but, rest assured, hot on the heels of the deputy minister these words will be repeated to us at any Russian barracks): "There is a lack of decisions by the Russian Federation Government on implementing a number of paragraphs in the Russian Federation Law 'On the Status of Servicemen,' the level of pay is extremely low, the number of homeless is rising, and psychological and physical overload owing to a shortage of manpower is on the increase." The quick-fire retort—it's all been proclaimed, but it is not being implemented in practice: Namely, the right to a place of

residence in any populated area of the country following discharge, the procedure for offering servicemen and their families accommodations following discharge, state insurance for servicemen, free shipment of a serviceman's personal property when transferring to a new service location....

A brief word on pay. Frankly, everything that needs to be said was said in the subhead—just one in four families keeps its head above the poverty line. Is it really necessary to paint a vivid picture of officer life, the domestic existence of officer families, in order to depict precisely what this means? So much has been said about this already! To all appearances, in a country where the majority of the population only just makes ends meet, people are no longer shocked by the notion of a poverty-stricken officer. By way of an example, Col. Gen. Mironov cited the case of a worker with the most lowly qualifications at the Volga Motor Vehicle Plant [VAZ] who earns R1.5 million. It emerges that a first category military pilot would be better off nowadays resigning and going off to sweep up metal filings in a VAZ workshop. And, indeed, this is what they are doing. Most of them are men under 30, and generally the most promising, energetic, and intelligent officers.

Accommodations are altogether a sore point. But particularly for those discharged into the reserves. For the latter, the program for providing accommodations in 1993 was only fulfilled to a level of 15 percent. For those still in service, somewhere in the region of 80 percent of what was planned was constructed. This figure altogether knocks you off your feet. But the thrust is one and the same: The volume of housing construction is declining. The deputy defense minister said simply: Today, the ministry has no opportunity to implement the government's decrees "On Granting Russian Federation Citizens in Need of Improved Accommodations Nonreturnable Subsidies To Construct or Acquire Housing," and "On Measures for the Social Protection of the Population Living in Closed Territorial-Administrative Formations." And there is no mention at all of implementing state programs—at best, this aspect will hold its ground at last year's level.

But you can go on analyzing the situation until you are blue in the face, and you can go on recounting disaster after disaster, but it all boils down to one thing: What is needed is money. And there is none.

Ministry of Finance: The State's Economy Will Not Stretch to a Defense Budget of R55 Trillion

However, in the opinion of Finance Ministry spokesman Sergey Kondrashov, the problem is one of how to "stretch" a defense budget albeit of just R37 trillion. As of today, the defense budget in the first five months of 1994 was financed to a level of just 77.1 percent. Let's think about this: While we argue over the missing R18 trillion, while statesmen strike sparks in heated debates, and we, here below, keep an eye on the battle of the titans in the hope that they do not deal the final blow to the

Army—all this time, the Armed Forces have been living for almost six months with this same financial noose, some R37 trillion in length, around its neck. Yet even this measly 37 trillion is not forthcoming, which is why the noose around the Army's neck is growing even tighter. It turns out that the whole debate surrounding the defense budget is purely theoretical: For economists from various schools, it is an opportunity to make a brilliant display of their erudition; for the deputies, it is a chance to perfect their debating skills; and for the politicians, it is a chance to score points in the eyes of gullible "soldier boys"....

So what is going on—is it all villainy on the part of the Ministry of Finance? For those who prefer independent analysis, I will cite the following information for perusal: First, according to the law presented by the government and adopted by the Duma, in the second quarter of 1994 finance will be issued at a speed "commensurate with the actual receipt into the Federal Budget of taxes and payments"; second, in the first five months of this year, 15 (yes, fifteen!) percent of the total taxes planned for in the draft annual budget were received into the budget. This figure was cited at the hearings by Sergey Kondrashov. You can argue the details as much as you like, accuse one another of bungling and abuses, and allocate billions and trillions on paper, but if the state is unable to collect the taxes, and if even at this early stage it is slashing the size of projected revenue, then what is the value of any state program? What is the value of laws which are not backed by a single kopeck?

The unfortunate Finance Ministry representative first expressed doubts that it might be possible to cram the provision of all the Army's social needs into a sum as small (he agrees with this) as R37 trillion, and then he expressed doubts over the possibility of actually succeeding in scraping together even these R37 trillion. The forecast for budget receipts is forcing the Finance Ministry to resolve one specific task every month: namely, whom to underpay, and by how much. As a result, the debt to the military department has already hit 5.7 trillion. And so it is that the debt-ridden state in the form of the government is beginning to devise ways of offsetting this debt. If the trillions in taxation cannot be obtained from the commercial structures, then perhaps the pockets of the disciplined military can be fleeced? So it is that a law has been written which abolishes declared benefits. Pay has been frozen. And instead of a suitable food allowance, all they have received is compensation equal to one minimum wage. Indeed, the government has accumulated quite a lot of these fruitful ideas, the main one of which, it emerged, is not only to set a defense budget below even the lowest level, but also to

underfinance even this miserliness. Any increase in pay can only be a pipe dream, as all that remains is to beseech the gods that, come Judgment Day, the cashier's grills might open. Meanwhile, in June the Army will be underpaid by an even greater margin than in May. This is what Kondrashov said, and he knows what he is talking about. It was also noted that, according to official calculations by the Finance Ministry and the Ministry of the Economy, the "light at the end of the tunnel" will only start glimmering at best at the end of 1995. But life has taught us that the wisest thing is to prepare for the worst nevertheless.

A Few Words About 'Ways of Resolving...'

The Defense Ministry has drawn up a whole package of draft laws for state programs aimed at returning our Armed Forces to the worthy place in society befitting their status. Some of them have been handed over to the Main Legal Administration under the Russian Federation president, and some are already with the Russian Federation Government. There are also specific proposals from the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of the Economy. When it sits on Thursday the Duma Defense Committee will probably sum up the results of the hearings and compile its program of measures with due account of the sides' proposals. All proposals, of course, warrant a more detailed discussion on the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, but it is simply that newspaper space is limited. But then it is better to talk about intentions once they begin to acquire the form of completed documents, ready for specific discussion.

I will merely point out that the second part of the hearings progressed with the participation of representatives of commercial structures who had arrived with businesslike proposals on how to get moving on the "accursed" problem of housing in the Army. This is a separate topic for discussion. But as far as we can we will enlighten our readers about certain programs.

The idea that the might of the Russian Army will "blossom" through national business structures is emerging altogether somewhat surreptitiously. The idea is preposterous, of course. But then it is painfully disagreeable to think that our Army should have to vegetate in the outer darkness without money for another two years at least, and maybe even more. Who, then, will emerge out of this "limbo" into God's world, and with what? A section with a 45-mm gun and one missile? Just as in the famous book which reminds us to this day of the glory which we have inherited, the wealth of experience of defeat and victory. But, as Kondrashov said, the Army will only be able to extract itself from this impasse in conjunction with the entire national economy. And without harboring illusions.

STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

START II Impact on Strategic Forces Viewed

944D0047A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 1 Jun 94 p 9

[Article by Lev Volkov with introduction by Pavel Felgengauer: "START II and the Topol Mobile Intercontinental Missiles"]

[Text] Lev Volkov is a lieutenant general and former chief of the Ministry of Defense Central Research Institute (the main institute in the system of the Strategic Missile Forces). He is a full member of the International and Russian engineering academies and a corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

In the first days of January 1993 and, accordingly, in the final days of the presidency of George Bush, the Russian-American START II treaty on a reduction in strategic offensive arms was signed in Moscow. Many observers were astonished at that time at the incomprehensible haste in the signing and, most importantly, at the necessity for inviting to Moscow a president who had just two weeks of his term to go. Boris Yeltsin was probably in urgent need of international confirmation of his status following the first major (and extremely unsuccessful for the president) clash with parliament (Congress of People's Deputies) in December 1992.

There arose, naturally, quite widespread suspicions that START II was an insufficiently weighed, opportunist document that by the year 2003 would have placed Russia in a position of strategic inequality.

But if START II was signed in a hurry, it had been prepared quite thoroughly, and not only by specialists of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs but also of the General Staff, what is more. "START II is a result of the joint efforts of two ministries—Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense. Never before have the two departments worked so closely and in such a friendly working atmosphere," Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of the Russian Army General Staff, maintains. The group of experts from the Ministry of Defense was headed by General Nikolayev, incidentally, who is now commander in chief of border forces and who was at that time first deputy chief of the General Staff.

The former Supreme Soviet greeted the treaty warily and after several hearings postponed ratification to the fall of 1993 in order never to return to it. Altogether, the treaty could not have been considered in earnest, for that matter, until the fate of the former Soviet strategic arms in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine had been decided and until these countries had ratified the START I treaty and subscribed to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Now all the preliminary conditions have been more or less fulfilled, and the time has come for the ratification of START II by the new Federal Assembly. The ratification or nonratification will determine for many years to come Russia's defense policy and the structure of its strategic

nuclear force. But, in any event, the old strategic weapons systems added to our armory in the 1970's and 1980's will have to be eliminated since their service life is coming to an end. As a result, in the current Strategic Missile Forces system armory there is only one system of ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles—the Topol—that simultaneously corresponds to the terms of START II and is sufficiently modern to be able to survive (with a certain modernization) until the year 2015. In the next year or two the Russian military and political leadership will have to choose: either stick with the Topol system, as the basis of the future ground-based Strategic Missile Forces, or immediately begin the development of another prospective intercontinental missile....

"According to open press data, six catastrophes accompanied by the sinking of the boats, explosions, and fires, the result of which were the loss of nuclear munitions and missiles and also the loss of life of personnel, have occurred in the course of the operation of several dozen nuclear submarines. But no one today is raising the question of abandoning the use of strategic nuclear weapons on nuclear submarines."

START II

Compared with the START I treaty, the START II treaty alters the structure of the strategic nuclear force thanks to the elimination in the Strategic Missile Forces of missiles with multiple reentry vehicles. It is necessary in fulfilling START II conditions to have dismantled 675-780 launchers (3,775-3,880 warheads) by the years 2000-2003 and during this time to have created in exchange a grouping of 800-900 single-warhead missiles. With regard to the country's actual economic situation, it will have been possible, most likely, to deploy only 600-700 ground-based ICBM's, that is, in practice we will not have assimilated the quota of 3,500 warheads for the strategic nuclear force.

It would be desirable, therefore, to adjust a number of the provisions of START II prior to its ratification: the "automatic" termination of the treaty in the event of a violation of the provisions of the 1972 ABM Treaty and stricter control of the possibility of the return to the grouping of the warheads removed in accordance with the treaty from the missiles and bombers.

In addition, it would be desirable to extend the time-frame of the reduction in the Strategic Missile Forces to the year 2005, which would make it possible to make fuller use of the service life of the ICBM's to be destroyed, compensating for the insufficient funding of strategic nuclear force development programs. This adjustment ensues directly from Russia's economic difficulties, but it does not alter the cardinal provisions of the program for the development of the Strategic Missile Forces, merely shifts the time scale for its realization.

Prospect—Single-Warhead Missiles

The treaty between the USSR and the United States limiting strategic offensive arms (SALT II), which

Leonid Brezhnev and Jimmy Carter signed in 1979, determined an overall permissible number of delivery systems and also the number of ICBM's with multiple reentry vehicles (820). As a result, it was advantageous to have in the grouping the maximum permissible number of ICBM's with multiple reentry vehicles.

START I limited to a considerably greater extent the number of weapons compared with the number of delivery systems, which determined the prospective nature of an increase in the single-warhead part of the grouping. Although according to the terms of START I it was possible to preserve some part of the ICBM's with multiple reentry vehicles, including 154 heavy missiles, the overall limitation on the number of warheads compelled increased survivability and an aspiration to the single-warhead grouping. After all, the destruction by one weapon of an ICBM with 10 warheads pays, and the destruction of a single-warhead missile with one weapon is only equivalent exchange.

Thus the switch to single-warhead ICBM's was the arterial direction for the development of the Strategic Missile Forces grouping adopted in 1991 together with START I, and the terms of START II merely accelerated the timeframe of this switch.

Liquid Fuel

The Strategic Missile Forces grouping had as of 1 January 1993 six classes of ICBM's, including four classes using a liquid fuel that is highly toxic and dangerous in operation—"heptyl" (asymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine—P.F.)—and two classes using compound [sme-sevoy] solid fuel that is nontoxic and considerably safer in operation, including the Topol single-warhead mobile missiles. The solid fuel is charged under plant conditions, repositories, fuel tanks, and fuel supply lines in the line units are not needed, and fuel vapor discharges are excluded. Solid fuel may be used for the ICBM's in both the fixed- and mobile-basing versions, which affords opportunities for standardization, whereas it is dangerous to use liquid fuel in mobile missiles.

We would mention also that our solid fuel is in a number of its specifications superior to the fuel used in the United States' ICBM's, and in terms of the energetics of the missiles as a whole, the solid-fuel systems are only very negligibly inferior to their liquid-fuel counterparts.

Thus all program developers have unanimously concluded that the prospective Strategic Missile Forces grouping should have solid-fuel ICBM's.

ICBM Basing Modes

The "Fundamental Provisions of the Russian Federation Military Doctrine" define as the purpose of policy in the sphere of nuclear weapons: removal of the danger of nuclear war by way of deterring the unleashing of aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies. They also define the mission of the strategic nuclear force: maintaining the composition and status of the strategic

nuclear force at a level providing for the assured infliction of the desired damage on an aggressor under any conditions.

These doctrinal provisions compel the consideration as the main scenario of the use of the strategic nuclear force and the Strategic Missile Forces the infliction on an aggressor of unacceptable damage in a retaliatory strike, that is, after the enemy's ICBM and SLBM warheads have delivered a strike against the territory of Russia.

In the struggle between launcher protection facilities and the accuracy of warhead delivery to target that has gone on for several decades, victory for the coming decade goes to the accuracy of the missile guidance systems. A MX missile warhead delivered to a launch silo with the current degree of protection (of the order of 100 kg per square centimeter) would destroy it with 0.998 probability, and warheads of the Minuteman-3M ICBM and the Trident-2 SLBM, with 0.921 probability. Two warheads of the Trident-2 SLBM would destroy a launch silo with 0.994 probability. A further increase in launch silo protection requiring big outlays for construction would easily be countered by the use of guided warheads capable with a probability of close to 1 of destroying launch silos with a protection an order of magnitude greater than is customary at the present time.

The data presented in respect to launch silo survivability raise no doubts since the well-known algebraic dependence incorporating three parameters: protection of the launch silo and the power and accuracy of the warhead to be delivered to it, are used for the calculation.

The development of offensive arms has in the past 20 years forced the missile engineers of the USSR (Russia) and the United States to earnestly seek basing versions with an indeterminate location of the ICBM and its launcher. Mobile ground and railroad launchers have been developed, whose survival, even with the prospective means of space reconnaissance (radar, infrared, optical), in a retaliatory strike is six to seven times higher than the survivability of a modern launch silo with a strike against it of one warhead from a Trident-2 missile.

The United States completed the development of ground and railroad ICBM sites, but abandoned their deployment under the conditions strategic arms reduction since it has a potential for a retaliatory strike, thanks to the modernization of submarines and their fitting with Trident-2 missiles, two to three times greater than Russia. In the USSR mobile sites were deployed at the end of the 1980's, which considerably enhanced the efficiency of the strategic nuclear force in the delivery of a retaliatory strike.

In the course of preparation of START I the main efforts of the American side were geared to various prohibitions and limitations of the Strategic Missile Forces' mobile grouping: a ban on the use of several shelters (launchers) for one ICBM, a ban on the Strategic Missile Forces' whole mobile grouping, a ban on the use of railroad sites,

limitation of the strength of the mobile grouping, limitation of the mobile ICBM patrolling areas, notification of changes of position, and so forth. It should be noted that, for the most part, our delegation succeeded in preserving an acceptable strength of the mobile grouping and conditions whereby it remains sufficiently effective.

Today approximately one-third of the ICBM's in the Russian Strategic Missile Forces are mobile, including 72 launchers with Topol missiles that are currently being withdrawn from Belarus. It is contemplated that in the future the Strategic Missile Forces will have 60-70 percent mobile ICBM's and 30-40 percent fixed launch silos. The contribution of the mobile sites to the efficiency of a retaliatory strike of the Strategic Missile Forces here will constitute 80-85 percent, and to the efficiency of the strategic nuclear force, 60-70 percent.

Vulnerability of Mobile Sites in a Conventional War

During operations in position areas of sabotage groups or in the event of a breach of the front of our forces in the course of a conventional war where combat operations are conducted in the disposition of Strategic Missile Forces' units and combined units, mobile sites are more vulnerable than fixed sites. The efficiency of the operations of aviation against mobile and silo launchers with guided aerial bombs or cruise missiles with conventional shells is approximately identical. One single unit of ammunition would with a high degree of probability destroy a protected launch silo thanks to greater hitting accuracy, and it would be easier to destroy a less protected mobile launcher, but harder to find it among several combat launch positions or on traffic routes.

It should be noted, however, that the views of the military-political leadership on the possibility of an aggressor's premeditated destruction with impunity of strategic nuclear weapons in the course of a conventional war are now changing. The "Fundamental Provisions of the Military Doctrine" note that massive strikes against the strategic nuclear force by conventional weapons could bring about a retaliatory nuclear strike. I would like to see this provision strengthened: A premeditated attack with the use of conventional weapons on the strategic nuclear force means the guaranteed start of a nuclear war. It is essential to enshrine this provision politically since only the United States and NATO have the possibility of inflicting a "nonnuclear" strike against the Russian strategic nuclear force, whereas the destruction of the nuclear weapons of the United States by conventional arms is highly problematical.

Thus possible losses of mobile and fixed ICBM's in a conventional war are not a characteristic of the arms but, rather, the degree of tolerance of the leadership of the country observing the annihilation of strategic weapons reduced to a reasonable minimum. The danger of the destruction in a conventional war of mobile ICBM's and the possible consequences are not in the least bit different from the danger of the destruction of nuclear

power stations, chemical plants, nuclear submarine bases, airfields with strategic bombers, and other similar facilities.

Safety of Operation of Mobile Sites in Peacetime

It is obvious that the operation of mobile sites connected with a change of position on prepared routes is potentially more complex and dangerous than ICBM's in launch silos. It is important that these potential threats not become reality.

A particular feature of the mode of the operational use of mobile launchers that is frequently not understood by the critics of this basing version is the fact that the missiles in a permanent state of readiness 96 percent of the time are in battle position, that is, in protected installations where they are dependably guarded by personnel using special facilities for detecting and destroying intruders. The routes for changing the launcher position have engineering support realized in advance, the march is usually undertaken at night, when traffic intensity is low, the launcher is provided with cover in the front and at the rear by special vehicles, the drivers of the launchers are highly skilled specialists who constantly undergo training in simulators and at automotive test grounds, and the driver's work is monitored by the launcher commander and a set of technical facilities.

The enumerated measures have made it possible to markedly increase safety on the march compared with the practical operation of the first SS-20 intermediate-range mobile sites. There were in the process of operation of several hundred SS-20 launchers an average of eight to 10 accidents, breakages, and instances of damage a year, but none of them signified even the preconditions of an incidence of radioactive contamination.

As a result of the great deal of organizing work that was performed in the Strategic Missile Forces, the introduction of new designs, and an improvement in the selection and assignment of launcher driver personnel, the accident rate has declined sharply and the probability of an incident is not more than 0.00001 a year. This means that with the operation of 500 launchers there is a 5 percent probability of an accident at one of them over the course of 10 years. In terms of industrial grading, conditions of occupational activity with such an accident probability are considered safe.

I would like to compare the safety of nuclear weapons in different components of the strategic nuclear force. According to open press data, six catastrophes accompanied by the sinking of the boats, explosions, and fires, the result of which were the loss of nuclear munitions and missiles and also the loss of life of personnel, occurred in the course of the operation of several dozen nuclear submarines in the USSR. But today no one is raising the question of the abandonment of the use of strategic nuclear weapons on nuclear submarines. On the contrary, this component of the strategic nuclear force is in

terms of the proportion of nuclear weapons being augmented. The public is also well aware of the accident rate of our aircraft.

Thus the potential danger of the operation of mobile sites in peacetime is compensated in practice by technical and organizational measures and represents less of a threat to the public and the territories than other components of the strategic nuclear force.

Economy of the Strategic Missile Forces' Grouping With Mobile Sites

Outlays on the creation, introduction to the grouping, and operation over the warranty period of sites with fixed or mobile basing modes per missile, on the whole, are close for prospective fixed and mobile launchers. It should be noted, however, that the bulk of the outlays, for which funding per the "capital construction" item is the most complicated, is composed for the launch silo of expenditure on the reequipping or the construction of a new silo, and for the mobile launcher, on the development of a road network used by more than just the military. For example, the introduction of SS-24 railroad sites made it possible to replace the track, reinforce the bed, install automated equipment and means of communication, and build sidings, which improved the traffic capacity of a pronounced portion of our railroads. The development of a network of roads in the areas where the mobile ground-based sites are located is, naturally, also supported by the local administration. Whereas the public money "dug" into the earth in the construction of a launch silo is not returned even following the dismantling of the launcher and its hand-over to the local authorities.

What Happens if the Program To Create Mobile Sites Is Halted

The fixed and mobile sites in operation will have exhausted their service life by the years 2000-2003. The abandonment of one program without the fulfillment of any other would signify, therefore, the slow extinction of the most efficient and least costly component of the strategic nuclear force. Without the Strategic Missile Forces sea and aviation components could not perform their set assignments of deterring an aggressor. Critics of the program for developing the Strategic Missile Forces grouping based on single-warhead solid-fuel ICBM's with two basing modes should in saying "a" also be saying "b," that is, proposing some reasonable alternative.

Possible Alternative Versions

If we do not ratify START II and develop the strategic nuclear force and the Strategic Missile Forces under the conditions of START I, preserving the current mobile grouping strength, it will be necessary to develop a new missile with multiple reentry vehicles to replace the SS-18 heavy missile and also an SS-24-class light missile for the railroad site. Nor will it be possible to abandon the modernization of the single-warhead missile here

since this part of the grouping will by the years 2000-2003 also need to replace the missiles and launchers. For the Strategic Missile Forces such a program would be at least 30-50 percent more costly, and the grouping's efficiency in a retaliatory strike also would still be determined mainly by the mobile sites.

If START II is ratified (preferably with the proposed adjustments), it will be possible to speak only of the ratio of silo- and mobile-basing single-warhead missiles. But even today more than one-third of the launchers in the grouping are mobile. Since the mobile ground sites are several times more efficient than the silo sites, with an approximately identical cost, it would be expedient to have in the grouping the maximum quantity of them determined by the terms of the START I and START II treaties, with regard, of course, to the actual possibilities of industry, given its limited funding.

Thus the ratification or nonratification of START II will not alter the arterial direction of the development of the Strategic Missile Forces—the transition from missiles with multiple reentry vehicles to single-warhead missiles—since this is determined by the START I treaty that is already in effect (an appreciable limitation on the number of warheads compared with the number of missiles). The START II treaty merely shortens the timeframe of the transition to a single-warhead grouping and, the author believes, is in need of adjustment in this respect prior to ratification with regard to the country's economic situation. It is also obvious that it would be expedient to create the single-warhead grouping on the basis of one standardized Topol-class (SS-25) missile with two types of basing if only because approximately one-third of the ICBM's are of mobile ground basing and have the corresponding infrastructure of the position areas and an evolved system of operation.

Army's Nuclear Monitoring Service Described

*PM0906151994 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 9 Jun 94 p 2*

[Oleg Falichev article: "Secrets of the Nuclear Monsters. U.S. and Soviet Special Services Hunted for Them Even...Underground During Cold War. What About Now?"]

[Text] Everything was going smoothly during the preparations for one of the first treaties between the USSR and the United States on limiting nuclear tests. The sides had agreed that nuclear explosions do irreparable damage to the environment. And in 1974 the treaty "On the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Tests" was signed. But it remained unratified for another 17 years (!)—ratification only occurring in 1991. Why?

First and foremost, owing to the lack of joint services to monitor nuclear weapons tests and the top-secret nature of the national services. During the Cold War everything relating to the development and testing of nuclear monsters was top-secret. Each state strove to retain its priorities in this sphere.

But the most surprising point was something else. No intelligence service was able to obtain the information which was obtained by one of the USSR Defense Ministry's special services. It was set up by a 13 May 1958 government decree. As the document said, it was aimed at organizing permanent monitoring of nuclear weapons testing by foreign states and the development of the requisite ways and means to carry out this task.

A great deal for the technical equipping of the USSR Special Monitoring Service was done by well-known Academicians I.V. Kurchatov and M.A. Sndovskiy.... The very first chief of the service and its creator was Doctor of Technical Sciences Major General A. Ustyumenko, a State Prize winner.

Our Informational Note:

Research into the fundamental possibilities of recording the physical phenomena accompanying nuclear explosions began in the USSR in 1954-1957. That was when the first Armed Forces subunits designed to monitor nuclear weapons tests abroad were set up. The main result of this period was the practical affirmation of the possibility of carrying out such monitoring. The results obtained formed the basis of the USSR's position at the Geneva talks on ending nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in space, and underwater.

For 35 years the Special Monitoring Service managed to stay "in the background," so to speak. (Although one of its subdivisions—the Eshery Seismic Laboratory—has been repeatedly mentioned by the mass media in connection with the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict). Only today can we say something about it. How is it organized? Is it true that it can determine the location of any nuclear test at any test range in the world?

The brain center of the Special Monitoring Service of what is now the Russian Federation Defense Ministry is located in Moscow. This is where the organizational, operational, and scientific center is based. The city of Dubna in Moscow Oblast is home to the Information Collection and Processing Center. And then there are special monitoring laboratories, automated seismic stations, and autonomous observation centers dispersed throughout Russia and even the CIS.

We entered the organizational and operations center. The duty officer—Lieutenant Colonel V. Yakovlev—got up to meet us. Alongside his console are automated workstations equipped with visual display terminals and personal computers for the duty seismologist engineers. Graphics of earthquake intensity cover the walls. On the other side is a huge three-color display screen for monitoring the seismic situation worldwide.

"This is where the data from observation posts located around the country is collated and analyzed," Lt. Col. Yakovlev said. "We can time any nuclear explosion down to the second...."

Readers will clearly already have guessed that the main way of detecting underground nuclear explosions is by

seismic equipment. In order to register the seismic waves generated during the explosion special highly sensitive instruments—seismographs set up in tunnels or wells—are used. The more powerful the explosion, the stronger the seismic wave at the earth's crust and, consequently, the stronger the seismic signals recorded. Information is then transmitted by satellite to Dubna, where high-speed computers (up to 5 million operations per second) process it.

For instance, seismic signals from the nuclear range in Nevada reach us a few minutes later. And in a very short time full details of the underground nuclear explosion (time, place, yield, type, and so forth) are reported to the General Staff. Data from other monitoring methods—gas-aerosol, magnetic, acoustic, and electronic—are used to detect ground, air, and space-based nuclear explosions. It is impossible to talk about each one. I will just say a few words about the aerosol method.

There are observation posts on Russian territory equipped with devices to sample the tiniest aerosol particles from the air. These devices include very simple equipment—gauze-covered tables to collect particles that settle on the ground—and complex filtration and ventilation devices (a kind of huge vacuum cleaner that sucks in thousands of cubic meters of air). That is on the ground. At high altitude specially equipped aircraft are used to sample the aerosols.

The heart of the matter is that radioactive products of nuclear explosions containing radionuclides can occur within the aerosols. From them it is possible to determine the design [ustroystvo] of the nuclear charge and find out whether the state has gone very far in improving its nuclear weapons. This is why at the central laboratory in Moscow aerosol samples are impatiently awaited by physicists and analytical chemists armed with numerous clever instruments.

Specialists can learn a lot, for instance, from using gamma-spectroscopes with semiconductor detectors, mass spectrometers, and laser analyzers. Ultimately all this helps to improve the country's security and is a means of verifying the fulfillment of treaty commitments by other states.

The experience of radiation research was very useful in 1986, when many Special Monitoring Service specialists had to take part in eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster in the first few days after it happened. They experienced all the "joys" of working in the airborne and ground reconnaissance zone and near the smoking reactor.

Our Informational Note:

Over the course of 35 years the Special Monitoring Service has recorded more than 600 different nuclear explosions at foreign test ranges by the United States, France, China, Britain, and India. This has helped the country's leaders to make not only appropriate but technically substantiated political decisions in good time

With the end of the Cold War the problems with monitoring nuclear explosions ought to have diminished. But no, explosions have begun to be carried out solely underground, in tunnels and boreholes. And with small and exceptionally small yields. This has made them harder to detect. Potential nuclear weapon states have also emerged—Israel, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, South Africa, North Korea, and Brazil. The world has started talking about the threat of nuclear terrorism. All this has made sober-minded statesmen seek above all a political solution to this problem. Talks under UN auspices have begun in Geneva on a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

But only two countries currently have highly developed and effective systems for monitoring nuclear tests—Russia and the United States. In other words, the realities of life itself are forcing the two states to pool their efforts. In the quest for new and guaranteed ways and means to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. What progress has been made?

"Plenty," Colonel V. Kovalenko, deputy chief of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry's Special Monitoring Service, said. "In December 1992 we signed a memorandum of cooperation with the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which deals with similar issues. This makes it possible for us to exchange seismic data of potential value for monitoring nuclear weapons tests and to carry out joint experiments...."

This partnership is mutually advantageous, since both Russia and the United States have already reached the limits of the monitoring systems sited on their own territories. The computerized exchange of information between the centers in Dubna and Arlington near Washington is a substantial backup for this monitoring. Moreover, in accordance with the treaty between Russia and the United States on nuclear weapons limitation and testing, we have obtained an opportunity to carry out monitoring at U.S. stations (at Breckhills [name as transliterated], Newport, and Tulsa), while they are able to do so here (at Obninsk, Arti, and Novosibirsk). It is interesting that other countries are already expressing interest in cooperating with the Special Monitoring Service, rightly believing that this will promote the process of global verification of a nuclear test ban and the speedy conclusion of an international treaty in this sphere.

There are also some purely civilian aspects to the Special Monitoring Service's work. Last year it was decided through the Russian Federation Government decree "On the Formation of a Federal Seismological Observation and Earthquake Forecasting System" to pool the efforts of seismologists from the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Special Monitoring Service, and certain other departments to purposefully work on curbing such a terrible force of nature as earthquakes—even though forecasting them is quite a complex and risky business currently being cautiously tackled by only a few scientists around the world. But the Special Monitoring Service has done some good groundwork in this area too. A unique data base on

earthquakes since 1978 has been compiled and a map of earthquake-prone areas has been drawn up.

Huge plans are afoot. There is a readiness to cooperate with Aeroflot and other airlines in issuing information on storm fronts. And to cooperate with customs officials in detecting certain narcotic substances with the help of air analyzers.... But, nonetheless, the main aim is to create a global computer network producing information on nuclear weapons, to become integrated into an international system for the seismic monitoring of nuclear weapons tests, and also to use space-based and other means for purposefully monitoring nuclear weapons. Almost everything—experience, a high level of technical equipment, and unique specialists who training takes many years—is in place to accomplish this.

The United States and Russia are currently not carrying out nuclear tests. I would recall that we have declared a moratorium until September 1994. As has the United States—although B. Clinton is said to have already promised to extend it for another year. We hope to goodness... does. But the Russian Federation Defense Ministry Special Monitoring Service's work will not, I repeat, be diminishing. After all, its very existence is a kind of guarantee and precondition for a nuclear-free world.

GROUND TROOPS

Tunguska Air Defense System

94UM0438.1 Moscow *TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE* in Russian No 1-2, 1994 pp 33-35

[Article by Colonel V. Zhitnikov under rubric "TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE Catalog": "Tunguska Gun-Missile Air Defense System"]

[Text] The system is intended for air defense of motorized rifle (tank) regiment subunits against strikes by tactical and army aviation, fire support helicopters, cruise missiles and remotely piloted vehicles, and also for engaging lightly armored ground targets and personnel. The system is capable of engaging targets at a range up to 8 km and at an altitude up to 3.5 km. It includes a self-propelled antiaircraft mount, loader/transporter, servicing and maintenance equipment, and an automated monitoring and test station. The self-propelled antiaircraft mount on a tracked chassis (MT-S) base is the system's weapon platform. A hydromechanical transmission and hydropneumatic suspension are used in the chassis construction and provide high off-road capability, good maneuverability, and smoothness of movement over rugged terrain, which permits firing on the move.

Two 2A38M twin-barrel automatic antiaircraft guns covered by an armored jacket are located on the sides of a turret with 360° traverse. Their principle of action is based on using the energy of powder gases led off through a special opening of the barrels into gas cylinders. A liquid evaporation system is used to cool the barrels. The

twin-barrel configuration of the automatic gun permits an intensive rate of fire of up to 5,000 rounds per minute. The automatic guns have a belt feed. The ammunition belt is filled with standardized 30-mm rounds with the help of a ramming machine [nabivoch-naya mashinka]. The loader/transporter loads the unit of fire. Loading time for a full unit of fire is 16 minutes.

Shipping-launching containers with missiles also are situated on the sides of the turret and protected by an armored enclosure. They perform functions of sealed storage container and launcher. The system's 9M311 guided missile is bicaliber and two-stage. It has a separating solid-propellant booster motor which gives the missile a speed of almost three times that of sound. The launch weight is half that of single-stage missiles with similar characteristics. The small-caliber propulsion stage preserves high speed on the entire flight path. The missile warhead is continuous-rod/fragmentation. It has impact and proximity fuzes, which ensures destruction of a target both with a direct hit as well as when flying by it at a distance of up to 5 meters.

The missile control system is semiautomatic, with a radio command communications link. The light flux from a light source installed on the missile hits the optical direction finder and is converted into an electrical signal proportional to deflection from line of sight. The signal goes to the central computer system, which generates control commands. Then they are transmitted in the form of coded pulses through the tracking station

to the missile, where the gear generates commands for controlling the steering drive. The missile is moved onto the line of sight and held there.

The radar system of the air defense system consists of acquisition and tracking radars as well as a ground interrogator. The acquisition radar has a high scan rate and reliable means of suppressing a signal from local objects, which permits discriminating low-flying targets at ranges up to 18 km with high probability. The interrogator operates in two radio wavebands and provides guaranteed target recognition. The tracking radar accomplishes automatic lock-on and tracking of a target at a range up to 16 km. Hydraulic drives support precise, rapid training of weapons in a wide dynamic range when firing from in place and in movement.

The system's high-speed central computer system was developed based on the series-produced Aron-15 computer. It monitors the status of weapon systems, of the turret horizontal gunlaying drive, and of the entire system by simulating an aircraft overflight. It outputs data on target parameters and generates data for firing missile-gun armament. The majority of operations for controlling systems of the air defense system are the responsibility of the computer and automatic equipment unit. This permits a crew with average skills to perform combat work successfully. A team consists of four persons: commander, operator, gunner and driver. The Tunguska is outfitted with special equipment for protecting the crew against weapons of mass destruction and for creating normal conditions for its functioning within the turret.

Specifications and Performance Characteristics

| | |
|---|-----------|
| Kill zone range, km | |
| missile armament | 2.5-8.0 |
| gun armament | 0.2-4.0 |
| Kill zone altitude, km | |
| missile armament | 0.015-3.5 |
| gun armament | 0-3.0 |
| Range of fire against ground targets, km | 2.0 |
| Speed of engaged targets, m/sec | Up to 500 |
| Reaction time (during an overflight), sec | 8-10 |
| Kill probability | |
| missile armament | 0.5-0.8 |
| gun armament | 0.3-0.6 |
| Unit of fire | |
| surface-to-air missiles | 8 |
| 30-mm standardized cartridges | 1,936 |
| Weight of fighting vehicle, t | 34.0 |

Combat work is accomplished as follows. The surveillance radar scans air space while in place and in movement. After acquisition, targets are identified. The system commander, after determining that there is a target, selects the kind of armament (gun or missile) and passes target designations to the operator for lock-on and

tracking. The operator monitors automatic lock-on on the radar screens. If the enemy employs communications jamming, the target is locked-on in a manual mode. The tracking radar outputs precise target designations over synchronous communications to the optical sight and moves it onto the line of sight. The gunner detects the

target in the sight's field of view, takes it for tracking, and holds the sight aiming mark on the target in the process of guidance. Data go from the radar to the central computer system for controlling successive fire on targets by missiles and gun armament. Based on results of fire, the commander makes the decision on transferring fire to another target. System reaction time from the moment of target acquisition to firing on the target is 8-10 seconds.

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AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Free-Flight Aviation Rockets

94UM0438B Moscow *TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE* in Russian No 1-2, 1994 p 46

[Unattributed article]

[Text] The Novosibirsk Applied Physics Institute demonstrated its military products for the first time at the Moscow Air Show-92 international exhibition. These are

the S-8 and S-13 free-flight rocket weapon systems with rockets with solid-propellant engines and various types of warheads. They are mounted on combat aircraft (helicopters) and intended for engaging enemy armored equipment, engineer works and personnel.

Platforms for the S-8 80-mm free-flight air-launched weapons are Su-17M, Su-24, Su-25, Su-27, MiG-23 and MiG-27 aircraft and also Mi-8, Mi-24, Mi-28 and K-252 helicopters. Its 20 rockets are accommodated in the special B-8M1 rocket pod (length 3,550 mm, diameter 410 mm, empty weight 160 kg, loaded weight 400 kg). It has a conical nose section and good aerodynamic properties. The very same number of rockets is accommodated on helicopters in the B-8V20 rocket pod (length 1,790 mm, diameter 521 mm, empty weight 100 kg, loaded weight 342 kg).

The more powerful S-13 122-mm free-flight air-launched rocket weapon system is used on Su-27 and MiG-29 fighters and Su-25 attack aircraft. Its five rockets are located in the B-13L rocket pod (length 3,558 mm, diameter 410 mm, empty weight 160 kg, loaded weight 510 kg).

Specifications and Performance Characteristics of Rockets

| | S-8KOM | S-8BM | S-8DM | S-8DM |
|--------------------|-----------------------------|----------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------|
| Type warhead | Shaped-charge fragmentation | Armor-piercing | With bulk penetrating mixture | Illuminating detonating |
| Warhead weight, kg | 3.6 | 7.41 | 3.63 | 4.3 |
| Weight, kg | | | | |
| explosive | 0.9 | 0.6 | | |
| mixture | - | - | 2.15 | |
| compound | - | - | - | 1.0 |
| Length, mm | 1,570 | 1,540 | 1,700 | 1,632 |
| Weight, kg | 11.3 | 15.2 | 11.6 | 12.1 |
| Launch range, km | | | | |
| from aircraft | 1.3-4 | 1.2-2.2 | 1.3-3 | 4-4.5 |
| from helicopter | 8.5-2 | - | 8.5-2 | 4-4.5 |
| Speed, m/sec | 166-330 | 166-330 | 166-330 | 166-330 |

Specifications and Performance Characteristics of Rockets

| | S-13 | S-13T | S-13OF |
|-------------------------|-------------|--|---|
| Type warhead | Penetrating | Twin-module, penetrating, fragmentation-HE | Fragmentation-HE, organized fragmentation |
| Warhead weight, kg | 23 | 37.3 | 33 |
| Weight of explosive, kg | 1.92 | 4.5 | 7 |
| Length, mm | 2,900 | 3,100 | 2,898 |
| Weight, kg | 60 | 75 | 69 |
| Launch range, km | 1.1-4.0 | 1.1-3.0 | 1.6-3.0 |
| Speed, m/sec | 166-330 | 166-330 | 166-330 |

Write to the following address for additional information and with suggestions: 630117, Novosibirsk, ul. Sibuzova, 1/1, Applied Physics Institute. Telephone: (3832) 32-18-50. Fax: (3832) 32-18-56.

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REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Disposal of Unused Garrison Facilities

94UM0432A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 May 94 p.1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Ivan Ivanyuk. "Military Posts Are Going 'Into Retirement.' Do They Really Face Destruction or Neglect?"]

[Text] "Live at home, and your home will not collapse." These words of the poet about something simple and not painfully affecting everyone who has seen the senseless destruction are, unfortunately, valid not just for wars and conflicts. When the Russian Army went into action and began abandoning the familiar garrisons abroad, and all of us sighed as we calculated the property losses, it could not have occurred to anyone that we would squander far more in our own fatherland. And when, with the reduction of the Armed Forces in Russia, military posts began to be vacated, it turned out that there was actually no one in charge of them....

"A military unit was deployed in Krasnoglinskiy Rayon in the city of Samara," V. Ageychenko, chairman of the pension committee of the Alliance for the Social Protection of Pensioners, wrote to the editors. "It occupied two 100-apartment buildings, a messhall and other premises. The unit left in the spring of 1993, however. The buildings stand there without windows, floors or doors and continue to deteriorate. We went everywhere: to the police, the procurator's office, the city administration.... There is no one to be found to look after the post. No one is doing anything; everyone is blaming everyone else....

Unfortunately, such letters are not isolated entities in our mail. Even though alarm signals are coming in from various areas of the nation, from the Transbaykal to the Moscow region, they do not provide a complete picture of the scale of what is happening. The list of military posts vacated in 1993-1994 within the Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense is extremely vast. It was compiled by Russia's State Committee for Property and the Central Directorate of Material Resources of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense in October of last year and includes 312 posts. This means hundreds of

apartment buildings, clubs, barracks, messhalls, storage facilities, garages, parking lots and filling stations—property with a value of billions of rubles. And the number of posts whose fate has been decided can be counted on the fingers of one hand.

Why has this happened? Is there actually no one who would like to acquire all of this property? Or is the possibility of rectifying the financial affairs of the Ministry of Defense, which, quite frankly, did not receive very much in the privatization process, not obvious? There are more than enough good intentions, but the hitch lies in the fact that all of the ukases, decrees and directives issued up to this point have not provided a precisely defined system for utilizing or selling the military's real property. The military posts are federal property, and the Ministry of Defense must coordinate their sale with the State Committee for Property. According to Russia's Land Code, however, the land on which they are located belongs to local government agencies. And the latter say that if you want to sell your buildings, dismantle them and take them wherever you see fit.

While such debate is going on, "popular privatization" is underway on the sly. The people are starting to remove everything they can. They ask why the property should go to waste, all the more since there is no one to guard it. This is a slight exaggeration, but the fact remains that missiles have been dismantled and local aficionados have gradually not just removed refrigeration and other equipment of any value but have used toilet to blow up things which could not be dismantled..

A more detailed inventory of vacated military posts was recently conducted in the Ministry of Defense. They were all broken down into groups, to each of which a special approach will be taken. The most "prestigious" are the posts which it is planned to auction off. Those which cannot be sold will be transferred to the pool of local authorities or written off entirely as an expense.

Instructions for selling the posts and some initial experience already exist. There is just no confidence that the Ministry of Defense will earn a great deal. Even the state in general has not become any richer from this area of revenue. Furthermore, anyone attracted to the military property must provide firm guarantees, and these are presently stuck in a vicious circle of the State Committee for Property, the Ministry of Defense and local authorities.

Many specialists agree that the only rational route, given the present legal regulation of the land issue, is to lease out the military posts. And it would be the fair thing to give priority as lessees to reserve officers, whose privatization interests have not yet been taken fully into account.

The military posts could be turned into enterprises where reserve officers and their wives could work. Their retraining could be organized directly for the kind of production engaged in by the enterprise. The leased facilities and land would remain within the Ministry of Defense and provide profits for solving the social problems of military personnel.

One specific project for deciding the future of the military posts in this way has been worked out by the Independent Trade Union of Military Personnel and submitted to the government. It calls for setting up an auction association, one of whose founders would be the Ministry of Defense. The plan is meeting with support from commercial structures. Specifically, Tveruniversalbank is prepared to finance it. The Russian Business Center for Reserve Servicemen set up under the Independent Trade Union of Military Personnel is already working out the technical feasibility for building motor-vehicle service centers out of two large garrisons on the Moscow-St. Petersburg and Moscow-Smolensk routes. It is planned to locate a Moscow area center near Golitsyno-2, one of the main basing sites for military space personnel, which already has some experience in the retraining and job placement of reserve officers.

There are other options as well: for example, selling the posts together with the land. In any case drastic steps must be taken so that the inheritance of the armed forces, created by the labor of more than just a single generation, is not thrown to the wind or sold for next to nothing to those who are totally unconcerned about the military problems or the fate of the former servicemen.

Servicemen's Social Protection Measures Not Working

PM0906104394 Moscow TRUD in Russian 9 Jun 94 p 1

[Fedor Yemchenko report: "Officers, Eyes Right! But No Money Left"]

[Text] Mikhail Kolchev, chairman of the Independent Trade Union of Servicemen Central Committee, and Sergey Obrezanov, vice president of the State Security Veterans Club, held a press conference yesterday.

"The social tension in military units and aboard naval vessels is increasing all the time," Mikhail Kolchev said. "The Northern Fleet command, for instance, have not received their pay for three months. Around 140,000 officers have been forced to rent corners of other people's apartments.

"The president and the government," the Independent Trade Union of Servicemen leader noted, "have issued dozens of edicts and decrees aimed at ensuring social protection for servicemen. But these documents are not working. Local authorities are impeding in every possible way the implementation of the state program to build housing for officers discharged to the reserve."

Last year sufficient funds were allocated for these purposes. But the regions have only received half of the money. As a result, not a single [square] meter of housing has been commissioned in Murmansk. The housing program has been just 3 percent fulfilled.

The suits filed by the trade union with judicial organs alleging a failure to use state funds properly have not led to anything. Russian justice could find no legal grounds for initiating proceedings against those responsible.

UKRAINE

Leaders Convene Conference on Measures To Improve Discipline

Radetskyy Stresses Impact on Force Readiness

94UM04131 Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
5 May 94 pp 1-2

[Excerpt from presentation of Minister of Defense of Ukraine General of the Army of Ukraine Vitaliy Radetskyy at a practical-science conference: "Military Discipline—A Very Important Component of Combat Readiness"]

[Text] The Armed Forces, along with the chief task of ensuring the protection of the independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine, face the task of taking into account, in military development under contemporary conditions, the dynamic of changes in geopolitical circumstances and the accomplishment of a great deal of work that would make it possible to ensure in quality fashion the national security of Ukraine.

One of the chief places among the multifaceted areas of that activity belongs to the strengthening of military discipline. Military discipline is one type of state discipline, and has particular significance for the Armed Forces. It performs a role of an organizational nature, and instills orders in and protects the system of relations within the setting of the military collectives. Military discipline is undoubtedly one of the most important constituent elements of the combat readiness of the troops and the functioning of the Armed Forces as a whole. We are in extreme need today of a state of affairs under which every serviceman would knowingly fulfill the laws and norms of morality. Numerous instances, however, testify that we are still far away from that.

A considerable number of legal offenses were committed over the first quarter of this year in the ranks. And even though the increase is insignificant compared to the same statistical period for 1993, it must be admitted that a serious situation has taken shape in the Army. The state of military discipline as a whole is eliciting considerable concern in the Air Forces, the troops of the Odessa Military District and the ground forces. The supply of housing and the health of people remain acute problems among the troops.

The prevention of absence without leave from units by conscript servicemen and searching for them is not being resolved in satisfactory fashion.

The moral-psychological climate in many military subunits is not improving, and there are instances of non-regulation relations and barracks hooliganism; the overall number of instances of non-regulation relations in the Armed Forces of Ukraine this year has increased compared to the analogous period of last year.

The number of crimes connected with the theft of state property is increasing. One out of nine crimes is the theft of material assets of military units, organizations and institutions.

Why, while constantly and daily occupied with questions of strengthening military discipline, are we forced to admit that there is a drop in the overall level of organization and order and a rise in the crime rate?

The unfavorable influence of the social climate that is taking shape surrounding the Armed Forces is being felt first of all. The increased difficulty of the socio-economic situation in Ukraine, the negative processes that are taking place in society and being recreated in the Armed Forces, are leading to an increase in psychological tensions, apathy, confusion and uncertainty for the future in the officer corps, and are affecting the socio-psychological phenomena that constitute the foundation of its moral-psychological state.

Military sociological polling on problems of the social sentiments of servicemen in the Armed Forces of Ukraine has shown, at the same time, that the officer corps of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, despite all of the difficulties and problems of everyday life, still has a certain reserve of professional energy that permits the state and military leadership to count on the maintenance of the necessary level of combat and mobilization readiness in the units and subunits of the Armed Forces. This is testified to by the fact that close to 49 percent of the officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine have a positive attitude toward their social status today, and are striving for the realization of creative initiative, the discovery of intellectual and physical capabilities and characteristics of will in their service activity. These values occupy the second and third places respectively after the aspiration for material security, which is natural under our conditions.

Second, the higher leadership of the Armed Forces still has a reserve of trust among the overwhelming majority of the officer corps. This is the opinion of 72 percent of the servicemen who were polled for their assessment of the reasons for the problems and troubles in the Armed Forces. This credit of trust should be utilized by us as a means of consolidating and rallying the personnel in the contemporary stage of development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

At the same time, if we do not make use of the patriotic potential of the officer corps, the consequences could be disastrous for the Armed Forces. The results of research also testify to this.

We military people, however, in speaking of the immediate and organic dependence of military organization on the state of affairs in society as a whole, do not have the right to be troubled by it ourselves. One also cannot help but see the fact that our methods of activity are not in harmony with the actual circumstances and extraordinary conditions which the Armed Forces and state are in. There are many who approach the problems of today

with the measures of yesterday, who do not see the disparity of the decisions that are being made with the way the Armed Forces are living and what people expect of them. That is happening in the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense as well.

We have also not been able to make a qualitative breakthrough in stabilizing military discipline because certain methods of work that had positive results under the conditions of the Armed Forces of the former Soviet Union have not yet played themselves out today, but have rather become a distinctive kind of brake. A number of generals and officers have had great difficulty getting rid of the approaches of yesterday in the indoctrination of the personnel and the strengthening of discipline. "Force" forms and "command pedagogy" frequently have the opposite effect. The human factor is being taken into account in word but not in deed.

The generals and officers of the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense, on questions of strengthening military discipline, must in the spirit of personal responsibility

- improve the style and methods of management activity, and raise their personal executive discipline and responsibility for the ultimate results of the training of the troops;
- fundamentally rebuild the process of working through and making decisions on questions of military discipline;
- promptly review issues raised by the troops, be an example of energetic action to eliminate shortcomings and to strengthen organization and law and order, and raise comprehensively the effectiveness of organizational, executive and legal assurance of the fulfillment of the requirements of the Temporary Regulations of the Armed Forces;
- forego inspectional activity and move to organizational-creative activity among the troops on the basis of professionalism, a critical attitude toward each step, and checking of oneself through practical results. This is also important because a significant change in cadres has occurred over the last two years in the regiment—brigade—division—corps—district echelons. The overwhelming majority of senior officers and commanders do not have sufficient practical experience. Shouting, abuse and image cannot train them to lead their subordinate units and formations in competent fashion. This signifies that we must not only learn ourselves, but also teach our subordinates and provide practical assistance in the field;
- display constant concern for the professional growth of cadres in subordinate military structures, and provide practical assistance without excessive administration in the formation of a healthy moral atmosphere among the military collectives; and

—be highly demanding of those who have a disdainful attitude toward the needs and aspirations of the troops, or who make formalistic assessments of the state of affairs in subordinate units.

Our prestige as military leaders and our successes in the key areas of the organizational development of the Armed Forces as a whole will depend to a significant extent on this.

Third. We must look in a new way at the problems of the moral-psychological state of all categories of servicemen under the conditions of the destabilization of the situation in the state and the changes that are occurring in the vital activity of the Armed Forces, as is required by the Military Doctrine of Ukraine. There can be no strong military discipline, no official activity in the mastery of military hardware and weaponry, no reliable maintenance of the guaranteed level of combat readiness and battleworthiness without these components.

The Main Directorate for Indoctrination Work must take more decisive steps in the direction of the systematic development and formulation of a healthy moral-psychological state among the personnel along with the principal criteria for evaluating it, both in peacetime and in special times. Serious and practical work is needed. A unification of the efforts of all the directorates of the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense is expected for the accomplishment of that task.

The moral-psychological training of personnel is a constituent element of combat readiness. The commanders and superior officers supervising combat training, however, also have an effect on spiritual processes in the military environment.

Very serious work still lies ahead for us in order to see that the moral-psychological factor is activated. It would be expedient, in my opinion, to begin promptly the development of a system for the study, analysis and resolution of problems of the moral-psychological state of the troops. I feel that the question of more profound and scientific study of the problem of the moral-psychological state could be the subject of discussion at one of the practical-science conferences of the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense in 1995, after the completion of the first stage of the organizational development of the Armed Forces. This does not signify, however, that this question will only be raised a year from now. The results of work on these problems should be passed along to the military administrative elements at all levels to the extent of the receipt of those results, and they should pass through the prism of military practice during training, maneuvers and exercises.

Fourth. The skill of the military personnel to conduct purposeful indoctrination work gains great value in strengthening military discipline under the conditions of the democratization of army life. Practice today demands that we think about the creation of an indoctrination mechanism for strengthening military discipline. We are unfortunately not able to do this to the full

extent today, because we do not yet have a scientifically substantiated system of views on the indoctrination of the personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. And that is not just a pretty theoretical reference. Life itself dictates the development of a national theory of the indoctrination process in the Armed Forces. The difficult socio-economic and political situation in Ukraine and around it, around the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the sometime impossibility of foreseeing the development of this situation, the ideological fragmentation and uncertainty in the consciousness of people, the wholesale denigration of all and everything, including the best traditions of the Armed Forces of the former USSR, whence we all came, and the denigration of the young Ukrainian Army are all undermining the morale of the troops and causing a real necessity of urgent measures of a political, economic, organizational, educational and moral-psychological nature to strengthen the moral-psychological climate for servicemen in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The national theory of the indoctrination of the personnel, in my opinion, should reflect all aspects of the indoctrination work with the troops, from the basic aims and concepts and the system of views to the preparation and distribution of cadres of logistical and financial support for the indoctrination process. A prominent place in it should belong to the substance, forms and methods of military indoctrination and the educational mechanism for strengthening military discipline.

This should signify, first of all, a thorough knowledge of circumstances at all levels of the army organism, their constant analysis, the clear-cut distribution of duties of all officials on which the improvement of military discipline depends for the officers and generals of the directorates of the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense—when what and how each of them should be doing what. The speeches of the generals and officers of the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense to the personnel on topical problems in military organizational development must be put into practice.

The preparations for the fiftieth anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War are opening up broad possibilities for expanding the work to indoctrinate the personnel in the combat traditions of the people who, in unified combat ranks with the peoples of the former USSR and the anti-Hitlerite coalition, made a substantial contribution to the rout of German fascism and Japanese militarism. The martial glories of the warriors of Ukraine should be turned into a continuously running generator for the formation of civil consciousness and patriotism.

The system of humanities training for the personnel should be an important factor in the indoctrination process. Much is being done in this area, but there are many shortcomings as well. Significant corrections in both the substance and the forms of the work are required. One cannot circumvent, in speaking of the indoctrination of discipline, the problems of the individualization of that process based on the utilization of the

achievements of general and military psychology and sociology. Much cadre, theoretical and practical work lies ahead in this area. I feel, in the area of content, that a system of socio-psychological support for military discipline that would be composed of four basic elements should be created in the Armed Forces.

First is a unified system of military professional and psychological selection.

Second is socio-psychological support for military-professional activity.

Third is the psychological training of all categories of personnel in official positions.

Fourth is intensified special and dedicated moral-psychological training, depending on the specific nature of the professional activity.

The creation of a system of indoctrinational work in the Armed Forces and an indoctrinational mechanism for the strengthening of military discipline is one of our chief tasks. This requires high competence and initiative, great inner organization and personal discipline from every officer and general in the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense. A very great deal already depends on us today if we want to be the Ministry of Defense of a great European power—Ukraine.

Fifth, it is important to impart a steadfast social-legal orientation to the process of strengthening military discipline. The priority areas of the military policy of the leadership of Ukraine and the activity of the Ministry of Defense should thus be constant attention toward the problems of social protections for servicemen.

There is an urgent need for the rapid development of measures to ensure the stabilization of the social situation of officer personnel, and especially certain socio-demographic and professional categories.

The Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the Military Collegium of the Ministry of Defense, notwithstanding the difficult economic conditions, are devoting constant attention to the problems of social security for servicemen. The discussion concerns, first and foremost, carrying out compensatory measures under conditions of inflation and permanent price rises, and the resolution of the housing problem. On the agenda is the development of drafts of such legislation in the sphere of social protections for servicemen. It is very important here to learn to accumulate both our own and overseas experience.

We must think seriously about the development of a comprehensive, dedicated program for the social development of the Armed Forces. The essence of them, in my view, should consist of a scientifically substantiated definition of the aims, tasks, indications and measures, the establishment of the deadlines, rates and proportions of the development of the military-professional spiritual and social spheres from the military unit or ship up to the Armed Forces as a whole, and in the long run, the

full-scale integration of the social sphere of the Army into the social sphere of all of society. The generals and officers of the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine should structure their organizational and indoctrination work among the troops exclusively on the basis of the laws of Ukraine, the edicts and directives of the President of Ukraine as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and statutes and orders. A situation must be sought in which the law is respected to an identical extent and is upheld by both superior officers and subordinates. The organization of a regulation way of life and the introduction of monitoring of the upholding of law and order should be a prominent direction of our work.

The Minister of Defense of Ukraine, referring to the participants in the conference, emphasized that "We will never raise discipline if we do not work on prevention. But military-social activity is not a static, fixed structure from a dynamic point of view; it is a unity of processes and phenomena that change and develop. We should thus be concerned with the introduction of scientific approaches to studying the reasons for offenses, predicting the possible development of processes in discipline and devising paramount and long-term preventive measures. In the sphere of social-legal work to strengthen military discipline, we must single out more clearly the principal chains that are linked with the contemporary turnaround stage in the emergence of the Ukrainian state and military organizational development. The main thing here, in my opinion (and this is very important today), is to advance not by means of an escalation of the arrogant conclusions of verbal courage, but rather by means of penetration to the very depths of social-legal problems on the basis of accumulated experience, a scientific approach and their guaranteed resolution in the interests of the person in uniform."

Sixth, the successful strengthening of military discipline is possible only with a well-versed knowledge of its real situation. Objective, timely and complete information on violations of regulation order, incidents and crimes has great significance in this regard. This information should be present at all levels of military administration, from the subunit to the Ministry of Defense. The organizational measures of commanders and staffs of the bodies for indoctrination work at all levels should occupy an even more important place in this matter.

The institution of regulation order, increased exactingness toward subordinates, improvement of the system of monitoring and the application of disciplinary practice should all be of an effective, educational nature. I feel that it is essential that the officers of the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense analyze diligently the fulfillment of the requirements of orders, directives and instructions pertaining to the strengthening of military discipline, make an assessment of the organization of that activity by commanders, staffs and bodies for indoctrination work, and provide practical assistance on this issue during the end-of-training-period performance evaluations in the ranks.

Kobzar Stresses Moral-Psychological Factors

94UM0413B Kiev *NARODNA ARMIYA* in Ukrainian
5 May 94 pp 1-2

[Article prepared from a speech by Main Directorate for Indoctrination and Moral-Psychological Work of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Chief Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Kobzar to a practical-science conference by *NARODNA ARMIYA* correspondent Lieutenant-Colonel Volodymyr But: "We Will Be Able To Reach Better Indicators of Military Discipline Only Through Purposeful Influence on the Moral-Psychological State of the Troops"]

[Text] Analysis of the state of military discipline in the Armed Forces of Ukraine shows that no qualitative changes have been achieved in this issue. This signifies, first of all, that the complex military organism is not working as it should and, second, that the forms and methods we have chosen to strengthen military discipline have not been effective.

The low level of military discipline by no means testifies to the healthy and strong moral-psychological state of the troops—an indicator that, as world experience shows, has no less significance for the Armed Forces than modern weaponry.

So what the moral-psychological state of the troops mean? It is, on a general plane, the set of spiritual qualities of the personnel that signifies its conformity to the tasks of military service. The moral-psychological state of the troops, that is, is reduced to the so-called "human factor," with all of its multitude of components.

The military person should have not only a national and political awareness that is psychologically well grounded and emotionally committed to his Fatherland, but should also be well fed, dressed, armed and physically and professionally prepared for the performance of his duties. The moral-psychological state of the troops is based on a whole series of components. We are talking first and foremost namely about those, since we are primarily interested in the areas of practical work. And the components of a strong moral-psychological state, and not its traits, goes back to that.

Science shows that, first, it is impossible to formulate specifically any trait of a strong moral-psychological state, and second, that any of these traits can be formulated only through all-round influence on all of the constituent elements that make it up. In order to form such an integral trait as courage, for example, among the personnel, it is necessary to foster a thrust toward certain values, psychological tempering and physical durability, the people must be well armed, since courage relies on confidence in one's powers, and so forth.

The indicator of the moral-psychological state encompasses a very broad circle of areas of work, and reacts with sensitivity to a great many of the factors under which the military person operates. It is, that is to say, an

integrating indicator in which a multitude of components are focused, each of which proceeds from the satisfaction of these or those requirements of people starting with the biological and ending with the spiritual. The level of development of spiritual requirements itself is definitive in the evaluation of the moral-psychological state.

These views lead us to the conclusion that strengthening the moral-psychological state of the troops will require work with areas that lie outside the jurisdiction of the bodies for indoctrination work as well. It must thus be acknowledged that overall responsibility for the moral-psychological state of the personnel lies with the commander as the chief organizer and sole ultimate authority.

There exists a fundamentally important general law for us, however—the same way that certain factors affect the moral-psychological state of the troops, that state also affects the perception of any factor in their everyday conditions by the personnel, the level of insecurity in housing, a narrow circle of association etc. The level of development of spiritual requirements and a streamlined system for satisfying them are able to compensate for even the substantial problems that military-professional activity, and the conduct of combat operations in particular, entails. That is why the bodies for indoctrination work occupy a central place in the cause of strengthening the moral-psychological state of the troops.

We will be able to reach a better indicator of the military discipline only through purposeful influence on the moral-psychological state of the troops. That influence should be exercised by all the elements of field command and control. The methods of that influence differ in accordance with the specific tasks.

How can military discipline be maintained at a more or less satisfactory level under conditions where the level of discipline among the personnel remains low? We have always been trying to do just that by directing our efforts in raising military discipline mainly toward the creation of conditions where an undisciplined—that is, psychologically ready for an offense—serviceman was forced to uphold stipulated norms through the intensification of monitoring, increased exactingness etc. Life has shown that we were not able to achieve a radical change in the situation with such an approach.

So the way to strengthen military discipline, from the scientific point of view, lies in influencing the moral-psychological state of the troops as one with the level of discipline of the personnel—the main precondition for strong military discipline.

We understand that educational influences on the personnel on the part of indoctrination bodies alone are insufficient to achieve positive indicators of the moral-psychological state of the troops.

There is, by the way, another positive element connected with our orientation toward the concept of the moral-psychological state in the cause of strengthening military discipline, as well as the fighting ability of the troops—such an orientation allows us not to destroy the important components of practical work and not to focus on indoctrination alone.

We proceed from the fact that the formation of the level of discipline as a socio-psychological trait should be accomplished at both the conscious and the subconscious levels of each individual consciousness. This is achieved in practice thanks to the combination of measures of an indoctrinational, including ideological, work and measures for the socio-psychological support of military service in an interconnected system.

Indoctrination work in the Armed Forces is directed toward the formation of such personality traits as patriotism, ideological loyalty to the cause of building and protecting the Ukrainian state, respect for the law, and a conscientious attitude toward service obligations.

Both commanders at all levels and the corresponding officials of the bodies for indoctrination work—the deputy commanders, ethnic studies specialists, and workers in culture and education—are working on namely those tasks.

A great deal has been done in particular with regard to the development of guiding documents and the institution of standards for indoctrination work in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The standard complements of the Centers for Culture, Education and Leisure of the Armed Forces of Ukraine have been developed in accordance with the areas and amounts of their work. The Minister of Defense has signed the order "The Conduct of a Review Competition of the Centers of Culture, Education and Leisure, Collectives of Artistic Amateur Activities, Clubs and Ethnic-Studies Rooms," the provisions and requirements of which have been adopted by the troops for fulfillment, with the aim of a qualitative rise in the level of cultural and indoctrination work.

But it must be acknowledged as a whole that indoctrination work on our part is still unfortunately reduced to the ordinary informing of the personnel, while it should be emotionally amusing, should incite deep passions in servicemen, a historical memory of their people, a universal perception of their forefathers, and be based on subconscious national traits and models of behavior. Then the indoctrination work will bring significantly better results in the cause of strengthening the moral-psychological state of the troops and the level of discipline of the personnel. We are thus directing ourselves toward a search for and re-creation of new, vital forms of indoctrination work. An organizational structure of the bodies for indoctrination work has been developed and incorporated for this purpose that makes it possible to encompass all of these areas. We are devoting primary attention to the training of officials in practical work and

the satisfaction of the needs of the Armed Forces for methodological support for the work with personnel—both in the form of practical recommendations, making use for that purpose of the capabilities of the Scientific-Research and Methodological Center of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and special issues of the newspapers NARODNA ARMIYA and ZVYTYAZHETS, and in the form of specialized techniques and tests, oriented first and foremost toward those questions that are the most pressing.

Some questions of practical work require further scientific study, which would make it possible to reach a level of support of social technologies in work with the personnel. In order for the process of transition to those technologies to begin as soon as possible, we have ordered and are coordinating the corresponding research programs. They are being carried out both by our own military specialists, and by leading scholars of the Institute of Sociology and Psychology of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine.

The question not only of scientific-methodological support for the work with personnel, but raising the psychological and pedagogical competence of all officer personnel, is an ever more pressing one on the agenda. Each officer is an educator and pedagogue in the broad understanding of those words, and life requires today—and will require in the future—that we place emphasis on that

The deputy commander for indoctrination work cannot stand apart from the broad circle of questions that pertain one way or another to the interests and needs of the person. And this in turn requires a reliance on the mechanism for the administration of bodies of indoctrination work. We do not have such an opportunity today even in some very important areas. The fact is that some extremely necessary structures do not even exist, they have not been created. I have in mind the departments for indoctrination work of the administration of the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff.

The definition of indicators for evaluating the quality of work of the bodies for military administration in this area, as well as the set-up of a system for the corresponding information support, that is, a system of accounting for the work, is a fundamentally important issue in the cause of strengthening military discipline.

The importance of this question is connected with the fact that it pertains to feedback, without which positive results in the activity of administrative bodies cannot be achieved.

The principal requirement for any feedback is that it should correspond to the substance of the practical work. A scientific approach to this question is such, and we are oriented namely toward that. Structuring feedback using indicators of the quantity of violations of military discipline and crimes is renewing the erroneous system of concealment and focus on secondary measures and areas of work that will never provide stable and profound positive results.

Leaders Attend Conference To Discuss Strengthening Discipline

Speakers, Problems, Goals Noted

94UM0414A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
5 May 94 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Strengthening Law and Order and Discipline Is a Priority Area in the Activity of Military Cad.es")]

[Text] The "Legal and Socio-Psychological Problems of Military Discipline and Regulation Order in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Ways of Strengthening Them Today" practical-science conference of the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense was held the other day.

Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Main Directorate for Indoctrination Work Chief Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Kobzar made the opening remarks at the meeting; he stated in particular that "the problem of military discipline and law and order in the ranks has always attracted the attention of theoreticians and practitioners, thanks to which a definite increase can be observed every year in knowledge and experience in the study of this social aspect of the vital activity of the Army. Notwithstanding this, the state of military discipline has grown significantly worse, and there exists a steady trend toward growth in such types of offenses as evasion of military service, the theft of state property and official abuses. The number of instances of suicides remains very high in the Army. Life forces us to address this problem again and again, and to make an attempt to find and realize new reserves to improve organizational and indoctrination work.

"The practical-science conference was devoted to all of these issues as well. The task is to study deeply the problems of law and order and military discipline, which are becoming more and more widespread, by moving beyond the traditional framework and encompassing not only purely statistical data, but the host of preconditions that give rise to them."

He gave the floor to Minister of Defense of Ukraine General of the Army of Ukraine Vitaliy Radetsky for the report, "The Moral-Psychological State of the Personnel of the Armed Forces and the Activity of the Bodies of Military Administration to Strengthen Military Discipline and Law and Order in the Ranks." (The report is being published in somewhat abridged form.)

Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Main Directorate for Indoctrination Work Chief Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Kobzar spoke following the report of Minister of Defense of Ukraine General of the Army of Ukraine Vitaliy Radetsky. He devoted his presentation to a topical theme for the vital activity of the troops: "The Practice of the Utilization of Scientific Approaches in the Activity of Bodies for Indoctrination and Socio-Psychological Work Directed at Indoctrination and Raising the Level of Discipline of the Personnel."

As Minister of Defense of Ukraine General of the Army of Ukraine Vitaliy Radetsky indicated in his closing words, a serious and productive exchange of opinions took place during the practical-science conference with regard to strengthening military discipline in the Armed Forces. The conference demonstrated that the level of serious scientific study of problem issues in the vital activity of the Armed Forces and their well-founded analysis has been reached. The participants in the conference were able to formulate, in clear-cut and scientifically substantiated fashion, new and progressive approaches to solving the problem of strengthening military discipline.

The practical-science conference provided a profound analysis of the state of discipline in the ranks, and projected the principal directions of organizational and indoctrination work of the bodies of military administration. The report by Minister of Defense of Ukraine General of the Army of Ukraine Vitaliy Radetsky and the speeches of Ministry of Defense Main Directorate for Indoctrination Work Chief Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Kobzar, Deputy Minister of Defense for Rear Services—Chief of Rear Services for the Armed Forces of Ukraine Colonel-General Hryhoriy Mikhaylichenko, Deputy Minister of Defense for Weaponry—Chief of Weaponry of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Colonel-General Ivan Oliynyk, Ministry of Defense Main Directorate for Cadres Lieutenant-General Hryhoriy Dyachuk, Main Organizational-Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces Chief Major-General Valeriy Venher and other participants in the conference made it possible to draw the fundamental conclusion that the level of military discipline is defined to a considerable extent by the moral-psychological state of the personnel, which reflects the needs of the servicemen at a certain moment in time, their interests, social points of reference and psycho-physiological state, which determines the readiness of people to engage in various types of military activity and fulfill the requirements of standards and ethics.

The leadership of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the participants in the practical-science conference feel that the following are essential in order to invigorate the work pertaining to the establishment of law and order and strong military discipline:

1. To designate the work pertaining to strengthening law and order and discipline as one of the priority areas of activity of military cadres at all levels of military supervision.

The work system of military cadres with regard to the maintenance of strict law and order and conscious discipline in the ranks should encompass the principal areas of this activity, ascertain and substantiate indicators of the effectiveness of the measures that are being carried out, and create organizational-social and psychological-pedagogical conditions for the formation of a level of discipline among the personnel.

2. The organizational work of commanders, staffs and bodies for indoctrination work should be concentrated on eliminating the causes that worsen the

moral-psychological state of the personnel and, as a consequence, cause violations of the norms of regulations for service activity.

3. The indoctrination work of commanders and senior officers of all levels should promote the formation and development of such individual qualities as discipline among servicemen. The underpinnings for that should be the pedagogization of all spheres of military activity and individual indoctrination work, which should be of a preventive nature.
4. The efforts of military scholars and social-sciences scholars, in collaboration with scientists at prominent scientific institutions of Ukraine, should promote the formation and incarnation within the Armed Forces of the ideology of the Ukrainian state—an ideology of public patriotism with the person and his life, rights and freedoms at its center.
5. The efforts of bodies of military administration should be directed toward the achievement of a solid interconnection between Ukrainian society and the Armed Forces of Ukraine, through active collaboration and interaction with all of the public organizations of Ukraine to the benefit of state interests.
6. The bodies for indoctrination work, together with commanders, must focus their efforts on the formation of positive military traditions and rituals within the military collectives. The development of a system of measures with regard to moral incentives to stimulate the service activity of servicemen of various categories would be expedient.
7. Commanders and superior officers at all levels, together with the cadre bodies of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, must uphold the principle of social justice during the naming of servicemen to official positions. It is important to be guided therein by professional competence, high moral qualities and experience in the service of military cadres, with the broadest possible enlistment in this work of the officers' assemblies and their conduct with a regard for public opinion.
8. Military scholars must launch the profound development of a program with regard to the study, analysis and strengthening of the moral-psychological state of the troops.
9. The Main Directorate for Indoctrination Work must invigorate the activity of its sociological structures for the purpose of obtaining objective and prompt information on the moral-psychological state of the personnel in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

It would be expedient to be guided, during the evaluation of the state of military discipline in subordinate troops, by criteria that are clearly formulated by the corresponding guiding documents.

The leaders of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the participants in the practical-science conference

expressed the hope that the generals and officers of the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine will be actively involved in the work to establish strong law and order and conscious military discipline in the ranks, and will display creativity, exactingness and discipline therein.

Rear Services Head Mikhaylichenko on Supply, Support Problems

94UM0414B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
6 May 94 pp 1-3

[Article by Deputy Minister of Defense for Rear Services—Chief of Rear Services for the Armed Forces of Ukraine Colonel-General Hryhoriy Mikhaylichenko: "Answering for the Vital Activity of the Troops"]

[Text] The maintenance of high combat readiness and the necessary level of military discipline and organization in formations and units is directly connected with the full and timely satisfaction of the everyday material requirements of the personnel. The necessary material base for the resolution of these tasks exists within the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and it must be constantly maintained in a viable state.

It is very hard to do that under contemporary conditions, however, since the decline in production in the state is having a negative effect on logistical supply for the troops as well.

Resolution of questions of rear support is becoming more and more difficult owing to the limited financing of the Army. The funds allocated do not provide for even the vital needs of the troops. The indebtedness to enterprises and late payments for the receipt of materials are leading to cutbacks in the output of products that are needed by the Armed Forces. The Ministry of Defense is squandering the industrial capacity of enterprises that were created over many years, and it will be very difficult to restore it.

A significant quantity of food products is being received from suppliers without payment, as a consequence of which the indebtedness of the Armed Forces is increasing. The suppliers are in turn imposing penalties that total more than four billion karbovantsi a day. And who is suffering the losses? The Armed Forces once again! Funds cannot be allocated in this case for the development of the material base of the troops or improving the social conditions of the servicemen. The suppliers of Kharkiv, Poltava, Luhansk and Chernihivsk oblasts are refusing to supply the troops with meat, eggs and other foodstuffs. The food reserves at central and district warehouses have decreased sharply, which is leading in turn to disruptions in the supply of foodstuffs to the personnel in accordance with established supply norms. We thus see the way out for the resolution of the tasks that face the rear services of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the arrangement of logistical support for the troops with food, matériel, fuels, medical equipment and

medicines, and the resolution of a whole set of social problems that touch on the interests of all categories of servicemen.

The leadership of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, under these difficult conditions, is taking every step with regard to improving the supply of foodstuffs to the servicemen. Tobacco products have been issued to the conscript servicemen as of 1 January 1994. Those who do not smoke are permitted to receive monetary compensation in the amount of the value of the corresponding class of cigarettes.

Concern for quality food for the servicemen is constantly at the center of attention of the rear-support command at all levels. The food is prepared in tasty and varied fashion in most of the mess halls of military units.

A corresponding program is being developed with the aim of further improvements in the organization of food, which provides in particular for:

- the establishment of a unified day for the food service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine (the second Wednesday of each month). The monitored demonstration preparation of food, exchange of experience in the preparation of various dishes, especially Ukrainian cuisine, and the exhibition of dishes and confectionery and flour items are all performed on that day;
- the model upkeep of mess halls, a rise in the standards for eating and the straightening out of the schedule of mess hall operation;
- expansion of the assortment in the preparation of dishes, so that dishes are not repeated more than twice in a week; cutlets, meat patties and schnitzels are prepared no less than two or three times; flour items are baked one or two times;
- a competitive inspection is conducted every year for the best soldiers', sailors' and cadets' mess halls in garrisons, formations, large units and military districts of the branches of the Armed Forces of Ukraine;
- radical improvement in the training and placement of cadres in the food service. Only officers who have special education are to be named to the positions of chief of the service, and chiefs of the food service and mess halls are to be released from all types of details;
- the salary of the chiefs of mess halls are set at grade 9; the most responsible and conscientious warrant officers are to be named to that position;
- the certification of the culinary personnel of military mess halls by commissions of the military units is performed twice a year after the training periods. Up to 50 percent of the standard quantity of cooks may be women who have a motherly attitude toward the soldiers and prepare dishes with higher quality;

- increased everyday monitoring of the completeness of the issue of food and the reaching of stipulated consumption norms for the personnel. Every military mess hall shall equip a monitoring corner in a suitable manner for this purpose. The deputy commanders of units for rear support will conduct a session with the supervisory personnel and rear-support employees once every quarter with regard to monitoring the organization of food and the preparation of dishes;
- the development and entry into force of the "Uniform Requirements for the Organization and Upkeep of Military Mess Halls" and the "Instructions for Monitoring Military Catering."

I would like to direct your attention herein to the fact that notwithstanding all of the difficulties, our conscript servicemen are not eating all that badly. They receive 200 grams of meat, 100 grams of fish, 100 grams of milk, 30 grams of cream, 70 grams of sugar, 750 grams of bread, 900 grams of vegetables and potatoes a day, and four eggs a week and other foods as well.

Proper eating plays a large role in improving health care. All of the medical treatment facilities are for that reason supplied with fish, milk and dairy products, fresh vegetables and fruits, pork, meat from livestock and poultry first and foremost.

A vivid demonstration of the concern of the state for its protectors is the fulfillment of the Law of Ukraine "The Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and the Members of Their Families." The institution of the issue of a food ration also testifies to this. The rear support for the Armed Forces is making no small effort to fulfill that task, launching broad-scale work on military sovkhozes and the subsidiary plots of units. The food obtained thereby goes for the consumption of the troops. Real improvements in food supply for the servicemen, however, requires continuous and regular financing first of all. We are thankful to the many representatives of the President and the heads of the local industrial enterprises who are assisting us with the provision of dishes and mess hall equipment and its repair.

The enterprises of military trade play a large role in improving the food situation. Fresh vegetables and fruits and confectionery items are being found in the soldiers' pots first and foremost.

The summer trade of cold drinks and frozen and baked items will be organized at all military compounds as of May 1.

The medical service of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is working on improving medical support for servicemen. A new standard organizational structure is being instituted in the hospitals, which provides for the offering of specialized medical assistance. The possibility is being considered of offering it to the members of the families of servicemen and employees of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The existing method of research for flight

medical evaluations is being reviewed, and fundamentally new approaches to the individual assessment of the state of health, psycho-physiological condition of pilots and specialists of the flight operations control groups for each flight shift are being developed. A database for all personnel is being created under the program of medical support.

The physical plant of the service is also being developed. The construction of treatment wings at military hospitals located in Kovel, Kharkiv and Odessa is underway, along with diagnostic wings at Vinnytsya and Rivne. A great deal of attention is being paid to improving health-resort treatment. The construction of a diagnostics and treatment center at the Shklo military sanatorium is continuing for that purpose, along with overnight wings at the Truskavetsky and Yevpatoriya children's sanatoria and a mess hall for 1,000 at the Frunzenske sanatorium.

The medical personnel are also putting a great deal of effort into providing the military infirmaries, hospitals and sanatoria with medicines and medical matériel, and acquiring new diagnostics and treatment apparatus. The insufficient funding, however, is impeding the resolution of those tasks.

As vexing as it may be to talk about, the bath and laundry support for the troops has worsened considerably of late. The units and institutions have nothing with which to pay off the bath and laundry enterprises. And they have too few funds to obtain detergents and equipment, or for the prompt payment of wages to their employees or to pay for municipal services. But what is more, the Armed Forces are indebted for more than 50 billion karbovantsi to the enterprises of light industry for matériel received. The conscript servicemen are already wearing out their uniforms, but the mills have not even been paid for them yet.

The lack of funds makes it impossible to reach agreements with enterprises for the manufacture of matériel for 1994, although four months have already passed. The availability of some types of matériel at warehouses makes it possible to supply only the spring draft of young replacements and to shift to the wearing of summer dress.

The military uniform has always been one of the most important attributes of armed formations.

It can be reported today with all certainty that the new uniforms for the Armed Forces of Ukraine have been created and are being introduced.

They will be manufactured in the first half of this year for graduates of military institutes and schools, and for generals and officers of the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense. The capabilities of the textile mills and combines to sew the uniforms for military trade provide for the sewing of new uniforms for other categories of servicemen as well. The lack of funds for the

procurement of measured material, however, is unfortunately restraining this process.

The papakhas for the colonels have been left thanks to a host of requests. It is, after all, a long historical tradition of the Ukrainian Cossacks, and its replacement would have a negative effect not only on the servicemen, but on other segments of the population as well, as was indicated unequivocally in the mass media. Many complaints were received from some superior officers and servicemen with regard to the introduction of leather overcoats for generals. I assure you that the sewing of leather overcoat for generals is done only by request and only for a fee.

A series of measures is being instituted to improve the military uniform of cadets, which is, by the way, as close as possible to an officer's. They will be issued everyday uniforms in camouflage coloring as of 1 September 1994. Changes have also been made in the insignia. A new brass buckle is being developed in place of the "claw" buckle.

Shoes with high shins are being issued to conscript servicemen instead of the canvas high-tops. The overcoats are being replaced by a jacket from cape fabric, and the parade and open jackets with a dress jacket.

The discharge of conscript servicemen into the reserves at their request is permitted in parade dress, everyday field uniform that they are wearing or, in special cases, in civilian dress.

Servicemen who are entering service under contract in the positions of soldier or sergeant are provided only with the items of the field uniform according to the season during the trial period.

The rear support of the Armed Forces is taking a series of measures to improve the municipal-services support for servicemen in extended service. The use of military bathhouses and the services of the military unit support services combines is permitted for them and the members of their families, as well as hair cutting at non-regulation barber shops.

A very difficult situation has taken shape surrounding the provision of the troops with fuels and lubricants. The lack of funds for the procurement of the necessary quantity of fuel is reducing the training of flight personnel and drivers, which is having a negative effect on the combat readiness of the troops. Air defense units stationed a distance of 10—15 km or more from populated areas do not even have enough fuel to take the children to school, or the servicemen to their service locations.

Another problem must also be kept in mind—200 various types of fuels and lubricants are employed in the military hardware of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. More than 150 of those types are not manufactured at the enterprises of Ukraine. The State Committee of Ukraine for Oil and Gas has refused to supply us with them for

the last two years. The supply of fuels and lubricants has improved somewhat thanks to repeated appeals by the Ministry of Defense to the Cabinet of Ministers. The Ukrnaftoprodukt Association is ready to assume the entire obligation of providing the Armed Forces with fuels and lubricants. The ultimate resolution of this issue, however, depends on the availability of funds that the Ministry of Defense does not have at this time...

We are collecting funds in karbovantsi under these difficult conditions so as to at least somehow support the vital activity of the troops. We are leasing empty tank capacity, arranging the output of lubricants using our own manpower, and obtaining fuel through barter transactions. These measures, however, cover only a paltry portion of requirements, and are not solving the problem. Orders and directives have moreover been sent to the troops along with recommendations on restricting the consumption of fuels, economizing them, making widespread use of simulators, and various types of reductions in the number of trucks in the transport groups.

There are already tight restrictions on the use of passenger cars. Limits have been introduced for the expenditure of fuels and the service lives of motors, and an efficient system of centralized shipment of cargo is being developed. The system of logistical support is being reviewed so as to reduce the distance of shipment of cargo and the consumption of fuel, and new storage areas are being created at the bases of troop that are subject to disbanding, along with other measures.

Hasty and poorly thought-out decisions are having negative consequences in many cases. The commercialization of military trade is an example of this. The sale and leasing of those enterprises and stores has caused large losses, turning military trade from profitable into beggary. Only thanks to the considerable efforts of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine and Edict No. 41/94 of the President of Ukraine of 10 February 1994 has this campaign been halted for the social protection of the servicemen, first and foremost the conscript servicemen, as well as to improve the trade and domestic support for the troops, especially those at remote or closed locations.

The leaders of military trade, notwithstanding all of the difficulties, have resolved the task of seeking out the goods of prime necessity, starting with sewing needles and ending with complex technical groups of goods. It is worth noting that most of the collectives have met their targets for the trade and domestic support of military formations.

The difficult situation has also had an effect on the provision of servicemen in the Air Forces and the Air Defense Forces with everything they need. The rear services have been occupied there only with supporting flights and combat readiness, while the question of material and domestic support has always been relegated to the background. Two groups of rear-support specialists of the Armed Forces have been created today that are

studying the actual circumstances of those troops, and are taking steps to improve the living and domestic conditions of servicemen and provide them with the necessary matériel.

The rear-services inspectorate of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is working intensively. The theft of the people's property has been curtailed thanks to its resolute and principled work, and funds have been supplemented at the expense of those guilty of waste, shortages and abuses. A number of officials guilty of abuses of their official positions and excessive spending have been relieved of their duties, and the criminal cases have been turned over to the military procuracy.

The central bodies of the rear support for the Armed Forces of Ukraine are staffed by highly qualified officers who are capable of organizing the rear support for the troops.

I say to the parents of the servicemen not to worry about your sons. We can assure you that there will be no disruptions in food supply, medical care and the provision of matériel. If there are problems in some places with questions of logistical support or complaints regarding the poor quality of the food, we ask you to write to the address 252063, city of Kiev, Dehtyariivska St., Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine for Rear Services—Chief of Rear Services for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Or telephone at (044) 213-72-61.

I promise that immediate steps to end those problems and improve the state of affairs will be undertaken.

I appeal to the leaders of local authorities at all levels to find an opportunity to allocate plots of land to servicemen for their own gardening activity, so that they will be able to provide their families with potatoes and vegetables.

The heads of the kolkhozes and sovkhoses of military units are ready to provide accommodations and assistance in equipping stores for the sale of their products at military compounds—milk, meat, eggs, vegetables—which will be mutually advantageous for both parties. We have agreed to take into the Agriculture Directorate of Rear Services for the Armed Forces the kolkhozes and sovkhoses that have lost faith in their existence. Assistance will be granted on our part.

The leaders of the Ministry of Defense and Rear Services for the Armed Forces of Ukraine are working nonstop. A constant search is underway, as can be seen, for ways of solving complex problems, increasing the maneuverability and steadfastness of support and service units, and finding sources of extrabudgetary financing for the measures being pursued in the Armed Forces.

I would like to emphasize, in summing up the aforementioned, that the complexity of the problems that have arisen cannot diminish our perseverance in the cause of building the Armed Forces of an independent Ukraine.

Officers Called Upon To Improve Staff Skills

94UM0461A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
4 Jun 94 p 2

[Article by Col. Georgiy Kostenko, academician, under "How Should the Army of Ukraine Be?": "The General and the Lieutenant Both Need Training, or on the Problems in the Formation of the Staff Skills of the Officer Personnel of the Armed Forces"]

[Text] In analyzing and comparing World War II documents, historians throughout the world note a high level of staff skills of officers of the Red Army, which at that time predetermined a common understanding of the orders and directives from the supreme commander down to the platoon leader and in our time a high readability of front documents. Approved and crystallized in the battles of the Great Patriotic War, staff skills have subsequently become that quality indicator that defines the degree of professionalism of officers.

In the process of the development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, our officers have a unique opportunity not only to bring their staff skills up to world standards but also to give them a national coloring. Unfortunately, this is not happening. The author of these lines, being chairman and member of certification boards at different levels and also being involved through the nature of his work in the study of official documents, has reached an alarming conclusion: today it is necessary to speak not only of the further improvement of staff skills of officers of command and control agencies but also of their partial restoration.

Staff skills are a constant factor that represents the totality of theoretical knowledge and practical skills that the officer needs to perform his official duties. This does not contradict military art, which includes the theory and practice of command and control of forces. In addition, regardless of the position held, the staff skills of the officer are characterized by system knowledge of questions having to do with his immediate functions, by the continuous search for new knowledge and more advanced practical skills within the limits of the position held and for a step higher, and also by the possession of the means to perform duties on the basis of interchangeability.

The qualitative indicators that best characterize the genuine staff skills of the officer are knowledge of the achievements of contemporary military thought; the ability to collect and analyze the necessary information in a timely manner and to make the correct conclusions, proposals, and recommendations; and the capability to comprehend adequately the intention of the commander (chief) and ability to put his decision into effect through means guaranteeing a common understanding by all subordinates. Knowledge of the balance of secrets in his field of professional interests makes it possible for the officer dependably to keep secrets entrusted to him and not to overload regime agencies with obsolete information. The lowering of staff skills is a sign of the decline of

the professionalism of the officer, which is fraught with the danger of his performance of official duties at an amateur level.

Each of the indicators enumerated above could be the subject of a separate conversation. But the intention of the present notes is to show the basic reason for the lowering of staff skills and to propose a simple, effective, and inexpensive means of improving them in the command and control agencies of all levels. The assertion that it is possible to establish an effective mechanism of military development in the absence of the corresponding skills of the officers is the result of incorrect thinking and profound error.

The lowering of staff skills is the result of a set of objective and subjective reasons. And as bitter as it may be, it should be recognized that the determining reason is the second one, which is expressed in diminished interest in contemporary military theory. It is not difficult to see that inadequate immersion in the theory of the subject is the basis for the complex situations in which individual leaders find themselves who try to carry out partial reforms outside of the state program for the development of the armed forces. In the period of intensive military development as one of the components of the development of the state, knowledge of current theory of his subject of professional interests is the basic indicator of the staff skills of the officer and a criterion for the assessment of his professionalism. Errors at the theoretical level lead in practice to economic expenditures that are inadmissible for us today.

The negligence of the command and control agency is the other side of the low staff skills of its officer personnel. I dare express the unpopular idea that the responsibility for the poor performance today must be assigned equally to the author of the document and to the command agency that is directed to carry it out. If for guidance use is made of a document wherein it is impossible to clarify the content of the subject, then there is no answer to the question: "What is to be done?" and, the main thing, if there is no clear determination of the final result of the activity, then such a document was based on negligence in the planning stage. Personal conversations with the developers of such schemes permit one to reach the depressing conclusion that they have a negative attitude toward military theory as the highest form of organization of military knowledge.

Is there an effective way to raise the staff skills of all categories of officers? From 1979 through 1989, I carried out investigations in the course of 46 operational-tactical, command-staff, tactical, mobilization, testing, and experimental exercises, including 9 with field firing. My conclusion is that an exercise on any scale carried out without preliminary theoretical preparation of the officer personnel comes close to an experimental exercise not in form but in content and this is the reason for its poor results. And there is another aspect of such organization of exercises. To analyze exercises with

theoretically untrained personnel is ignorant from a pedagogical point of view and immoral from an ethical point of view.

To raise staff skills, it is necessary to give back to officer personnel their striving for in-depth theoretical knowledge on the subject of their professional interests. For this there is a simple, effective, and inexpensive mechanism—preliminary conferences and seminars on the subject of the pending exercises and training drills. Such a mechanism is effective because of the consistent integration of theory and practice and the possibility of approving the corresponding theoretical positions under the conditions of Ukraine with their subsequent adjustment and the refinement of existing plans. Today this has one other rather important meaning. To begin an exercise or training drill without preliminary theoretical study of the theme is wasteful from an economic point of view and useless from a juridical point of view, because in the near future the conditions of contract service will prohibit taking personnel out into the field without preliminary theoretical training.

In the intervals between exercises and training drills, up-to-date staff skills of the officer are developed through his assimilation of the theory of the subject of his professional interests in the process of daily creative labor and initiative.

In conclusion, I would like once again to stress that staff skills can be raised only if the officers assimilate current military theory. There is no other way.

CAUCASIAN STATES

RF Troops Serve as Armenia's Border Guards

944K1391A Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian
7 Jun 94 p 2

[Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Pavel Ilin, deputy chief of a border detachment for personnel, by Vladimir Arutyunyan, special correspondent of GOLOS ARMENII for the Shirak region; place and date not given: "The Mission of the Border Troops—Defense of the Interests of Russia and the Guarding of the Exterior Borders of the CIS"]

[Text] Since the start of the 19th century Gyumri-Aleksandropol had always been regarded as a most important strategic point on the southern borders of the Russian Empire. And in Soviet times also Leninakan was "singled out" in a military respect. The permanent presence of quite a tangible contingent of military always creates a distinctive atmosphere and makes its mark on the tenor of urban life. Gyumri has always treated people in military uniform with affection and respect. But even against this background the border guards were a special, privileged caste, as it were. As we know, according to a number of agreements, the guarding of the "exterior" border of Armenia (with Turkey and Iran) has been entrusted to units of the border forces of the Russian Federation. On

20 May the Gyumri border detachment celebrated its 70th anniversary. On this occasion and in connection with the fact that 28 May is Border Guards Day we decided to meet with a representative of the Gyumri Border Detachment and chat about the present times. Our interlocutor is Lieutenant Colonel Pavel Igorevich Ilin, deputy chief of the border detachment for personnel and work with the staff.

[Arutyunyan] A few words about the history of the detachment, if you will.

[Ilin] Our detachment, the oldest on the territory of Armenia, was formed in 1924. Two heroes of the Soviet Union: Colonel Dudko, who fell in the fighting for Berlin, and Colonel Leonov, chief of the detachment, who was posthumously awarded the title of hero of the Soviet Union for the events of 15-16 March 1969 on Damanskiy Island on the Ussuri River, were raised here.

[Arutyunyan] Previously the border troops were officially called the border troops of the USSR KGB. What is the troops' present status and what is their place in the overall system of the armed forces of Russia?

[Ilin] Our relationship with the Armed Forces is relatively undefined. An edict of the president of Russia has formed the Federal Border Service, which is subordinate to the president of the Russian Federation directly.

[Arutyunyan] It is symbolic that your holiday—Border Guards Day—coincides in Armenia with our national holiday—Independence Day. And independence begins with the sanctity of the border. How in this sense do you see the functions and missions of the border troops of Russia stationed in Armenia?

[Ilin] The status and functions of the border troops here are defined by mutual agreements between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Armenia. And the border troops' mission is to defend Russia's interests on the territory of the Republic of Armenia and to guard the exterior borders of the CIS—in this case, the border with Turkey. And, in accordance with the agreement, the troops are deployed here to carry out this mission.

[Arutyunyan] We have already observed that there has always been a friendly attitude toward the border guards in our city. How are relations shaping up with the authorities and the public currently?

[Ilin] We are building relations with the authorities at practically all levels—from the leadership of the rayons through Mr. Kocharyan, authorized government representative for the Shirak zone.

They consider all our problems their own. And they settle practically all the questions that we put to them for support for the guarding of the borders. In the past 18 months there have been no conflict situations with the local populace or any provocations in respect to the border guards. We met just before the detachment's anniversary with the leaders of almost all enterprises of the city, and they all expressed a single thought: The ties

of sponsorship that had been established back in the so-called stagnation times needed to be restored and more meetings with representatives of the enterprises and organizations needed to be held. We have already reserved sponsorship for some enterprises.

[Arutyunyan] The image of the border guard was for many years here associated with that of the fair-haired Russian type. What is the national composition of your detachment, say, now?

[Ilin] Representatives of 26-28 nationalities have customarily served in our detachment. There are now, in fact, just two—Russians and Armenians. More precisely, when draftees come from Russia, we come across Bashkirs, say, but mainly representatives of the two nationalities (we would add that the fact that Armenians also serve in the unit could have been guessed without the clarifying question: almost 100 vehicles at the gate of the unit and attempts to squeeze through the gate and the fence, with a throng at the checkpoint, in a word, the painfully familiar native "Armenian landscape"—V. A.).

[Arutyunyan] We know from past years that the so-called border regime was quite strict. What kind of changes have there been in the essence of the border regime?

[Ilin] By a decision of the Government of Armenia a number of forces that used to enter the border zone now no longer do so, and the procedure of the drafting of the papers for crossing the line of engineer structures has been simplified. We are now seeing, however, and the local leadership has appealed to us repeatedly in this connection, that it is altogether necessary to tighten the regime. This applies particularly to the area of the Akhuryanskoye Reservoir and questions of fishing. For the inhabitants of some villages have been issued permits for agricultural work beyond the line of the engineer structures, and they are not cultivating the land but fishing. On the other hand, not a tightening up exactly but simply greater strictness in the permit procedure is required. Because Turkey remains Turkey, and questions of the safety of the inhabitants that work in the vicinity of the border cannot be left unattended.

[Arutyunyan] Are the violations of the border and provocations from "that side" frequent?

[Ilin] There are violations both on the part of Turkey and from our rear.

[Arutyunyan] More detail, if you can: What are the violations from the rear?

[Ilin] These are mainly mentally defective people. If we take the border itself, however, we have on the part of the contiguous territory the rustling of livestock and a violation of the border regime almost daily. Rustling of livestock on our territory. This also remains at the level of protests as yet—on the part of the border commissar.

[Arutyunyan] Do such generally quite petty phenomena pursue the actual aim of inflaming the atmosphere or are these simply chance occurrences?

[Ilin] I would not say that the atmosphere on the border is being inflamed on Turkey's part today, I could not today say this. But there are instances of a violation of the border regime that pursue the goal of a test of our strength and of the border that we guard. Flights by Turkish combat aircraft along the border, say.

[Arutyunyan] Living conditions in Armenia are quite difficult today. What is life like for the detachment under these conditions?

[Ilin] We are attempting first and foremost to resolve the lighting problem. There are border posts that have not had lighting for months. In connection with the agreement signed on 15 March in Yerevan, the Government of Armenia has now allocated us cash for the local purchase of flour and to pay for the water, lighting, and the products of the meat-packing plant that we purchase. But this is not enough for us, all the same. In accordance with this agreement, Armenia will assume 50 percent of the expenses on the maintenance of the troops, and the amount that Armenia should contribute for the upkeep of the troops and the border military units on the territory of Armenia has been determined. There are problems with firewood and coal. The firewood problem is being resolved, it would seem, the coal problem, no. We are supplied with gasoline from Russia. There is no water at all at our base in the village of Akhurchik, there is no water supply.

[Arutyunyan] And how has the question of the employment and education of the members of the families of the border guards been resolved?

[Ilin] There is always work for our wives in the detachment, this problem has been resolved. Positions to enable women to work, on contract included, have been determined at the border posts. We have our own kindergarten and our own high school, which is attached to School 25 of the city of Sochi. We recruited the teachers on a competitive basis—95 percent of them are local, and there is a professor and candidate of sciences.

Forced Roundup of Conscripits Seen Harmful

944K1297A Yerevan AZG in Armenian 7 Apr 94 p 1

[Editorial: "Armies and Battlefronts Cannot Be Run With Roundups"]

[Text] What is happening today in the capital's streets, roads, bus and metro stations, markets and coffee shops is beyond anyone's imagination. Classic Armenian disorganization and cottage-industry and self-enterprise mentality could not have taken a worse form than the means that have been "selected" for the organization of the current conscription drive. At virtually every step men, especially young ones, are targeted for roundups that use the crudest methods: force, brutality and disparagement. What is being done behind slogans of defending the fatherland and mobilizing the Army is discrediting the entire essence of this worthy program. As a result, neither the Army can be properly mobilized

nor can the defense of the borders of the fatherland become more sound. Instead, fear, panic and demoralization may overtake people's minds, perhaps in an irreversible manner.

What is most disturbing, however, is not the roundups but the mistrust which follows them. In the past few days our office has received numerous reports that the individuals who are in charge of these "operations" rob and plunder indiscriminately everyone—those who are liable as well as those who are not liable for military service—with insatiable enthusiasm. Our information about the seizure of cash and jewelry and the collection of bribes in American dollars has already gone beyond the limits of rumors. Strong protests are heard especially from those who cannot afford to "liberate" their kin, because they think that if they had the means their sons and husbands would not be taken to the Army and that the defense of the Army would not have turned into a "merchants'" business.

Yes, mistrust rules everywhere, and the minister of state responsible for defense [Vazgen Sargsyan] could not dispel that mistrust with his well-known television address. He could not dispel it by presenting the conscription drive as a personal, almost private, task to the people without taking into account Armenia's morale and psychological state, the socioeconomic condition of the people, the presence of foreign influences that corrupt the young, the natural fear of military service and especially the political capital that the ruling group has lost amongst the people.

Since there is no organization or press organ which opposes a strong army and a sound defense, an important task such as the conscription drive should have been arranged nationally as befits a state in a truly organized and professional manner with the appropriate propaganda.

Otherwise, with the current foul means we can have neither a combat-ready army nor a sound defense.

Pilot Sentenced to Death in Nagorno-Karabakh

94UM0457A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 28 May 94 p 3

[Article by Liana Minasyan, under rubric "Justice": "Nagorno-Karabakh Republic Military Tribunal Sentences Yuriy Belichenko to Death: Radical Party Attempts To Save the Mercenary"]

[Text] Yuriy Belichenko, a military pilot who was sentenced four days ago by the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic Military Tribunal in accordance with the articles pertaining to "premeditated murder under aggravating circumstances" and for the "inflicting of material damage of an especially large scale" (213 million rubles in August 1992 prices), has been sentenced to death. He participated in bombings by the Azerbaijani air forces of villages in Mardakertskiy Rayon, which led to losses of human life and large amounts of destruction. Belichenko, who formally is considered to be a citizen of

Ukraine (where he was called up into the Soviet Army of that period), and served in Azerbaijan. After the collapse of the USSR and the withdrawal of Russian troops, he continued to serve there. His aircraft was shot down after a combat sortie and, according to the data in the investigation, the pilot admitted that he had been recruited for \$10,000 monthly, plus a bonus for successful bombing.

Incidentally, there is another pilot—true, a Russian one, Chistyakov—who is in a similar situation. The only difference is that the court that is trying him in Stepanakert is still in session and the sentence has not yet been pronounced. Belichenko, however, is left with the possibility of requesting the presidium of the NKR [Nagorno-Karabakh Republic] Supreme Council to pardon him, but, according to data provided by the military procurator, such a request has not yet been made.

According to certain information, the Ukrainian authorities have not shown any interest in Belichenko's fate, despite his formal Ukrainian citizenship. The reason that they give is that his actions were the consequence of a personal choice and that he himself bears the responsibility for them. As a mercenary, this pilot cannot be recognized as a prisoner of war, and the laws governing the protection of prisoners of war do not extend to him.

Nevertheless Belichenko's wife, who now lives with their children in Krasnodar Kray, has sent telegrams to Russian minister of foreign affairs Kozyrev and to the Karabakh authorities, requesting them to take part in her husband's fate. Something that can serve as a formal precedent for such participation is the situation involving six Russian mercenaries who were sentenced to death in Baku for having participated in combat actions on the side of the Karabakh Armenians. At that time they were handed over to the Russian authorities in exchange for several Azerbaijanis who had been taken prisoner. Karabakh official consultations that have already been conducted by the Russian MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], are linked with the possibility of exchanging Belichenko for five Armenians who also have been sentenced to death—they are incriminated in the murder of Azerbaijani journalist Salatyn Askerova (originally, seven persons had been accused, but two of them have already died in prison, and the fate of the remaining persons still remains unknown). As for pilot Chistyakov,

it is not precluded that, after the sentence has been pronounced, he will be handed over to Russia and will serve his punishment on its territory.

Meanwhile the Radical Party has decided to choose the example of Belichenko to carry out a demonstration to abolish the death penalty and to establish a permanent international tribunal on military crimes. Party members who picketed yesterday in front of the Armenian Embassy in Moscow feel that crimes similar to those that Belichenko is accused of committing should be under the jurisdiction of an international criminal court with supranational powers, and they have stated that "the incident with him is viewed as a model one, and we are speaking not about a humanitarian, but a political problem." Having shared their views with Armenian ambassador Mamikonyan, who received them and who stated that "the context spoils the idea: pity concerning the sentencing of a person whose actions led to the death of peaceful citizens, was expressed with a complete lack of an attempt to analyze other similar incidents from the opposite side," the participants in the demonstration expressed their readiness to picket the Azerbaijani Embassy also.

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

Insurgent Supply Dumps Found in Tajikistan

94UM0437A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
2 Jun 94 p 1

[ITAR-TASS item from Dushanbe: "Tajikistan Military Authorities Assert the Situation Is Fully Under Control"]

[Text] Eleven major underground supply dumps with weapons and sets of military uniforms were discovered in mountains of the Tajik Pripamirye during a large-scale operation conducted by forces of the Republic Ministry of Defense together with local Ministry of Security and Ministry of Internal Affairs subunits.

According to a statement by Tajikistan Minister of Defense Major General Aleksandr Shishlyannikov, subunits of government forces are in full control of the situation in the Pripamirye region and are providing reliable security for Khaburabad Pass.

ARMS TRADE

U.S., Novosibirsk Share Conversion Tasks

944F0792A Novosibirsk VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK in Russian 7 Jun 94 p 2

[Article by Vadim Yuryev: "We Have Been Offered U.S. Army Know-How"]

[Text] Frederick Shapu, executive of the American company ICT Group, has brought good news from Los Angeles to Novosibirsk: Conversion is also under way at military plants in the United States; of course, it causes many problems of all kinds. Well, perhaps they are not as serious as here, but nonetheless it is a pleasure.

Since production at the defense enterprises in America is being cut back sharply, they are looking for new clients. Frederick Shapu decided to take advantage of the moment. Just a few months ago, the U.S. Department of Defense declassified its technological developments in the area of digital, that is, wireless telephone communications. Incidentally, they have been used for a long time in the U.S. Army, but their use was forbidden for civilian purposes. Such an opportunity has now appeared. So Shapu flew to Novosibirsk in order to propose his investment project to develop the same system of telecommunications here. In his words, the ICT Group company is in a position to free us of virtually all communication wires and cables: Telephones, TV channels, and faxes will all be digital.

In discussing the potential of his company, Frederick Shapu emphasized the following. First, he said, this is not just another toy for the rich: For example, the installation of a digital telephone will cost a client no more than the installation of a regular telephone. However, the quality of communications will be absolutely incomparable. Second, local enterprises would manufacture the equipment; that is to say, new jobs will appear here. This is to say nothing about Novosibirsk not being required to make any financial outlays—he will invest the money.

I do not know if everything is indeed as lucrative as Shapu says, but the oblast administration undertook to work on the proposal of the American businessman with local enterprises. If they turn down this scheme, for some reason, another proposal may very well be made by the American workers of military plants: Russian proletarians, let us unite!

'Voyentekh' Director Funtikov Interviewed

94UM0436A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 May 94 p 6

[Interview with Anatoliy Grigoryevich Funtikov, Voyentekh general director, by Valentin Rudenko; place and date of interview not given: "Voyentekh Does Have Something To Offer"]

[Text] From KRASNAYA ZVEZDA files: Lieutenant General (Reserve) Anatoliy Funtikov was born in 1931.

He graduated from the Serpukhov Aviation-Technical School and from the Air Force Engineering Academy imeni Mozhayskiy. He served in combat units, at the Baykonur Cosmodrome, and in the central administration of the Ministry of Defense. He was employed in the testing of strategic missiles, for which he earned the State Prize. He is a doctor of technical sciences, a professor, and an academician of the International Engineering Academy. Prior to his appointment as general director of the Voyentekh State Armament and Military Equipment Sales Company, he was first deputy chief for armament of the Russian Armed Forces.

[Rudenko] Anatoliy Grigoryevich, when and why was the Voyentekh State Company formed, and who was its founder?

[Funtikov] The idea of creating our company belongs to the leaders of the Armed Forces ministries, and chiefly defense minister, General of the Army Pavel Sergeyevich Grachev. In order to get money to build housing for servicemen from somewhere other than the budget, he proposed creating a special cost accounting foreign trade organization that would export combat equipment and armament at the disposal of the Ministry of Defense. This proposal was carefully examined by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and in mid-1992 a special government decree was published forming the Voyentekh State Armament and Military Equipment Sales Company. The Ministry of Defense, the Russian Federal Property Fund, the RF State Committee for the Management of State Property, the Committee for Social Support to Servicemen, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and the RF State Committee for Defense Industry acted as the company's founders.

[Rudenko] How justified was creation of yet another foreign trade organization, since after all, the Oboroneksport VO, the Spetsvneshtekhnika GVK or, for example, the GUSK would have been fully capable of assuming the task of selling freed armament? They did have the experience and the corresponding structures for this, didn't they?

[Funtikov] Yes, they did. But they naturally didn't want to get fully into the business of exporting used armament at a time when the warehouses of the defense enterprises were literally bursting with new products: It would have been a lot of trouble, and the work would not have been very profitable. Each item had to be fitted out, repaired, and painted.

Because it was established by the Ministry of Defense, and works in the interests of the Army (97 percent of the proceeds from weapon sales go specifically to construction of housing for servicemen), and having support from powerful structures of the Ministry of Defense such as the GRAU [Main Missile and Artillery Directorate] and the Main Directorate of Armored Forces, from engineering and chemical troops, and from the main procurement directorates of the arms and services, the

Voyentekh State Company was vitally interested in organizing the work of exporting freed armament.

[Rudenko] Do you share the point of view of those who feel that the Ministry of Defense shouldn't involve itself in arms exports at all?

[Funtikov] The Ministry of Defense is of course not a military trade organization. It has other tasks, and another purpose. But weapon exports are a special item. The reality is such that approximately a fourth to a fifth of the assortment of armament sought by foreign clients can be delivered efficiently only from the forces. This is not to mention the fact that comprehensive testing of combat equipment, specialist training and repair of weapons and combat equipment proceed practically 100 percent at the proving grounds, training centers and repair plants of the Ministry of Defense.

The Main Directorate of International Military Cooperation of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces could organize arms exports quite professionally, and well. And it must be said that it is exerting a great deal of effort to develop military-technical cooperation, to train foreign specialists and to render other services.

Considering that a military department is not fully suited to purely commercial activity, our state company assumed this function. It is a state enterprise, fully answerable to currently effective legislation. Everyone here understands the interests of both military arms manufacturers and citizens well. We realize that the role our company plays will grow considering the inadequate financing of the Ministry of Defense. After all, selling freed combat equipment and weapons is a realistic way of obtaining nonbudgetary resources not only to solve social problems but also to reequip the Army.

[Rudenko] How much "surplus" weaponry does the Army have today that could be offered for sale?

[Funtikov] Our state company does not keep records on the amount of armament freed in the course of the Russian Army's reduction—that's a function of the General Staff, but there is no debate that there is a large amount of it. Forces are being withdrawn from countries of Eastern Europe and the Baltics, and units in internal districts are being disbanded. Moreover there is much combat equipment in warehouses and storage depots. Given the extreme deficit in the defense budget, the most reasonable thing would be to sell it, and use the proceeds to solve social problems, and develop and produce new models of armament.

[Rudenko] But wanting to sell these weapons isn't enough. Someone has to want to buy them. How do things stand in this area? We are offering used goods, after all.

[Funtikov] Armament in the forces can be said to be used only on paper. It's actually new as a rule. When we train tank crews, for example, we use a few training vehicles, leaving the rest of the tanks in storage at depots and bases. Air defense weapons don't get much use,

while infantry weapons get even less. In this case their price is naturally below that of new models, which is attractive to foreign customers. Far from all countries are able to allow themselves to purchase ultramodern weapons directly from the conveyers of defense enterprises.

[Rudenko] By the way, how are prices of weapons supplied from the troops set?

[Funtikov] The main criteria here are the newness of the model, the date of manufacture, remaining life, and actual technical condition of the articles. Consider for example a helicopter that has served half of its useful life. Its price would be approximately 60 percent of the cost of a new helicopter. Price policy is a delicate, flexible thing. There are also many other factors that have to be accounted for when appraising a particular item. But in any case, under no circumstances are we offering armament at dumping prices.

[Rudenko] What models of armament enjoy the greatest demand today?

[Funtikov] I would put infantry fighting vehicles at the top of the list. And not only the latest BMP-3, but even the BMP-2. Foreign customers are showing great interest in antitank weapons, T-72S and T-80U tanks, our helicopters—especially the Mi-8 and the Mi-24, all models and modifications of the Kalashnikov assault rifle, the Igla, Strela-10M, Tor, Tunguska, S-300PMU-1 and S-300V surface-to-air missile systems, and of course, MiG-29 and Su-27 airplanes, as well as ammunition of all types. As for naval equipment, small patrol boats are in demand.

When it comes to potential customers, they can be found today in countries of Southeast Asia, the Near East and Africa.

[Rudenko] It's no secret that there was too much red tape in our arms trade system. It sometimes took months to finalize a contract. Has anything changed recently in this aspect?

[Funtikov] Not much, unfortunately. As before, it takes a lot of legwork to get approval of documents for the sale of weapons or combat equipment from the corresponding ministries and departments. As an example it took me a little less than 4 months to finalize a contract to sell a consignment of pistols to the Vietnamese Ministry of Internal Affairs. Such an approach doesn't of course promote development of military-technical cooperation. Many customers want the weapons delivered within a week or a month, they are prepared to pay immediately, and we need to consider their wishes.

[Rudenko] What should be done in your opinion to retake lost positions in the arms market? And is such an objective even realistic for us in principle?

[Funtikov] Of course it's realistic. The main argument in favor of this assertion can be found in the fabulous

characteristics of our armament. The entire world recognizes that it is fully competitive, while many models simply have no analogues, being superior to foreign prototypes. The fact that we sell 16 times less armament than the USA today is explained in my opinion primarily by subjective and not objective causes.

If we intend to occupy a truly worthy place in the arms market, we will need to direct the efforts of not only specialized exporters and defense enterprises but also all state structures toward this objective.

Once I went to Kuwait for negotiations. And do you know who went there to offer a consignment of American weapons to the Kuwaiti Defense Ministry? A former president of the United States. It was Bush. That's the level we're dealing with.

It must be said that we have recently been taking steps to maximally activate military and technical cooperation. Consider at least the government decree granting enterprises the right to enter the foreign market on their own. It will doubtlessly sweep our exports into the mainstream.

The enterprises do have something to offer their foreign partners. An inspection of specialized exporters carried out recently by the Russian president's inspection administration revealed that billions of dollars' worth of weapons and combat equipment have accumulated in the warehouse of defense firms.

[Rudenko] Wouldn't a mass invasion of the world market by enterprises mean the end of the state's monopoly on arms trade?

[Funtikov] Of course not. In this case, you see, a monopoly is defined not as the existence of a single vendor but as strict regulation of arms trade—on the basis of the corresponding government decrees, through the licensing committee, and through restrictions on what can be traded.

I do not support the idea that we should have a thousand specialized exporters, but large firms such as, for example, the Antey Concern, the Kurganmashzavod Joint-Stock Company, the OKB Sukhovo ANPK, MAPO [Moscow Aviation Production Association] and others should have access to the foreign market. We can only gain from this.

By the way, while the right to export defense products is possessed by dozens of organizations in the USA and other Western countries, the state still maintains a monopoly on weapon sales.

[Rudenko] What sort of relations are you developing with the Rosvooruzheniye State Company, recently formed out of three specialized exporters, and with the financial and industrial groups being formed out of large defense firms?

[Funtikov] Are you asking whether we are entering the foreign market as competitors? I can say quite certainly,

no. And there are simply no reasons for such competition to exist between our companies. We have different niches. In this case our niche is far more modest than that of Rosvooruzheniye.

As far as the financial and industrial groups are concerned, I am convinced that they will play a most active role in the arms market in the immediate future. It is for this reason that our company is providing what support it can to their formation.

I would like to say in conclusion that because of the sharp reduction of appropriations to defense, and consequently to armament, we should allocate part of the proceeds from exporting defense products to establishing a firm scientific and technical foundation upon which to design equipment of the future. These may perhaps not be full-scale developments, but we believe that the time will come when our state will have the possibility for satisfying the Army's demand for the latest weapons to the fullest.

Sweden's Selection of Leopard-2 Tank Over T-80 Examined

*94UM0460A NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
18 May 94 p 2*

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent Aleksandr Sychev: "How the T-80 Tank Lost the Swedish Contract to the Leopard-2"]

[Text] In September 1993, at the request of the Swedish Ministry of Defense and with the permission of the Russian Government, two T-80U tanks were sent to Sweden for testing. These combat vehicles returned home in March 1994. Russian heavy armament was presented in the West for the first time and in principle was seen as a possible variant in the reequipment of two tank and three mechanized brigades.

At the time of the arrival of the Russian tanks in Sweden, the search for a replacement for the obsolete STRV-103 tanks produced by the Swedish concern Bofors since the 1960's and for its British counterpart of the same age, the "Centurion," had been continuing for more than two years. Tests were performed on the American tank "M1A2 Abrams," the West German "Leopard-2K Imperwood," and the French "Leclerc."

There are 400 tanks subject to replacement. So far the Swedish Parliament has given its approval for 200 vehicles but it has authorized the expenditure of less money than that—about a billion kronor (approximately \$150 million). The incongruence of the dream of the military with the possibilities of the country forced the Ministry of Defense to look for an up-to-date and high-quality tank that would serve the next 30 years, extremely advantageous in terms of price as well as other contractual conditions. Therefore, when the T-80U first appeared at an arms exhibition in Abu Dhabi, the

Swedes decided to test it as well. In terms of price—about \$3 million—the tank was doubtless very interesting.

But they were not able to complete the testing. The government made the decision to buy West German "Leopards." Judging by the haste with which the choice was made and by the attempts to disparage the merits of the T-80, the decision was basically dictated by political considerations. Swedish Minister of Defense Anders Bjoerck declared, in particular, that only servicemen no taller than 165 cm can work in a Russian tank, and it is difficult to find such people in Sweden, and that the loader may lose his arms, although in reality this process has been automated....

By the way, the FRG and France demonstrated how to trade with arms. There were more and more frequent visits of high-ranking government delegations from Bonn and Paris in Stockholm and Shevde, where a tank test range is located. It is rumored that the Germans brought about a ton and a half of documentation and advertising about the "Leopard" and the French brought about 3 tons. In Sweden, the French merchants established a presentation office and hired retired generals to work in it. They spent about \$5 million to promote the "Leclerc."

These two main competitors for the big contract (the United States was out of the game as soon as it refused to concede even a cent) agreed on the most improbable conditions of the deal even to the point of concluding contracts on the basis of 100-percent compensation. The advantage went to Bonn's offer to establish a joint enterprise in Sweden for the assembly of the "Leopard" tanks, part of the production of which Bonn agreed to sell to third countries. This makes it possible for Stockholm not only to rearm its army but also to create a large number of new jobs, which is quite important in time of crisis.

In Sweden, for some reason Washington did not utilize a single one of its customary methods to attract a buyer and did not even resort to the means of political pressure, which it actively utilizes in other regions to increase its share of world trade, which in the last few years has increased from 30.5 to 45.8 percent.

The arms market has become tight and to occupy a substantial place there it is necessary to trade in the new way, as do the French and Germans. It appears that the reform of the arms trade in Russia that apparently began with an edict from the president on the establishment of the firm "Rosvooruzheniye" was limited to this. In any case, the view of trade in the leadership of the country has not changed. We expect it to bring many billions into the treasury but we are not giving political support to our merchants abroad. Not a single delegation visited the T-80 tanks in Sweden. And there can be no talk of the organization of a temporary representation with the hiring of local military people or the establishment of joint production in Sweden.

In Sweden, the T-80 tanks justified the funds spent on them and showed what they are capable of doing, even

though they were driven by Swedish crews that quickly learned this art. Even during the preparatory phase, the meticulous Swedes set forth their questions on 500 pages, questions that were answered by close to 10 Russian research establishments.

The vehicles were driven through ravines and snow drifts at the very Arctic Circle. The tanks did not break down a single time over six months. "My observation is that the military people liked the T-80," said Aleksandr Vonsovskiy, an expert with the state company "Rosvooruzheniye" who has been given awards in our time for his commercial successes, "our tank is better than the other vehicles and is adapted to Swedish conditions. But even if it came to the commercial negotiations that are planned for 1995, we could not offer conditions analogous to those of the Germans and French."

To change the tendency in recent years toward declining Russian arms exports (from 1988 through 1992, they declined 83 percent in comparable prices and amount to about \$2 billion), it is necessary to change a lot above all in the attitude toward this business and also to resolve the problem of the compatibility of Western and Russian standards for arms, which will inhibit the advancement of complex Russian hardware to Western markets. The differences are so great that for the Swedes to acquire the T-80U tanks would mean that they would have to spend many millions more to restructure all of their logistical and technical support facilities.

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Duma's Sulakshin on Impact of Defense Cuts on Industry

94UM0434A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 May 94 p 3

[Article by Stepan Sulakshin, chairman of State Duma Military-Industrial Complex Subcommittee, under rubric "What Lawmakers Propose": "Two Quarters on Starvation Rations"]

[Text]

[Box insert]

That is the position in which defense enterprises may find themselves if the State Duma does not support its Defense Committee and Industry Committee.

[End box insert]

The state of affairs in the defense complex presently is one of the questions demanding the most careful attention of society, specialists, lawmakers, and the executive department.

We recall how for several years it was impressed on the country that the military-industrial "monster is devouring taxpayers' money, squandering labor, energy and resources" and so on. But then economic reforms and

avalanching conversion burst forth (Americans ooh and aah over five-percent reductions and conversion of military production, but for us they are measured in tens of percentage points in a year). In 1993 compared with 1991 the production volume of arms and military equipment was 21.7 percent, capital investments and RDT&E financing volumes were halved, and the export of military products decreased by more than three times.

What Did Reforms Give Us?

It is without question that the militarized economy needed reforming, but let us have a look at whether or not the federal budget deficit dropped after the engagement with the so-called monster, and in essence with ourselves. Who in the country began to live better and who was helped by debts and advances unpaid to the defense establishment, by insufficient funds of defense and of the budget of financed products, and by interest on enormous credit discount rates? Is structural perestroika under way? How are conversion programs being fulfilled? Why did the country reject the billions of dollars it could have received from export deliveries? Is it possible to underfinance the Army with defense capability and sociopolitical consequences in mind?

Finally, how did it happen that the state and government began to consider it permissible for themselves to take away products of the defense establishment, but not pay for them, or to specify a state order, but not pay an advance for its fulfillment, not index the working capital of enterprises, and so on?

Answers to these questions are provided by life itself. Here are the facts. Quite recently the number of defense enterprises and organizations exceeded 1,800 and employed 4.5 million persons (including 800,000 in the sphere of science). If we figure in the "family" factor, then this is 12-15 million persons. The defense industrial complex includes over 70 so-called monofunctional city-plants with an isolated production and life support infrastructure. One does not have to be a state figure to understand that reforming such a complex without losses (present and future) for the country's defense capability and without social shocks for people or at least with minimum losses is a task not just for a single year. But what is happening in the defense complex today has no logical explanation.

There is another side to the question. A significant portion of defense design bureaus, scientific research institutes, and plants having unique technologies, equipment and cadres already were supporting production of consumer products long ago. In 1993 the proportion of civilian products put out by defense enterprises was 78.3 percent of the overall volume. It seemed clear to everyone that conversion programs also require large investments of funds, but it very often happens that enterprises, having prepared 50, 70, or 90 percent of production capacities for output of consumer goods, do not receive the remaining money from the state to begin production. Private capital also is in no hurry to invest.

The majority of directors say with substantiation: we work and attract, but neither the domestic nor the foreign entrepreneur comes to us and hardly will come in the next few years! Help can be expected from nowhere except the state.

To sum up briefly, no positive results are seen from past reforms, with little exception. On the other hand, devastation in the defense complex and the increased potential of technological, structural and sociopolitical dangers are quite evident not only from the standpoint of defense capability, but also for the country's sociopolitical situation as a whole.

It Is Very Costly To Economize on Defense

The extremely serious situation in defense sectors of industry at the present time is the result of an avalanching reduction in military expenditures, an avalanching conversion, which reached 80 percent, and a monetary system utterly wrecked by mutual non-payments, by credit and debit indebtedness, by a delay of payments for fulfilled orders on the part of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and other clients, by late payment of conversion credits and subsidies, by the lengthiness of noncash banking transactions, and by an absence of working capital.

As of 1 January 1994 the indebtedness of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, i.e., the state, was R1.217 billion and that of customer enterprises was R770 billion. Because of late payment of the state defense order, enterprises of the defense complex were forced to pay R400 billion from budgetary funds for use of bank credit, basically to commercial banks. Overall indebtedness for payment of wages is up to R200 billion.

The price increase on material resources and energy carriers of almost 11 times compared with 1992, the significantly lesser price increase (by 6.6 times) on manufactured products, and also late charges brought the majority of enterprises to the verge of bankruptcy—artificial bankruptcy, we will note.

The number of workers at enterprises of Goskomoborprom [State Committee for the Defense Industry], 4.5 million, dropped by 500,000 over the last three years basically because of an outflow of highly skilled cadres. The drop in the number of associates of many scientific research institutes and design bureaus was from 30 to 50 percent. Experimental, test and range facilities are in a depressing state. There has been a sharp reduction in the scope of tests and experiments being carried out. At least 1.2 million persons from defense sectors may be let go in 1994 because of a reduction in budget appropriations, including around 400,000 from the scientific sector, which will lead to irreversible consequences for the defense complex.

The 1993 state defense order for certain kinds of arms and military equipment busied only 10-15 percent of

production capacities. The order fell below the minimum permissible level for many kinds of articles, and as a result this is leading to degradation and loss of high-tech industries.

Thus, appropriations for 1991-1993 were reduced by almost 8.3 times for military RDT&E and by more than 5 times for civilian RDT&E. A further reduction in appropriations both for purchasing arms and military equipment as well as for RDT&E is envisaged for 1994, which in particular will permit only paying debts for 1993, paying for products manufactured during January-March 1994, and paying for reserve property. No funds remain for the rest of defense products envisaged by the state order for 1994.

The 1993 state order has been fulfilled only by 47.9 percent and the actual financing of military RDT&E in 1993 was around 30 percent. Financing for these items is envisaged at the 20-22 percent level in 1994. As a result of such actions, entire directions for development of combatant ships, special communications systems, combat subsystems and military aviation elements will be terminated, work to create a reserve of advance scientific work essentially will cease, work to develop military science and technology as a whole will stop, and creative scientific-design collectives formed over the years will break up once and for all.

The bill "On the 1994 Federal Budget," introduced by the Russian Federation government and approved in the first reading by the State Duma, provides for allocating defense expenditures at the level at which existing Ministry of Defense indebtedness essentially equals the volume of allocated funds. Enterprises will not even be on starvation rations for essentially the two remaining quarters... In evaluating the situation professionally, members of the State Duma committees for Defense, for Industry and others cannot agree with the proposed draft budget. There also is a positive attitude of the President of Russia toward bringing corresponding expenditures for the defense complex to the minimum permissible. Amendments to the second reading of the law on the budget have been prepared and the Duma should approve them, while at the same time taking a tougher approach to forming the income part of the budget.

Not Just the Manufacturer Is Responsible for the State Order

The astounding system of interaction of state, government as a whole and Ministry of Finance which has been revealed, particularly with the defense complex, demands changes. There must be real responsibility (right up to judicial liability and dismissal of responsible government persons) for ensuring fulfillment of the state defense order and financing it. Under market conditions the system of placing the state order must become competitive for enterprises of all forms of ownership, with guarantees of necessary profitability and concessions on the part of the state. In the absence of working

capital (there also is a presidential edict on this subject), all work must receive a mandatory advance.

It is necessary to determine the rank of the government [kazenny] defense enterprise and compile a list of these enterprises. The rest should be relieved of exorbitant overhead expenses and the system of mobilization reserves should be revised. The formula in this case is simple. If the state cannot finance, release the enterprise and perhaps it "will provide for" itself. But now even the state order is sent down and no advance at all is given!

Laws "On the State Defense Order," "On Mobilization Reserves" and "On the Government Enterprise" are about to be adopted. These laws are in the Duma's portfolio of bills. The law on the state defense order is in the June plan.

The time has come to revise export policy. Not only would many defense enterprises be able to survive, but they would be able to develop successfully even with minimum export deliveries. A law on military-technical cooperation with foreign states is needed. The task is to return lost markets and currency earnings to Russia.

Of course, each problem touched upon is a subject of independent analysis. On the whole, however, it is clear that Russian reforms of the economy cannot be carried out by cutting off the branch on which we sit. After allowing a sharp slump in industrial production, in profits and in taxes into the budget (budget incomes in the first quarter were around half of those planned), it is now impossible to find money to pay for these same reforms. There are no grounds to expect outside investments as well as investments of private and banking capital in the next few years. This means it is necessary to restore the base nucleus of industry and not allow a further production slump. An adjustment of economic policy in the country is necessary. The State Duma and its specialized committees are working in this direction, but the legislative process is not rapid. Operational management decisions and adjustments to the economic course in the country are up to the government and the president. It must be hoped that the long awaited expeditious actions on problems being discussed today also finally will follow.

Kirov Plant Shut Down

94UM0318A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian No 44, 12 Mar 94 p 3

[Article by Andrey Bagrov and Andrey Sinitsyn: "The Kirov Plant Has Shut Down: The Putilov Workers Have Gone on Leave Until October"]

[Text] The threat of a halt in the production of strategic missiles and the initiation of sausage production is the most popular argument in the discussions of the directors of the military-industrial complex with authorities at all levels. However, the lack of success in numerous attempts by representatives of the Russian VPK [military-industrial complex] to convince the other sectors of the economy of the enormous benefit of high-tech defense and

of their competitiveness in world markets provides grounds for doubting the fundamental possibility of accustoming VPK enterprises to a "peacetime situation" and the budget deficit; yesterday, for the second time, the Kirov plant in St. Petersburg was shut down.

After going back to work following the first shutdown and assembling 150 tractors, the Kirov workers were unable to solve the problem of selling them: 400 machines await their fate in the yard at the enterprise. The plant management attributes the lack of buyers for the Kirov tractors to the doubling in cost of the tractors since the beginning of the year, linking this rise to a change in the tax laws (which appears extremely doubtful to KOMMERSANT-DAILY experts; this can justify no more than a 10-percent increase.) Due to the shutdown more than 5,000 workers have been forced to take leave without pay. The most likely date for the renewal of production is 1 October, although "planted" loans by the federal government to the farmers could stimulate demand somewhat, in which case the plant would begin operating as of 1 April. Other, purely military assembly subdivisions belonging to the Kirov Zavod AO [joint-stock association]: the transmission plant, the Spetsmash plant (which produces tanks and artillery) and the steam turbine unit (which produces steam turbines for submarines, among other things).

The shutdown of the Kirov plant is yet another manifestation of the already obvious economic crisis in which almost all of the enterprises in the Russian military-industrial complex find themselves. The overall drop in production at Petersburg defense plants was 28.6 percent in 1993, including 38.8 percent in the aviation industry, while indebtedness to the state by 132 military enterprises of the city reached 150 billion rubles. As a result Petersburg has assumed 33rd place in Russia with respect to the reduction in production volumes (Leningrad Oblast, 67th; Moscow, 49th).

In this situation it would be logical to expect coordinated actions from the management at the plants, local authorities and the federal government to overcome the crisis. The plant administration is working out plans for specializing as a rule oriented toward financing out of the budget, however, (papers pertaining to a coordinated plan with the American Caterpillar company were signed quite recently, but implementation of the idea of producing city buses is still in the initial stage. A recent conference showed that Anatoliy Sobchak has still not defined his position—either to restrain the directors of the VPK enterprises with a "Democles sword" or unequivocally to support their demands (which could have a negative effect on the attitude toward the mayor of Petersburg in Moscow). One way or another, all of the main hopes are pinned on a solution involving the federal budget. The end justifies the means in this case. This will put into action the traditional lobbying methods (the signing of demands for reduced taxes by the directors, exemption from duties, the provision of

subsidies, the establishment of machine-tool committees and so forth), and some now forgotten foreign economic tricks: delegations of production veterans with Soviet orders on their lapels in government offices. There is no doubt about the choice of the members of the current "government management team": to envelop the plant in the heroic performance of the first five-year plans or not.

Products From Kurgan Machine-Building Plant

94UM0434D Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian
28 May 94 p 5

[Article by Vadim Vlasov under rubric "Portrait of a Firm": "The Best Infantry Fighting Vehicles in the World Are the Product of the Kurgan Machine-Building Plant, but They Make More Than Military Equipment Here"]

[Text] The Kurgan Machine-Building Plant, known by us and abroad for the best infantry fighting vehicles in the world, began its history as an enterprise for producing heavy bridgebuilding cranes. It was being laid down back in prewar time, but the war did not permit construction to be completed. The Kurgan Machine-Building Plant put out the first product, reduction gears and trolleys for travelling cranes, only in 1950. At that time it belonged to the Ministry of Transport Machine-Building.

Beginning in 1954 the Kurgan Plant began mastering production of defense products—the ATS-712 medium artillery prime mover.

A specialized design bureau was established here for developing prime movers and other combat equipment. Construction of the forge shop, foundry and assembly shop was in full swing. At that time the plant was manned by experienced engineering-technical cadres of the Omsk Plant imeni October Revolution, the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant and other defense enterprises.

Following the first vehicle, whose series output began in 1955, a new one, the ATS-650 artillery prime mover, was designed and went into series production in the early 1960's.

When the Kurgan Machine-Building Plant was assigned in 1968 to produce an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1) that was fundamentally new from the standpoint of military equipment design and technology, over 40 percent of manufacturing equipment already was operating here in an automatic or semiautomatic regime, numerical control machine tools and automatic lines were being actively introduced, and instrument making shops were being developed intensively. Not many know that it was in Kurgan that series production of thin-walled armor hulls with use of original manufacturing processes was adjusted for the first time in the world, which permitted cutting the labor-intensiveness of work in half and achieving high quality of manufactured products.

The BMP-1 was mastered at the Kurgan Machine-Building Plant in a rather short time and 2,000 vehicles per year were produced. This number was sufficient to completely satisfy the Army's needs for infantry fighting vehicles [IFV's] and spare parts for them. The plant was awarded the Order of Labor Red Banner for mastering and organizing production of this machine.

[Box insert]

Our reference

The BMP-1 represented a fast, highly maneuverable, armored and very reliable fighting vehicle. It was armed with the 2A28 Grom 73-mm smoothbore gun, a coaxial 7.62-mm PKT [Kalashnikov tank machinegun] and Malyutka ATGM system. A spacious passenger compartment equipped with firing ports and periscopes permitted assault troops to conduct massed fire without leaving the vehicle. [End box insert]

The BMP-1 received high recognition not only in our Armed Forces, but in many foreign armies as well, above all of Warsaw Pact countries, and also in many states of the Near East and Africa, in India and in others to which they were exported.

The concept of infantry fighting vehicles as a kind of combat equipment proved very successful. The BMP-2 was a further development of the BMP-1.

[Box insert]

Our reference

The BMP-2 already had automatic weapons and anti-tank missiles of a new generation. In particular, the Malyutka ATGM system was replaced with the more advanced Konkurs antitank system. The Grom gun gave way to a new 2A42 30-mm automatic cannon stabilized in two planes and with a double-belt feed. The BMP-2 is capable of destroying even helicopters. Even today, it is one of the best IFV's. Many designers, engineers and workers of the Kurgan Machine-Building Plant were recognized with high awards and the State Prize for developing and organizing production of the BMP-2.

[End box insert]

The BMP-2 was used widely in Afghanistan and showed itself to be a very effective means in conducting combat operations in rugged areas, also including the mountains. Our soldiers called it the "swallow," and the enemy dubbed it the "devil wagon." Its appearance at positions struck panicky fear in them.

When the BMP-2 was placed in series production, not even everyone at the plant knew that the design of a fundamentally new IFV, the BMP-3, already was in full swing in a specialized design bureau under the direction of Doctor of Technical Sciences Major General A. Blagonravov in close cooperation with the Tula Specialized Instrument Making Design Bureau (General Designer Academician Shipunov).

[Box insert]

Our reference

The BMP-3 differed from its predecessors not only by the weapons complex, but also by its configuration and chassis. A more powerful (500 hp) engine was installed in the BMP-3. A hydromechanical transmission with power takeoff to water-jet propellers was used for the first time on domestic armored equipment, which permits it to cross water obstacles at a speed of 10 km/hr. On the highway the BMP-3 easily develops a speed of up to 70 km/hr and it has a range up to 600 km.

The BMP-3's arsenal includes the 2A70 100-mm gun/launcher, 2A72 30-mm automatic gun and PKT machinegun. All this is installed in a single unit in the turret. The IFV combat team has at its disposal two PKT machineguns in independent mounts in the fighting vehicle's hull front section, two Kalashnikov PK machineguns in stowage, six AK-74 assault rifles and a 26-mm signal pistol.

[End box insert]

The BMP-3 was demonstrated at a 1993 arms exhibition in Abu-Dhabi, where it received high acclaim from military and technical specialists. A number of countries expressed a desire to purchase our IFV for their own ground troops. One lot of them already has been delivered to the United Arab Emirates.

Today, when the volume of the defense order has been cut sharply, the Kurgan Machine-Building Plant, along with mastering the BMP-3, is forced to engage actively in conversion programs, particularly the output of machine-building products for the national economy and sophisticated household equipment. Plant shops now assemble not only IFV's, but also the KMZ-012 minitractor with a full set of detachable equipment, trailers, and MKSM-800 small, multipurpose, self-propelled civil construction vehicles. The civil construction vehicle, for example, can be used as a loader, for grading and moving soil, digging trenches and pits, stacking pallets, bricks and concrete elements, and performing other work.

Under conditions of an extremely difficult economic situation, all this permitted preserving a more or less stable position of the enterprise and unique specialist collectives. The proportion of civilian products in the overall production volume was 45 percent in 1993. The Kurgan Machine-Building Plant has been one of the best defense industry enterprises for more than two decades.

Speaking of the plant and its establishment, it is impossible not to note that all combat equipment developments were carried out here in close collaboration with specialists of Transmash VNII [All-Union Scientific Research Institute], the Military Academy of Armored Troops, Kubinka Scientific Test Institute of Armored Equipment, and officers of the Russian Ministry of Defense Main Armor Directorate.

Along with creating and producing a new type of equipment, much attention always has been given to solving social and everyday problems. Every fifth resident of Kurgan (350,000) is connected with plant activity in one way or another.

Several years ago the plant was reorganized as an open joint-stock company and now is developing along the path of reorganization as a major financial-industrial group. Under conditions of clear insufficiency of the state defense order and practical absence of other kinds of budget financing, the enterprise is forced to seek new mechanisms for preserving scientific and production cooperation. Essentially the only solution is to orient itself toward carefully calculated market needs and conquer the market, relying on support of nonstate financial and investment institutions.

A key point in creating such an infrastructure is the determination and development of an optimum model of relationships which would permit using the industrial and financial potential with greatest effectiveness. The Kurganmashinvest Investment Company is being established for this purpose at the initiative of the plant, of the specialized Russkoye oruzhiye Corporation, and of MENATEP Bank. The Spetsialnoye mashinostroyeniye i metallurgiya AO [Joint-Stock Company] and a number of major suppliers and traditional partners of the Kurgan Machine-Building Plant also became part of the company. Founders of this company see their main task to be a unification of efforts for developing and producing advanced, competitive models of armored equipment by attracting nonbudget funds of commercial as well as state structures; supporting an active marketing program; and providing legal and financial support to the sale of products in markets and to their servicing.

'Dvigateli-94' Engine Design Show

94UM0434C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 May 94 p 3

[Article by Aleksandr Andryushkov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, under rubric "Exhibitions": "High Technologies: Costs Today, Profits Tomorrow"]

[Text] The roar of aerospace turbines and of various industrial motors of the 2nd Moscow International Exhibition Dvigateli-94 is over. It showed (down to the pain of an exposed nerve) to its participants and thousands of visitors interested in the country's technical progress what a critical state of development we are at today.

Around a hundred scientific production associations and special design bureaus from the CIS and twenty leading engine building firms from the far abroad presented their products in the Forum pavilion of the exhibition complex on Krasnaya Presnya. "The idea of assembling specialists in creating engines for different applications in one exhibition is valuable," said Russian Federation Government First Deputy Chairman Oleg Soskovets, "in that for the first time it enables scientists and designers, production engineers and industrial workers

to become mutually enriched by know-how and foremost technologies, coordinate ways of mutually advantageous cooperation, and find new partners and new spheres of the market for their products."

Time will tell how much the opportunities presented were used. Nevertheless, it is already possible to tell about certain results. The sensation of the exhibition was the cooperation agreement of the Russian Aviadvigatel and Permskiye motory joint-stock companies and the United Technologies/Pratt & Whitney corporation (USA). Just a few years ago engine builders from Perm affirmed their authority in the industrial world by certifying the powerful, reliable PS-90A aircraft engine. Unfortunately, the state's economic troubles did not permit realizing technological improvements in it and expanding the operating horizons. But it is common knowledge that nature does not tolerate emptiness. The Perm engine builders found a way out of a critical situation: they concluded an agreement with Pratt & Whitney (USA) to create two joint companies for production of aircraft and industrial engines. A German firm, Motoren und Turbinen (MTU) also is participating in the project. The goal is to create a more advanced engine for Il-96, Tu-204 and Il-76 aircraft using the experience of Russian and foreign engineers. The first model, PS-90P, was shown at the exhibition and drew the specialists' attention. As Viktor Chuyko, president of the Union of Aircraft Engine Building and a doctor of technical sciences, said, all the best of what was being created by the mind and hands of man was combined in it.

The Dvigateli-94 exhibition gladdened Russia's aviators with one other event—the announcement of the creation of a trainer aircraft for the Air Force. For long years pilots had been learning to fly in imported L-29 and L-39 aircraft. As a pilot who has mastered these aircraft, I confirm their insufficient reliability because of the presence of one engine and dependence of the air fleet on politics. The Special Design Bureau imeni Mikoyan created a domestic MIG-AT multipurpose aircraft. And again there was an example of survival under conditions of a lack of money: cooperation with the French company SNECMA. Two LARZAC 04Y3 jet engines (photo [photo not reproduced]) will be placed on the aircraft. Of course, this alliance has its fine points, but their solution is a matter for statesmen. I believe they also should spend money to produce a domestic engine. For example, specialists from Ufa are ready to set about making it.

The exposition of enterprises of the missile-space industry and the motor vehicle, tractor, and ship engine makers was interesting. The technical exhibition was able for the first time to satisfy the interest of specialists in different areas. In addition, one of the most important problems of mankind was being solved at the exhibition: how to preserve living nature under conditions of intensive development of high technologies and in the long run not permit ourselves to perish under the "umbrella" formed by exhaust gases.

Nuclear Ship Designer Khlopin Interviewed

94UM0434B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 May 94 p 4

[Interview with Nikolay Sidorovich Khlopin, professor, academician, Hero of Socialist Labor, Lenin and State Prize laureate, director of department, Kurchatov Institute, by Mikhail Rebrov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, date, place and occasion unknown, under rubric "Pertinent Interview": "Nuclear Powered Ships Are Sending an SOS, but the Nuclear Powered Fleet Is To Be"; photograph of Khlopin included]

[Text]

[Box insert]

From KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's dossier

Nikolay Sidorovich Khlopin. Born in 1923. Went through the Great Patriotic War, signed his name on the Reichstag, was seriously wounded. Devoted his labor activity to nuclear powered ships. He has been in the Kurchatov Institute since 1949, beginning as a laboratory assistant working on a degree thesis, and now is a department director. He is a professor, academician, Hero of Socialist Labor and Lenin and State Prize laureate. As his colleagues say, "From the first tholepin to today on nuclear powered ships—surface and submarine, civilian and military." As he himself says, "This is interesting work and a long and difficult search, the meaning of which lies in arriving at reliable simplicity after having mastered the incredibly complex."

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[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Nikolay Sidorovich, the first nuclear powered submarine went on alert status three and a half decades ago, and a year later the first nuclear powered icebreaker was placed in operation. Now the attitude toward these events is contradictory and at times even negative...

[Khlopin] Our time generally is full of contradictions. All and everything is criticized without sufficient argumentation. It would be naive to assert that atomic energy does not have its dark sides, but how can one perform the missions facing the Navy without it? Only nuclear powered submarines can keep from coming to the surface and can perform their assigned missions during an entire independent deployment. And how can we turn the Northern Sea Route into a permanently operating artery without nuclear powered ships?

The logic of developing marine nuclear power engineering depends to a considerable extent on the country's financial capacities, which must be used wisely.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Alas, to this day we have not learned to count money; more precisely, to count the options in order to see the real prospects. But returning to submarines. What has been done during these years?

[Khlopin] A great deal, although we succeeded in creating a fully unusual construction already for the first submarine—I have in mind the small, powerful plant. This was done under the direction of Academician A. P. Aleksandrov. Many solutions found here proved very successful and were used in subsequent design projects...

Now, thanks to powerful, compact plants our submarines as a rule have higher speeds than foreign ones, while being inferior to the latter in concealment. Already in 1970 we had nuclear powered submarines with a submerged speed of over 40 knots. A further reduction in noise of combatant ships is expected, which will ensure concealment of their operations. Integrated acoustic designing, where design solutions are aimed at reducing acoustic emissions to the minimum, will become a mandatory component in creating the new submarines. In other words, the submarine should become a unique acoustic "black hole" in the sea which will not succeed in being detected by any method.

I am setting forth only my own opinion. Quiet submarines have been developed with powerful fourth-generation plants. Concepts for fifth-generation plants are being developed...

This is no simple task. Replacing the propeller with a water screw and making the transition to full electric propulsion similar to that used in diesel submarines open up prospects. One other kind of electric propulsion is worth mentioning—without screw or water-jet. A propelling pressure is created for the ship by passing a current through sea water in strong magnetic fields. Superconducting cables and superhigh magnetic fields are needed for such a motor...

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Nikolay Sidorovich, what main directions does science see here today?

[Khlopin] There are several such directions. Safety of marine power engineering is coming to the foreground. Increasing the reliability of plants and the self-protection of their reactors by creating negative feedbacks in the core, excluding losses of the heat-transfer agent, additional barriers preventing a spread of radioactivity... These are only some of the measures aimed at precluding both accidents themselves as well as their consequences.

Safety at sea has its specifics, for a reactor on a ship is not only a source of danger, but also a means of saving the ship in extreme circumstances.

Then there is the search for new areas of applying atomic energy and its improvement. There are numerous interesting prospects here. To some they may seem unrealistic, but the fact is, even the nuclear powered submarine was considered a fantastic concept in the late 1940's.

Special mention should be made of control. Anatoliy Petrovich Aleksandrov demanded that it be just as simple as in the automobile—step on the gas or take your foot off... And such a reactor was created. Reactor power increases when you increase the feed water flow rate and

power drops when you decrease the rate, and this without any shift in the absorbers controlling reactivity.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] You mentioned technical measures, but does the so-called human factor also exist?..

[Khlopkin] It does, and its importance is very great. And I am thinking not just of operator errors at the console in a stress situation. The question posed is broader. The entire safety management system is being examined in order to preclude the possibility of making incorrect decisions back in the design stage and not allow poor quality in manufacturing equipment or unsatisfactory operation. This is a very complex problem, but it is solvable.

Also among questions which must be solved by scientists are ecological ones, not just in the course of operation, but also when removing reactors from operation... Very strict monitoring is important here. We have developed supremely sensitive gear for researching radioactivity of sea water. The sunken submarine Komsomolets was inspected with its help. The result was that the leak was less than 0.1 curie per year. At a distance of a few meters from the submarine hull, the level is so low that it is not detected.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Nuclear powered ships are sending an SOS, equipment is aging, appropriations are being reduced, and yards are standing idle. But on all corners one hears one and the same: conversion, conversion... But the fact is, words and actions do not always coincide. How are things with you?

[Khlopkin] There is much that is contradictory here, and not in the idea itself, which is indisputable. Conversion is not only the result of disarmament, but also its stimulus. There are a multitude of questions here: scale, time periods, state support, consistency and thought-out nature of programs... Conversion... We still did not know that word, but we began engaging in it around 40 years ago. Nine nuclear powered civilian vessels were built and the tenth had been launched. By the way, speaking of reasonable approaches, it is advisable to replace today's diesel powered icebreakers, which have exhausted their service life, with nuclear powered ones. This will be cheaper for Russia. Now yards are free for a number of reasons. It would appear they should be loaded down with orders, but we give these orders for icebreakers to foreign firms. I can illustrate the parity of prices with the following example. Taymyr with a single reactor unit was built together with Finland and cost \$140 million. Sibir, more powerful with a double reactor unit, was built here and cost 120 million. But that was rubles!

Here is another example. Floating atomic electric power stations for supplying heat and electricity to northern coastal cities and mineral enterprises. The degree of necessary construction for a building site in this case is enormously less and the area of condemned lands is less. Such atomic electric power stations can be shifted to any spot...

We have created small, unique power plants without analogues in the world. They have no moving parts, current is produced without a turbine—by a thermoelectric generator operating from an atomic reactor. Self-adjusting thermoelectric power stations with a minimum of servicing are intended for supplying small settlements and military posts with electrical energy. Thermal output can be taken to five megawatts, electrical output to 150 kilowatts, and the service life is up to 25 years.

Here is another example. The Rosshelf Joint-Stock Company has been established. It proposes to use the potential of defense sectors to carry on oil and natural gas production on the shelf. The initial settling-in of enterprises in areas with an ice situation, where enormous reserves of hydrocarbons already now have been discovered, can be done with the help of nuclear powered icebreakers. They will give the enterprise electrical energy and will protect it from ice. Submarines can survey deposits, map the bottom, and select routes for laying pipelines.

Atomic plants successfully solve the problem of distilling water, they are very promising for use in outer space, and they are being purchased willingly abroad. In short, the peaceful atom is not a phrase, but action.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Today the question is heard more and more often: With disarmament going on, is it necessary to upgrade combatant ships and their power plants? The country is growing poor...

[Khlopkin] Yes, a considerable reduction is going on in the Navy now. Orders for new nuclear powered ships are being cut back sharply. Some of them, which were just not completed, are being scrapped. And this is not only in Russia, but in other countries as well. But again, let us proceed from the realities: war, as the last means of solving conflict situations, is not excluded from consideration by a single state. Russia is a maritime power, and this year its Navy celebrates its tricentennial. The Navy was its glory, it guaranteed its safety, and that is how it should remain even now. It is another matter that the might of a maritime power is determined not so much by the number of ships as by their fighting qualities. The motto of Admiral Makarov, "Remember the war," is pertinent even now.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] And the final question, Nikolay Sidorovich. You went down the front roads. What was the most memorable in those years?

[Khlopkin] The war itself, with its horrors, its losses, its distorted fates, but also the joy of victory... The war mercilessly shoved customary concepts together, transferring people's lives into another dimension often inconceivable in its tragedy. The last terrible battle was on 1 May 1945, when our division was holding back an avalanche of German divisions heading for Berlin. We held out... Later came the meeting with the Americans, but already beyond the Elbe... I took off my greatcoat and captain's shoulderboards in 1945 and since then have been a civilian and have been very busy with

civilian matters. But Russia's military interests are dear to me, and so I say: The nuclear powered fleet is to be! There is for now simply no alternative to nuclear power engineering for the oceangoing submarine fleet.

SECURITY SERVICES

Nikolayev Reviews Performance of Border Troops in 1994

94UM0431A Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian
No 20, 25-31 May 94 p 2

[Interview with Col-Gen Andrey Nikolayev, commander in chief of the Russian Federation's Border Troops, by correspondent Eduard Lunev: "The New Border Situation"]

[Text] [Lunev] Andrey Ivanovich, this year Russia's Border Troops are commemorating their official holiday on new lines. The length of the border would appear to have been shortened, but, judging from the fact that you are spending most of your time out of the office, the number of concerns has increased in inverse proportion. What is the explanation for this?

[Nikolayev] The border of the former Union exceeded 62,000 km, while Russia's border is 60,932 km. Not a large difference, as you can see. The numerical strength of Russia's Border Troops is 30,000 men below the Union level. As much as 30 percent of the Border Troops' assets, along with engineering and technical equipment, remained outside of Russia. This means that the border has been weakened by the same percentage. Around 1,500 border violators have been apprehended just since the beginning of this year. Around 400 weapons and a large quantity of ammunition have been detected and confiscated. And so, as you can see, the border fully reflects those disturbing processes occurring inside the country. This is why I perform my job more on the border than in the office. This is confirmed by the fact that I have gone on special assignment 14 times in 2 months.

[Lunev] You were recently made a member of the Security Council, which means that the border service today is regarded not just as armed protection and defense of Russia's borders but also as a political field contributing to the maintenance of diplomatic mutual understanding of contiguous states. Is that so?

[Nikolayev] One has to be a diplomat, to seek and find mutually acceptable decisions on issues involving contiguous states. Reality is forcing us to do that:

the border with countries which are not members of the Commonwealth—the Baltic states (which have a border with the Russian Federation stretching 1,025 km, and the crossing of the border is not defined in the international legal respect);

the border with Norway, Finland, Poland, the PRC, Mongolia, Korea, Japan and the USA, which coincides with the border of the former USSR (with a length of

9,758.2 km; the maritime border with Japan and the United States is not defined by legal treaty);

the border with the Commonwealth nations—Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan—which extends more than 12,000 km (these border sections are not covered in the military respect and are not defined by legal treaty).

[Lunev] Andrey Ivanovich, your name appeared in the newspapers when you were still a young lieutenant. Today you are a colonel-general. An entire lifetime separates these milestones. If you can, tell us about that briefly.

[Nikolayev] I was born in Moscow four years following the Victory. I had to become a military man if only because that was the main occupation for men like us. My father was a colonel-general. He brought us up in such way that I was never the general's son, but I was the son of a general. The reader may not believe that this fact brought me many unpleasant moments during my studies at the school. My career as an officer then began. I commanded a company, a battalion and a regiment. I graduated from the Academy imeni Frunze and the General Staff Academy. In order for people not to think that I achieved this through patronage I had to strive for gold medals, even though I am indifferent when it comes to any kind of award. I shall be happy if I can be of benefit to Russia in this post and if at least one of my sons continues the family tradition.

[Lunev] How do you see the future of the Russian border? Will it be an "iron curtain" or something like the American-Mexican border?

[Nikolayev] We shall form on the basis of treaties groups of Russian border troops in states of the "near abroad" for the joint protection of the CIS' external borders. Such groups have already been set up in Armenia, Georgia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzia.

On other sectors of the border there will be a gradual transition from continuous (solid) engineering and technical equipment of protection based on barbed-wire obstacles to a system of covering individual sectors using the latest achievements of science and technology. With time, I am certain, there will be no "iron curtain."

General Explains New Border Protection Concept

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in Russian 11 Jun 94 pp 2-3

[Article by Lieutenant General Aleksandr Tymko, chief of the Main Staff of the Russian Border Troops: "When Will There Be an End to the Lack of Borders. Lieutenant General Aleksandr Tymko, Chief of the Border Troops Main Staff, Presents the New Concept for the Protection of the State Border"]

[Text] Colonel General Andrey Nikolayev, commander in chief of the Russian Federation [RF] Border Troops,

put the Concept for the Border Troops' Protection of the State Border, the RF Exclusive Economic Zone, and the CIS States' External Borders into effect 25 January this year after submitting it to the RF Government. This document is nothing new for the troops. May 1991 saw the adoption of the first concept defining reform of protection of the border and the USSR's economic zone. However it was not put into practice. The processes of disintegration made it necessary to considerably rework many of its provisions. In December 1992 a new version appeared—with a purely Russian state "slant." But the fluidity of the geopolitical situation on the territory of the former USSR had an adverse effect on the previously established system of border protection and the domestic political situation in Russia changed so rapidly throughout 1993 that the second concept too suffered the fate of its predecessor—it was no longer current. It became necessary to formulate a new concept to take into consideration current realities. Which are as follows.

With the formation of the RF there have been radical changes in the status, position, and conditions for the protection of the State Border. Around 14,000 km of the over 60,000-km Russian border (over 80 percent of the land border) is in new positions that had not been prepared for service or formalized in international law. The RF Border Troops have lost around 40 percent of their ground-, sea-, and air-based forces and facilities along with prepared sites for their deployment and for the basing of naval and air-based forces, engineering and technical facilities, a well-oiled border infrastructure, training facilities, command and communications posts, barracks and housing, and virtually all the international communications posts in the west and south of the country. The Border Troops' combat capabilities have more than halved.

Russia currently has one-half or one-third the amount of ships and launches as the United States and Japan per unit area of its territorial waters and exclusive economic zone. Limited use of ships owing to fuel shortages increases this gap still further. And the troops' lack of icebreakers virtually reduces to zero protection of the State Border and Russia's exclusive economic zone in the Arctic. An extremely grave situation has developed as regards troop manning, particularly in terms of the draft contingent.

The troops lack a total of over 7,000 officers alone and around 20,000 drafted servicemen. Negative trends have also manifested themselves in the social sphere. To date over 10,000 officers and warrant officers in the Border Troops are without apartments, and the question of housing for the families of servicemen from the combined formations and units withdrawn from the Baltic states and Azerbaijan, and also from the newly-created checkpoints, is an acute one. In these conditions there was an objective need for the phased creation of the Russian Border Troops rather than for their reorganization—a need reflected in the new concept.

Revival could be said to be the main idea behind the new concept for the protection of Russia's borders. Revival of the Border Troops, revival of reliable protection of the Russian State Border and the external borders of the CIS states, and also revival of the actual prestige of border service. It was on this that President Yeltsin focused his attention in his speech 27 May this year during a meeting with the leadership of the Federal Border Service of the Russian Border Troops Main Command.

The fundamental difference between the new concept and the previous ones is the fact that it allows for a change in the conditions of border protection to an extent consonant with the transitional period.

Presumably in the event of a change of emphasis in Russia's domestic and foreign policy certain provisions of the latest concept will not be put into effect. However it will by and large remain effective.

The concept stipulates that its main objective is to revive the Russian Border Troops and ensure the protection on the State Border of the vital interests of the individual, society, and the Russian state within the Commonwealth countries' overall collective security system.

The concept is based on the principles of the peaceful resolution of border issues and the development of cooperation in guarding the borders of the Commonwealth states and the suitability of combat personnel and the numerical strength of the Border Troops with the tasks to be performed, current legislation, and Russia's international commitments and economic potential.

Provision is also made for ensuring the personal safety of personnel and Border Troop formations, the centralization of their leadership, and the principle of one-man command on a legal basis.

The concept lays down the main areas of the RF Border Troops' activity with consideration for the special features of the regions and the state's economic potential, along with their role and position in guarding the Commonwealth's external borders.

In two or three years it is planned to create in all regions a Border Troop grouping disposed in depth, plus operational reserves, and also to form a system of material and technical support.

Moreover a considerable increase in the troops' potential as regards the protection of the exclusive economic zone is envisaged.

Combating intelligence and subversive activity by foreign intelligence services and organizations and also illegal actions by criminal communities on the State Border, and raising the quality of border surveillance and standards at border checkpoints to international norms and standards are priority areas in the Border Troops' activity of guarding the State Border. The

"human factor"—looking after troops and providing servicemen with social protection—has been singled out as a priority area of activity.

The creation of the CIS and the Economic Union, and the existence of "transparent" borders between the republics of the former USSR have also created new political realities, primarily a commitment by all Commonwealth states to ensuring a stable situation on the external borders. However, by no means all the newly formed states have an opportunity or the means to reliably protect their borders, which compels them to seek ways of pooling efforts to ensure their own security on their external borders.

At present, in line with requests from the leadership of Armenia, Georgia, Kirghizia [Kyrgyzstan], and Tajikistan, RF Border Troops are stationed on the territory of these states guarding their state borders with Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and China, which are at the same time Commonwealth external borders. What is more, some Russian Border Troop officers and warrant officers are protecting Turkmenistan's external state borders with Afghanistan and Iran.

Questions of pooling or coordinating efforts in the protection of external borders on the territory of the former USSR are being resolved in one way or another with Belorussia [Belarus], Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan with consideration for the special features of each state's approach to this matter.

The role of the Russian Border Troops in guarding the Commonwealth's external borders is vividly manifested in Tajikistan. The Russian Border Troops in collaboration with troop contingents from other Commonwealth states are performing the tasks of stopping armed groups, weapons, munitions, and drugs penetrating the Tajik-Afghan border. This is having a positive effect on the stabilization of the situation both in Tajikistan itself and in other adjacent states.

Existing Border Troop groupings will guard the border with consideration for special regional features in areas that coincide with the former USSR border, while this task will be performed by newly-formed Russian Border Troop groupings on borders with the Baltic States (as with distant foreign countries).

In the Caucasus it is planned to guard the border in two positions: First—on the CIS external borders (Georgia, Armenia, and possibly Azerbaijan); the second border protection line follows the Russian State Border, in view of the situation on the border and in adjacent regions.

Our border with Belorussia will be guarded on the basis of a treaty, focusing more on guarding the external CIS border in this region. Our border guards will quite possibly guard this section of the CIS border jointly with Belorussia's border troops.

The Russian-Ukrainian border will be guarded in line with the situation prevailing there, eventually on a joint basis with Ukrainian Border Troops.

Our border guards also guard the external borders of Tajikistan and Kirghizia on the basis of a treaty.

By and large emphasis is placed on a sensible combination of possibilities for safeguarding the state's security on its own border and the external borders of the Commonwealth. Thus memorandums have been signed on joint protection of the Commonwealth states' external borders in the Central Asian and Western regions. The question of signing a similar memorandum with the states of the Transcaucasus is on the agenda.

The exclusive economic zone is guarded by formations of naval forces and aviation and coastal forces and facilities of the Border Troops interacting with the forces and facilities of RF ministries and departments. At the same time the main efforts are concentrated on inhibiting and suppressing illegal activity by Russian and foreign ships. The formulation and introduction of a state system to monitor and track the situation and identify ships by water area and by region is being organized.

Over the next year or two we will seek the optimum scenarios for the protection of the State Border at sea by means of the comprehensive use of sea- and air-based forces and facilities in conjunction with land-based (coastal) components. Studies and experiments will be conducted into the creation of special sea-based formations of the Border Troops on a tactical and operational level.

In the Arctic region protection of the border is being reorganized with consideration for the opening of the Arctic ship route to foreign ships in transit through Russian ports; operational activity is being improved and the basis of a unified system for monitoring the surface situation in territorial waters and ports is being outlined, for which a structurally complete Border Troop grouping is being created in the Arctic.

Effective technologies are being introduced at RF State Border checkpoints, and the provision of equipment for all components of border control is being improved in order to detect and avert illegal border crossing by individuals and transport systems.

At present a considerable proportion of the RF Border Troop grouping operates in areas of local wars and armed conflicts. The concept stipulates for the first time that under these conditions the State Border is guarded in collaboration with the forces and facilities of the RF and CIS states' Armed Forces and other troops, using forms and methods characteristic of border service and systematic combat operations by the troops with consideration for the special features of the prevailing situation. In some areas the Border Troops are switching to the defense and protection of Russia's State Border

jointly with the Armed Forces. Steps are being taken to ensure the personal safety of the Border Troops.

Practice shows that any scientific or practical idea and the most necessary and carefully conceived program will remain just a good intention if it is not backed up by material-technical and financial resources. The implementation of the concept necessitates the adoption of certain urgent measures at federal level to ensure the security of the RF on its borders and the external borders of the Commonwealth states.

These measures could include the provision of amenities for troops on the new borders, the creation of the requisite infrastructure to ensure that troops are maintained on permanent combat readiness and are capable of performing their tasks of reliably guarding the border under varying conditions. The concept itself also includes a mechanism for the implementation of its main provisions. It envisages in particular the submission to RF legislative bodies of draft laws on the protection of the State Border, the exclusive economic zone, and areas of Border Troop activity; the publication of departmental statutory instruments by the commander in chief of the Border Troops; and the formulation and adoption of annual plans for organizational and other development of the Border Troops.

Thus the establishment and formalization in international law of the RF State Border, the formation and provision of amenities for the troops on the new borders, their strengthening and development, manning, the intensification of their social protection, and also comprehensive material and technical support are the priority tasks in 1994.

This year provision is being made for the formation of additional troop and operational groups, operational-troop departments, border detachments, individual border subunits [komendatury], a border control detachment and individual checkpoints, naval units and subunits, individual air squadrons, tactical reserves, and other units. By the end of the year the RF Border Troop grouping may have increased by 20,000-30,000 men.

A considerable part of the concept is devoted to developing a system of legal and social protection for servicemen and other citizens involved in the protection of the State Border. Draft legislative acts designed to provide legal protection, establish guarantees and compensation, boost the standard of living of the servicemen, primarily those serving in subunits directly guarding the border and the exclusive economic zone, and develop a system of benefits with consideration for physical-geographical and other regional features have been outlined and formulated. Agreements are being drafted with

Commonwealth states on matters pertaining to the legal status, material and financial support, benefits and compensation, housing, medical, pension, everyday-service and trade, and other kinds of support for RF Border Troop servicemen involved in guarding the State Border on their territories.

The wide-ranging tasks envisaged by the concept can only be resolved if the troops are manned by professionally trained cadres.

The phased transition to a mixed system of manning, including citizens from the CIS states coming to serve in the Russian Border Troops on contract, is a priority in manning and training of cadres and personnel for the Russian Border Troops. This is only possible once amendments have been made to current legislation.

It is also necessary to formulate and introduce systems for the professional recruitment and assessment of the quality of cadres' activity, their transfer and promotion, and the provision of incentives for officer cadres' military-professional activity; to develop regional centers for the training of warrant officers (ensigns); and to improve the system of training for border guard officers. The formation of a Border Troops Military Academy will undoubtedly help resolve the problem of providing the troops with trained officer cadres.

The question of creating a Border Troop Polytechnical Institute is being studied.

Questions pertaining to the scientific study of problems of the theory and practice of guarding the State Border hold a special place in the concept.

In its current state scientific support cannot be improved by cosmetic means. It must first be shaped into an integral system whereby any scientific idea that is of benefit to the troops finds someone to implement it and a customer. We have formed a complete system of scientific support which makes it possible to provide a comprehensive solution to all the troops' important problems based on in-depth scientific studies. The Center for Operational-Border Studies and the Border Troops Research Technical Center is intended to be an important component of the system of scientific support for the troops' activity that is being developed.

In view of the fact that it is hard to predict the duration of the transitional period, it has been decided to implement the concept by formulating and adopting annual plans for the organizational and other development of the Border Troops.

I would like to hope that the new document will be a real basis for our work of strengthening Russian statehood and defending the vital national interests of the RF and the Commonwealth states.

Russian Counterintelligence Officer Interviewed

94UM0429A Volgograd VOLGOGRADSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 12 May 94 p 2

[Interview with Colonel of State Security Viktor Nikolayevich Bobrov, chief, Department of Military Counterintelligence, by I. Barykin; place and date of interview not given: "It's Painful To See How They're Selling the Motherland"]

[Text] Could I ever have imagined five or so years ago that I would be able to interview the counterintelligence chief so easily? All the more so because he has no patience with the mass media which, in his opinion, are responsible in many ways for some of the things that are happening in the country now? But V. N. Bobrov, colonel of state security, chief of the Department of Military Counterintelligence of the RF Federal Counterintelligence Service for the 8th Guards Army Corps, does have respect for our firm—VOLGOGRADSKAYA PRAVDA. Because in his words it continues to express the views of many, including the unfortunate, layers of, and it tries to speak the truth, no matter how bitter it may be.

At the appointed hour I drove up to the famous "house with antennas" on Chekisty Square. Vladimir Nikolayevich received me in his modestly furnished office. The furnishings were limited to a huge map of Europe covering an entire wall showing the locations of the intelligence centers of the NATO bloc, portraits of F. E. Dzerzhinskiy and Yu. V. Andropov (despite the changes, the occupant of this office remains faithful once and forever to assimilated principles), and a pile of telephones on a little table, ready for instantaneous communication with the most remote points in the country and with the chief of the RF Federal Counterintelligence Service.

No matter how I tried to steer it in the needed channel, our conversation, which went on for over an hour, wouldn't stay within its banks. Viktor Nikolayevich guided the interview away from slippery issues with a smile. Anyway, I soon became used to these "secrets of the Madrid court," and accepted the rules of the game.

My first question touched upon a topic that was most painful to my partner in conversation:

[Barykin] Would I be right in saying that these are the worst times for counterintelligence, now that the economy has been devastated and the army is disintegrating, now that there are huge holes in the borders, and now that people are trying to toss 70 years of history into the trash can?

[Bobrov] "That's putting it mildly," my partner in conversation bitterly asserted. "Many military secrets have been sold for 30 pieces of silver (seven and a half dollars, if we convert this at today's rate). footholds have been lost in Europe, Africa, Latin America and the Near East, and our troops are scurrying out of Eastern Europe and the Baltics. Giving away state secrets has become so commonplace. Things can't get any worse," my partner in conversation sighed. "But no matter how they've tried to bring my department down," he continued, "it has managed to keep

its secrets. There were enough clear minds around here that we managed to encrypt the archives and information on our agents long before the August coup. For example the BND (West German intelligence) is still trying to figure out the GDR's undercover operation. I can tell you that their efforts are useless."

[Barykin] What are the strategy and tactics of counterintelligence today?

[Bobrov] "Having managed to preserve its operation, our department is doing what it is supposed to be doing—protecting state and military secrets, providing counterintelligence support to the Armed Forces, determining their combat capability, and fighting terrorists and saboteurs, organized crime and the drug trade (unfortunately it has made its way into the army as well)."

[Barykin] To the extent possible, can you offer any details about the activity of your department?

[Bobrov] "Now that servicemen are being withdrawn hastily from the Western and Northwestern groups of forces, foreign intelligence is openly recruiting our soldiers and officers. We are trying to stop this work. Recall the notorious 'Gorchakov case.' The ex-civil aviation pilot was recruited by the BND, he stayed behind in the FRG, and there he organized a local ring, trapping in his nets those whose eyes caught fire from the sight of dollars and Deutsche marks. Our fellow-countryman from Volgograd managed to fall in with them. Gorchakov tasked him to collect secret information from a certain unit in the Western Group of Forces. The sorry spy was caught red-handed and was shuttled over to Moscow, where he faced a military court. My associates and I had the occasion to question him in Lefortovo.

"Unfortunately such recruitment of our soldiers and officers by Western special services is continuing, and it is proceeding more intensively. Not only our potential enemies—the special services of the USA, France and Germany—but even our former friends are showing keen interest in the new huge force grouping building up in the Northern Caucasus. Intelligence services of Ukraine, Moldova and the Baltic and Transcaucasian states are pricking up their ears, even though we had reached agreement with them not to engage in such activity. They are all interested in learning the scale of deployment of the new force grouping, its mobilization plans, its armament, combat readiness, and the morale of our soldiers. Our 'friends' are also interested in the latest developments of our defense research institutes and plants. This is why military delegations from the NATO countries have started visiting Volgograd so much more frequently. All military attaches that visit us are in fact career scouts, and they have but one purpose—gathering secret information, and filling in the details that their associates in espionage failed to root out.

"They come here like it's their home, behave impertinently, and capitalize on the possibilities offered by the conventional arms limitation treaty for their own ends. We naturally keep our eyes on all of them. Our operational possibilities allow us to do so. When it becomes

necessary, we toss them some 'bait,' lead them on a false trail, and establish who their contacts are.

"As long as you've asked for the details," V. N. Bobrov said, "our department's sphere of activity includes the lower reaches of the Volga, and naturally, Kapustin Yar, which is also within the zone of interest of 'friendly' special services. That's how far things have gone! A military attache is, after all, a military scout, he can fly into our city incognito, without any kind of permission, settle down with some family, and go about getting answers to questions he's interested in.

"We also monitor the activities of foreign specialists employed in construction of military posts. There are no restrictions, you see, on their movements about the territory of another state. That's how it came about that we detained Turks, even in Kapustin Yar, under the guise of vocational-technical school students, with forged diplomas and passports. What were they doing in Kapustin Yar?

"Korean specialists carry dollars from English banks in their suitcases in circumvention of tax laws."

[Barykin] "One of the tasks assigned to military counterintelligence, as you yourself have said, is to fight organized crime in the army. Has all of this really assumed such a scale?" was my next question to Bobrov.

[Bobrov] "Unfortunately, all of the negative processes that have affected the society are affecting those who work behind the high fences of the military. The army is disintegrating, discipline and the morale of servicemen are falling, and as a result, incidents occur—'dedovshchina' going as far as murder, shady bank transactions, and major misappropriations of weapons and explosives from military storage dumps.

"Recently we fended off an attack on a certain military depot near Kotluban by persons of Dagestani nationality. They planned to kill the sentries and take large lots of weapons out of the oblast. To the honor of our division, in the 4 year's that I've been in Volgograd only one assault rifle has gone missing. We squelched an attempt to obtain several million rubles from a bank on the basis of a forged letter of advice."

[Barykin] As I understand from this conversation, military counterintelligence has its "eyes and ears" everywhere. By that I mean undercover agents.

[Bobrov] "As they say in cases such as this, we don't get paid to do nothing: Where necessary, we use special equipment and undercover assistance. These people are patriots who offer to help for something other than the sake of money. We simply can't offer them any incentives at market prices. All intelligence services of the world have their informants, and for some reason it's only in our country that the impression certain strata of the population sometimes hold of them is not as it should be. These people are a priceless treasure to us, and they help us a very great deal. Who do you think wrote the Old Testament? A scout! This was his first message to the Divine Center. Covert operatives—angels—helped him to

gather the data. And the first counterespionage agent did everything he could to keep the message from the Center's scout from falling into the wrong hands."

During our interview the telephone rang incessantly, and Viktor Nikolayevich's short answers—"I'm busy"—once again emphasized that this department has respect for our newspaper and its representatives. Nonetheless, in order not to abuse the counterintelligence agent's time, I cut short my list of questions.

[Barykin] "Viktor Nikolayevich," I urged my partner in conversation to be open, "tell me honestly, are you sorry that you went into counterintelligence?"

[Bobrov] "So far, no," the occupant of the office smiled. "Still, all of these years—and I've worked in this department for almost a quarter of a century—I've been unable to calmly accept those who are selling the country and its secrets. It's painful to see, believe me, and painful to hear that the KGB, and now the FSK, is looked at as some kind of monster. It angers me to hear that. The country was strong in its secrets, which our people have watched over at the cost of their lives. They were the first to fall under the knife of the purges of 1932, and NKVD divisions defended Stalingrad down to the last warrior. And it's not the fault of the rank and file of the KGB that it was headed by scum like Beria. There are many people like that in the MVD, and if you're looking for a true monster, consider what the MVD has transformed into.

"I started my military career in the missile forces," the counterspy continued his narration when I asked him for a sketch of his biography. "I graduated from the appropriate schools. No, not the kind you're thinking of—missile schools. The KGB school and academy came some time later. Once I was summoned by KGB chief Kryuchkov: You're going to Afghanistan for a week, he told me. But as it turned out, I stayed half a year there. I worked on a special assignment in this country from the first day of commitment of our troops. After Afghanistan I worked wherever they sent me. In 1990 I moved with my family to Volgograd."

Three years ago Viktor Nikolayevich became a grandfather. His daughter works in the tax inspectorate, his son-in-law is a military pilot, and his wife is a well known radio journalist.

"No matter how difficult it may be for the motherland today, I believe that some sort of stability will nonetheless set in," the counterintelligence chief concluded the interview. "And I'll be happy if our department could make the contribution within its means to this effort. And one other thing. Please extend my deep regards to all war veterans in this holiday period. For saving the world from the abhorrent yoke of fascism. And this rain that is now falling outside this window is the tears of soldiers' widows that had not be fully shed during the war."

What V. N. Bobrov said in parting is still fresh in my memory: "The English have a saying: My country, right or wrong. That is, our problems are for us to solve, and we don't need any 'friends'."

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